Sanders v. Yuba County

• Citation: 55 Cal.Rptr. 852,247 Cal.App.2d 748
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 17 January 1967
• Parties: Orval SANDERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF YUBA, Respondent, County of Yuba et al., Defendants. Civ. 11267.

Page 852

55 Cal.Rptr. 852

247 Cal.App.2d 748

Orval SANDERS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF YUBA, Respondent County of Yuba et al., Defendants.

Civ. 11267.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 17, 1967.

Changaris, Trezza & Ithurburn, by Malcolm Misuraca, Yuba City, for appellant.

Rich, Fuidge, Dawson, Marsh & Morris, by Dennis C. Noonan and Chester Morris, Marysville, for respondent.

PIERCE, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Orval Sanders' complaint was demurred to. The appeal is from a judgment dismissing the action against defendant county following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend the counts against said county. We are not concerned on this appeal with the liability of the remaining defendants who are alleged to be agents of the county.

The complaint against the county (preceded by a claim duly filed) is upon two theories (both expressed in one count). First it is alleged that on January 5, 1965, while plaintiff was an inmate in defendant county's jail he received an eye injury when he raised up in bed and was struck by a metal towel rack attached to the bed. This is alleged to have been a dangerous and defective condition of which defendant county had both constructive and actual knowledge but of which it negligently failed to give warning. Secondly, it is alleged that other named defendants, jailers acting within the scope and course of their employment, negligently failed to summon medical care for eight days after the accident although they had knowledge of plaintiff's need for such medical care. Because we deem the second aspect of the complaint to have merit, we consider it first.

RE THE COUNTY'S LIABILITY TO SUMMON MEDICAL CARE.

The California Tort Claims Act of 1963 (Gov.Code, sec. 810 et seq.) is admittedly applicable to this appeal. On its face section 845.6 thereof is expressly in point to cover plaintiff's complaint against the county for the failure of its agents to furnish medical care. It provides in material part:

'Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; But, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856 (which cover persons suffering from mental illness and are not here in point), A public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is (sic) Liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

The portion of section 845.6 which we have italicized could not be clearer. It creates liability both in the county and in its agents, under the circumstances specified, in unambiguous language. So clear, specific and unambiguous is that language that, Standing alone, there is nothing to interpret or construe.

Section 844.6, however, which was adopted as a part of the same act provides in material part as follows: '(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) of this section, a public entity is not liable for:

'(1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.

'(2) An injury to any prisoner.'

Nothing in any of the exceptions, subdivisions (b), (c) and (d), has any possible application here. Essentially, therefore, subdivision (a) of section 844.6 says: 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of law * * * a public entity is not liable for: * * * (2) An injury to any prisoner.' (Emphasis supplied.) In the parlance of the common law one who owes a statutory duty to an injured prisoner to take reasonable action to summon medical care and two violates that duty to the end that said injury is enhanced commits 'An injury to * * * (that) prisoner.' If, therefore, subdivision (a) of section 844.6 is to be interpreted within the limits of such legal parlance, the phrase: 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of law,' would require us to conclude there was a direct repeal by the Legislature of one provision of a single act by another provision, both having been adopted at the same time. ¹

It is to be noted that if there has been a repeal of the second clause of section 845.6 by subdivision (a) of section 844.6, a paradoxical occurrence has taken place. Although both sections were adopted as a part of the same act and at the same time, section 845.6 would ordinarily control over section 844.6, subdivision (a), under the general rule stated in People v. Kuhn, 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 701, 31 Cal.Rptr. 253, 257, 'that 'where inconsistent provisions are found in an act, that provision which is latest in position in the act is deemed to express the last, final legislative intent, and prevails over prior repugnant provisions, though all are found in the same act and are intended to take effect at the same time.' (Alameda County v. Dalton, 148 Cal. 246, 251, 82 P. 1050, 1052; in accord: Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 526, 228 P. 1040; Matter of Roberts, 157 Cal. 472, 477, 108 P. 315.)' That rule (under the assumed premise of irreconcilability) would have to fall here because of the phrase in subdivision (a) of section 844.6, 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of law.'

We believe, however, that the two sections can be reconciled.

A reviewing court, seeking to ascertain the legislative intent, may properly rely upon the legislative history of the enactment. (Rich v. State Board of Optometry, 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 603, 45 Cal.Rptr. 512.) Therefore we follow Senate Bill 42 of the 1963 Legislative Session through its peregrinations to become the Government Tort Liability Act--a codification of California law on the subject of when and under what circumstances public entities and their employees may, and when they may not, be held liable in tort. Our excursion is limited to the sections in question, section 844.6, subdivision (a), and section 845.6, and the question we seek to answer is whether the Legislature did or did not intend to repeal the latter section by the former.

Senate Bill 42 as introduced was based upon recommendations by the California Law Revision Commission. As introduced it contained No section 844.6. None was recommended. It did contain section 845.6, recommended by the commission. ² The bill was amended five times in the Senate, twice in the Assembly. Section 844.6 was first added March 19, 1963. In form (at least insofar as here material) it was, and is, exactly as quoted above. The entire section was deleted on April 3, 1963, put back on April 22, 1963, and was in the bill when it passed the Senate. In the Assembly it was again deleted (on May 17, 1963); then reinstated (on June 15) and was in the act as finally adopted. A comment on the section in the Senate Journal for April 24, 1963, states:

'Although this section was considered and rejected by the Senate Committee on Judiciary, the section was added to the statute by the Senate Committee on Finance.

'The immunity provided to public entities by this section prevails over all other provisions of the statute. * * *'

In the meantime section 845.6 had been twice amended. As originally introduced no express liability was declared against the public entity itself for the failure of one of its employees to furnish medical care. On March 19, 1963, the same day that section 844.6 was first included in the bill, a minor change was made in section 845.6. ³ On April 3, 1963, a more significant change was made. The public entity, by amendment, was expressly made liable to the same extent as its employee acting within the course and scope of his employment. The bill was passed both by the Senate and the Assembly with that provision in it.

This legislative history reveals a significant factor as an aid to judicial interpretation of legislative intent. We have described the 'put and take' progress of section 844.6 as Senate Bill 42 journeyed through the Legislature. Each of the four times (twice in the Senate, twice in the Assembly) the section was inserted or reinserted the phrase 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of law' was included. During the whole of this period the second clause of section 845.6 was retained. Moreover, on April 3, 1963, it was strengthened by expressly providing that the public entity as well as the public employee was liable for a failure to summon medical care to a prisoner. It is difficult to rationalize an intent to repeal a clause that has been so strengthened and thereafter adopted by both branches of the Legislature.

At this juncture in the discussion we should refer back to the first clause of section 845.6 where it refers to immunity Generally of both the public entity and its employees for failure to furnish medical care to a prisoner. In the second clause, however, liability is narrowly limited to the particular instances: (1) where the employee knows or has reason to know of the need (2) of Immediate medical care and (3) fails to Summon such care. The first clause, it will be noted, as well as the second clause--exception, would both be meaningless surplusage should we give section 844.6, subdivision (a), the broad interpretation sought by respondent.

When the provisions of a statute are subject to two reasonable interpretations, the interpretation that will harmonize rather than that which will bring the two provisions in conflict should be adopted. (People v. Kuhn, supra, 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 698, 31 Cal.Rptr. 253.) '* * * A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provision relates.' (Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 724, 123 P.2d 505, 512; People v. Superior Court, 199 Cal.App.2d 303, 309, 18 Cal.Rptr. 557; Code Civ.Proc. sec. 1859.)

The latter rule...