Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. McCullough

• Decision Date: 02 February 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 2015–IA–00854–SCT,2015–IA–00854–SCT
• Citation: 212 So.3d 69
• Parties: SANDERSON FARMS, INC. and George Varnado v. D. D. MCCULLOUGH
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

212 So.3d 69

SANDERSON FARMS, INC. and George Varnado

v.D. D. MCCULLOUGH

NO. 2015–IA–00854–SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

February 2, 2017

RICHARD O. BURSON, SHIRLEY M. MOORE, ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

ORVIS A. SHIYOU, JR., ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

EN BANC.

BEAM, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. This case comes to the Court on interlocutory appeal of the Lincoln County Circuit court's Order Denying the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the plaintiff's overarching claim is framed in negligence, it factually sounds in intentional tort and is subsequently barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 15–1–49. Therefore, this Court reverses the trial court's Order Denying Summary Judgement and renders a verdict in favor of the Defendant.

FACTS

¶ 2. The following facts are disputed, though they have been summarized based on both party's briefs, deposition transcripts, and trial court orders.¹

¶ 3. On May 24, 2010, Plaintiff/Respondent D.D. McCullough was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Petitioner/Defendant George Varnado. Varnado, an employee of Petitioner/Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc., visited McCullough's chicken farm that afternoon to inspect its chicken houses, as directed by his employer. Consistent with a Boiler Production Agreement (BPA) McCullough signed earlier that year,² Varnado sought to conduct a routine evaluation of the chicken-house conditions to ensure they met the standards under the contract.

¶ 4. Throughout his inspection, Varnado discovered deficiencies in violation of the BPA, after which he returned to the cab of his truck and began to write a deficiency report. McCullough approached Varnado's vehicle and asked what he was doing, to which Varnado responded, that he was "writing deficiencies."³ Recognizing this report would affect the terms of the BPA and potentially terminate his contract, McCullough stood at the closed driver's side window and shouted to Varnado, "you lied to me, you gave me four days ... its [sic] only been two!" He then moved in front of Varnado's truck and yelled at him to get out to talk about the report. Varnado remained in the truck, with the doors locked and window closed, refusing to exit the vehicle.

¶ 5. McCullough continued to urge Varnardo to "get out and talk." Without warning or a discernable request to leave the property,⁴ Varnado then "mashed the gas," striking McCullogh with the vehicle. This contact forced McCullough back roughly two feet but did not cause him to fall. He again urged Varnado to get out and talk, but Varnado refused and instead moved his truck "straightforward," hitting McCullough a second time. McCullough again stumbled backward, though he did not fall.

¶ 6. McCullough approached the vehicle a third time and implored Varnado to get out and talk, while Varnado continued to yell inaudible responses from the safety of the truck cab. Varnado then moved the truck forward and "went straight through," knocking McCullough's "ass off," causing him to fall and hit his head on the truck's bumper. The impact pushed McCullough to the side of the truck, after which Varnado continued to drive off and exited the property.

¶ 7. Following the altercation, Varnado returned to McCullough's property, accompanied by several Sanderson officials and a deputy sheriff. The officials and the deputy approached McCullough's home in an effort to discuss the incident. They requested that McCullough go with them to the Sanderson office to discuss it further, but he refused and said that he was going to the emergency room instead. The officials, Varnado, and the deputy then left the property.

¶ 8. On May 26, two days following the incident, McCullough received a letter from Sanderson, terminating the BPA. The termination letter cited the BPA and noted that McCullough had violated both the duty to not interfere with Sanderson employees in the execution of their duties and the duty to not use threatening language toward those same employees. That same day,⁵ Sanderson officials removed roughly 99,000 chickens and their supplies from McCullough's farm and severed the relationship.

