Sanderson v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 13 October 1903
• Citation: 116 Ky. 435,76 S.W. 179
• Parties: SANDERSON v. HUNT.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

76 S.W. 179

116 Ky. 435

SANDERSON v. HUNT.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 13, 1903

Appeal from Circuit Court, Graves County.

"To be officially reported."

Action by May Hunt against T. J. Sanderson. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Bugg &amp Wickliffe, for appellant.

D. G Park, for appellee.

O'REAR J.

Appellee recovered a judgment against appellant for the sum of $3,500 in an action for slander. The writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was awarded appellee. Appellant, by proceedings had in bankruptcy subsequent to the judgment, was discharged of all of his provable debts. He included in his schedule of liabilities the judgment above named. The question for decision here is, was that judgment a liability from which the bankrupt was discharged under the act of Congress of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 550, c. 541 [U. S. Comp St. 1901, p. 3418]). Section 17 of chapter 3 of the bankrupt law of 1898 (30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428]) provides that "a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts except such as (1) are due as a tax levied by the United States, the state county, district, or municipality in which he resides; (2) are judgments in actions for frauds, or obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations, or for wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another. ***" It is conceded that, unless this claim falls within the provision of "wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another," the exception mentioned in the act would not apply, and appellant would be discharged. An essential element of every slander is that it shall have been maliciously uttered. Any act that is done unlawfully and maliciously is necessarily willfully done; that is, it is done of the volition of the actor. A slander is necessarily a willful and malicious act.

It is argued for appellant that the injury done by a slander is neither to the person nor to the property of the one about whom it is spoken. At common law the right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, of his limbs, his body, his health and his reputation. Of the "rights of persons," referred to by Blackstone (Bl. Com. p. 134), their infringement is discussed in part in this language: "The security of his reputation or good name from the acts of detraction and slander are rights to which every man is entitled by reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right." In volume 2, p. 118, Bl. Com. (Cooley), under the head of "Injuries Affecting Personal Security," he says: "As to injuries which affect the personal security of individuals, they are either injuries against their lives, their limbs, their body, their health, or their reputation." All these, as is each of them, are injuries to the person. The act of Congress must be understood as having used the words in the section quoted with reference to their common-law acceptation. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 289. An injury to one's person may be done in a number of ways. For example, it may be done to some member of his body, it may be to his health, it may be to his sense of feeling, it may be to his state or peace of mind. Any injury done to him that wounds him in any of these parts is essentially a personal injury--that is, an injury to his person; an injury to that which constitutes a part of his person. The law may not allow a recovery for all such injuries, but for such as it does allow a recovery for it may be classed generally as a recovery for a personal injury. As was said by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in McDonald v. Brown, 51 A. 213, 58...