Sanders v. State Of Fla.
| Decision Date | 22 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. SC09-1729.,SC09-1729. |
| Citation | 35 So.3d 864 |
| Parties | Marcus F. SANDERS, Petitioner,v.STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
35 So.3d 864
Marcus F. SANDERS, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC09-1729.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 22, 2010.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Robert J. Krauss Bureau Chief, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.
CANADY, J.
In this case we consider whether sentence points were properly scored on the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) scoresheet used for sentences imposed upon the revocation of probation. We have for review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Sanders v. State, 16 So.3d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), in which the Second District certified a question to this Court to be of great public importance. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We have revised the question as follows:
WHEN A DEFENDANT IS TO BE SENTENCED UPON REVOCATION OF PROBATION AND PRIOR TO THAT REVOCATION THE TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER ONE OR MORE OF THE ORIGINALLY SENTENCED OFFENSES HAS EXPIRED, MAY THE OFFENSES OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT NO LONGER HAS JURISDICTION BE SCORED AS ADDITIONAL OFFENSES?
For the reasons that follow, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative. Offenses over which the trial court no longer has jurisdiction cannot be scored as additional offenses during a sentencing proceeding following a violation of probation because they do not fit the definition of “additional offense” set out in section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (1999). Accordingly, we quash the decision under review and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In January of 2003, Marcus Sanders pleaded no contest to five offenses in three separate cases. The underlying criminal conduct occurred between February and August of 2000. Sanders was sentenced to concurrent three-year prison terms on all of the offenses, to be followed by concurrent terms of probation. He received two-year terms of probation for criminal mischief, attempted burglary, and aggravated assault. Those convictions were all third-degree felonies. Sanders received three-year terms of probation for the second-degree felony offenses of robbery and aggravated battery. Sanders, 16 So.3d at 233.
After Sanders completed the two-year probationary terms but before he had completed his remaining probation on the second-degree felonies, the State alleged that Sanders violated the conditions of his supervision by moving without the consent of his probation officer and by failing to complete a residential drug treatment program. Sanders admitted violating the conditions of his probation. He was not charged with any new substantive offense.
In December of 2006, the trial court revoked Sanders' probation for all five offenses. The trial court sentenced Sanders to concurrent 108-month prison terms on all five counts, which was a slight downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence of 111.6 months on the CPC scoresheet used by the trial court. Id.
Sanders appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal. He raised two issues. First, Sanders argued that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and sentencing him for the third-degree felony offenses because Sanders had completed
Second, Sanders contended that his sentences for the second-degree felonies should be reversed because of an error in preparing the scoresheet used at the sentencing following the revocation of probation. He asserted that because he could not be sentenced on the third-degree felonies, those crimes should not have been scored as additional offenses on a recalculated scoresheet. Sanders originally raised this issue before the trial court in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), which was constructively denied. Sanders, 16 So.3d at 234 n. 1.
The Second District affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. The Second District explained that an additional offense is “any offense other than the primary offense for which an offender is convicted and which is pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense.” Id. at 234 (quoting § 921.0021(1), Fla. Stat. (1999)). The Second District acknowledged that while the third-degree felonies were correctly listed as additional offenses when Sanders was originally sentenced in 2003, the offenses did not technically meet the definition of additional offenses in 2006 because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence Sanders on those counts. The Second District rejected Sanders' claim on appeal, however, because it concluded that the trial court could not employ a recalculated scoresheet when sentencing Sanders following his violation of probation. The Second District determined that “[t]he law is well-settled that following revocation of probation the trial court must use the original scoresheet used at the time the defendant was placed on probation” and that the trial court shall “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation.” Id. at 235 (quoting Adekunle v. State, 916 So.2d 950, 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2000)). The Second District then concluded that scoring the third-degree felonies as additional offenses “would be the only possible way to ensure that Sanders faced upon the revocation of his probation the same sentence for the second-degree offenses that he might have originally faced on those counts.” Id.
The Second District affirmed in part and reversed in part with instructions. In addition, the Second District certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHEN A DEFENDANT IS TO BE RESENTENCED AFTER THE TRIAL COURT REVOKES HIS OR HER PROBATION AND PRIOR TO THAT REVOCATION THE TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER ONE OR MORE OF THE ORIGINALLY SENTENCED OFFENSES HAS EXPIRED, SHOULD THESE OFFENSES OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT NO LONGER HAS JURISDICTION BE SCORED AS PRIOR RECORD ON A RECALCULATED SCORESHEET OR SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT EMPLOY THE ORIGINAL SCORESHEET ON WHICH THOSE OFFENSES WERE SCORED AS ADDITIONAL OFFENSES?
The issue before this Court is whether Sanders' third-degree felony offenses, for which he had completed his prison sentences and probation, should have been scored as additional offenses on the scoresheet used in the 2006 sentencing upon the revocation of his probation. This issue presents a legal question, requiring interpretation of statutes and rules of criminal procedures. Pure questions of law are subject to de novo review. Sims v. State, 998 So.2d 494, 504 (Fla.2008). In the analysis that follows, we begin by explaining why the third-degree felony offenses should not have been scored as additional offenses. We then address whether the erroneous scoring of the third-degree felony offenses was harmful in this case, concluding that the error was harmful.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(28) provides that “[s]entences imposed after revocation of probation or community control must be imposed according to the...
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