¶ 9. McCullough subsequently filed two lawsuits; the first, which alleged Sanderson's breach of contract, was dismissed on summary judgment. The second the case at hand—alleges that Varnado (and, as a result, Sanderson) breached the duty of reasonable care to operate a motor vehicle safely when Varnado failed to allow McCullough to move out of the truck's path prior to accelerating forward. Following a period of discovery, Sanderson and Varnado moved for summary judgment, claiming that McCullough's suit alleged a tort in negligence where, factually, the actions identified would constitute an intentional tort. Sanderson asserts that, sounding in intentional tort, McCullough's claims are time-barred and the suit should be dismissed.

¶ 10. The trial judge reviewed the partys' arguments and determined that, because Varnado denies having hit McCullough with his truck, much less intentionally doing so, a genuine issue of material fact exists surrounding the claims. The court denied the defendant's motion, and Sanderson filed this appeal.

¶ 11. On interlocutory appeal, and in their motion for summary judgment, Sanderson and Varnado (collectively, Defendants) argue the following issues:

I. Whether Plaintiff's sworn testimony demonstrates he alleges an intentional tort which is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

II. Whether Sanderson is liable for the intentional acts alleged by Plaintiff.

III. Whether Plaintiff has abandoned any claim against Sanderson related to the May 24, 2010, incident for failing to comply with the party's contractual dispute-resolution procedure.

IV. Whether Plaintiff's claim of negligent supervision is properly before this Court and whether it demonstrates that he alleges an intentional tort, not negligence .

Because we find that McCullough's claims are grounded in intentional tort, rather than negligence, they are accordingly time-barred. As all other issues are now immaterial, we address only the petitioner's first issue.⁶

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 12. This Court employs the de novo standard when reviewing a lower court's grant or denial of summary judgment and examines all the evidentiary matters before it, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, deposition testimony, affidavits, etc. McMillan v. Rodriguez , 823 So.2d 1173, 1176–77 (Miss. 2002), citations omitted. Summary judgment is properly granted when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." M.R.C.P. (56)(c). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Simpson , 880 So.2d at 1050. However, that party's claim must be supported by more than a mere scintilla of colorable evidence; it must be evidence upon which a fair-minded jury could return a favorable verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Galloway et al. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., et al., 515 So.2d 678, 683 (Miss. 1987). If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted in his or her favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Whether Plaintiff's sworn testimony demonstrates he alleges an intentional tort which is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

¶ 13. While McCullough alleges negligence in his complaint, calling for the application of the three-year statute of limitations, this Court is not bound by the claims set forth in his petition.⁷ Instead, " ‘[t]he law of the state is realistic. Substance prevails over form.’ "⁸ The question before this Court is whether the substance of McCullough's claim against Varnado and Sanderson sounds in intentional tort or negligence. The evidence presented to support the claim alleged in McCullough's complaint—while pleaded as an action in negligence—supports a claim generically akin to a common-law assault and battery: an intentional tort.

¶ 14. Under Section 15–1–35 of the Mississippi Code, civil actions for enumerated intentional torts—including assault, battery, and recently, intentional infliction of emotional distress⁹ —must be filed within one year of the injury alleged.¹⁰ While this Court "will not squeeze all intentional wrongs into the actions enumerated, ... [if] ... the conduct alleged may be fairly categorized as one of the enumerated torts, the one-year statute applies. Otherwise, it does not." Nichols v. Tri – State Brick & Tile Co. , 608 So.2d 324, 333 (Miss. 1992). Here, the fact that McCullough did not allege an intentional tort "is of no moment, as [t]here can be no escape from the bar of the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts by the mere refusal to style the cause brought in a recognized statutory category and thereby circumvent prohibition of the statute." City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson , 562 So.2d 1212, 1215 (Miss. 1990) (citing Dennis v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 234 So.2d 624, 626 (Miss.1970) ). The conduct alleged—though framed in negligence—is notably like the intentional torts of assault and battery and should be treated as such.

¶ 15. The incident at McCullough's farm occurred on May 24, 2010, though the claims against Sanderson and Varnado were not filed until June 17, 2011—roughly one month beyond the running of the statute of limitations for intentional torts. All issues presented in this appeal depend on the substantive basis of McCullough's claims and whether Varnado acted intentionally or negligently when he hit McCullough with his truck. If he acted...