Sanders v. Sutlive Bros. & Co.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1919 |
| Docket Number | 32838 |
| Citation | 174 N.W. 267,187 Iowa 300 |
| Parties | J. F. SANDERS, Appellant, v. SUTLIVE BROTHERS & CO. et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lee District Court.--W. S. HAMILTON, Judge.
ACTION of right for the possession of real property and damages resulted in a finding of court for the defendants and judgment thereon. The plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
John M Dawson and W. C. Howell, for appellant.
F. T Hughes, for appellees.
Lorenz Rigler died intestate, October 13, 1903, seized of the W 1/2 of Lot 3 of Block 29 in the city of Keokuk. He was survived by his wife, Margaret Rigler, and their two daughters, Naoma Webber and Sarah Speisz. On October 28, 1903, these daughters executed a deed to their mother, Margaret Rigler, of the above-described real estate for her natural life, providing therein that she should receive all income and profits therefrom during said period, and upon her death said real estate should revert to the grantors. Thereafter, Margaret Rigler entered into a contract, leasing the premises to the defendants for a period of five years from March 15, 1905; and on September 18, 1908, executed another lease of the premises to the defendants for a period of 10 years, to commence at the expiration of the previous lease, to wit, May 15, 1910. The lessor, Margaret Rigler, died intestate, March 6, 1910, a few days more than two months prior to the expiration of the first lease. One Neusch was appointed administrator of her estate. Whether the widow retained a distributive one-third interest in the premises, and the daughters acquired the same by inheritance, or in some way her one-third interest was converted into a life estate, with the remainder in the daughters, is not touched in the argument. The cause is submitted on the theory that Mrs. Rigler was a tenant for life, and therefore the leases terminated upon her death, and the daughters, as remaindermen, were entitled to immediate possession. In re Hubbell Trust, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N.W. 512. Conceding this to be so, the issue is whether, subsequently, the daughters and defendants adopted the 10-year lease as their own. That portion of the lease after the lessor's death only was void (Hubbell v. Hubbell, 172 Iowa 538, 154 N.W. 867), and the daughters, as remaindermen, and the lessees did not occupy the relation of landlord and tenant. If that relation ever existed, it must have sprung from a subsequent contract, either expressed or implied, between them. This was the court's view in Lowrey v. Reef, 1 Ind.App. 244 (27 N.E. 626), where it was said that:
"To entitle the appellee to any other interest in the lands for a period after the death of the lessor, he must have shown that a contract existed between himself and the appellants, by virtue of which there arose the relation of landlord and tenant, and that this relation existed at the time when the alleged trespasses occurred."
Such a contract need not be one entered anew, but may as well be an agreement between other parties, and subsequently adopted by the remaindermen and defendants as their own. Was this done by the remaindermen and the lessees of the life tenant? On the former appeal, the evidence was held to conclusively establish such adoption. 163 Iowa 172; 175 Iowa 582. However much that ruling may be questioned, it is the law of the case, and must stand unless it can be said that other evidence, subsequently adduced, warranted a different finding. Something more than mere continued occupation was essential to the ratification or adoption of the 10-year lease. McIntosh v. Lee, 57 Iowa 356, 10 N.W. 895. So, too, had the defendants merely been holding over, with the consent of the landlord, payment of rent as provided in the lease could not well be construed as evidence of ratification, for the lessee in that situation would be under...
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