Sandler v. Commonwealth Station Co.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1940
• Citation: 30 N.E.2d 389,307 Mass. 470
• Parties: PHILIP SANDLER v. COMMONWEALTH STATION CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

307 Mass. 470

30 N.E.2d 389

PHILIP SANDLER v. COMMONWEALTH STATION CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

November 27, 1940

October 11, 1940.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., DONAHUE, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.

Bailment. Negligence, Bailee, Parking space, Contractual limitation of liability.

Proximate Cause. Contract, Of bailment, Limiting liability.

Evidence that, when the owner of an automobile left it with the attendant at a public parking station and paid a charge therefor, he was handed a

"stub" of a "parking ticket" containing printed recitals purporting to limit the responsibility of the proprietor of the station for the automobile, which the owner did not read and which were not in any way called to his attention, did not require a finding that such recitals were binding on the owner as a part of the contract of bailment.

Evidence that the owner of an automobile, upon leaving it in a public parking station, paid to an employee of the proprietor a required charge and at the employee's request left the keys in the ignition switch, and that, when the owner returned for the automobile, no attendant was on duty and the automobile had been stolen, warranted findings that the proprietor was negligent in performance of his duty as a bailee for hire and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the theft.

TORT. Writ in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated September 11 1939.

There was a finding for the plaintiff bye Donovan, J., in the sum of $373.20. A report was dismissed by the Appellate Division. The defendant appealed.

The case was submitted on briefs. J. J. Tutun, for the defendant.

R. J. Coffin, for the plaintiff.

DONAHUE, J. The plaintiff at some time during the day on June 30, 1939 parked his automobile in a public parking station, operated by the defendant in the down town section of the city of Boston. The plaintiff paid a required charge to the defendant's agent and, at the latter's request, left the keys to the automobile in the ignition switch. When the plaintiff returned to the parking station between 6 and 6:15 P.M., there was no attendant there and the plaintiff found that his automobile had been stolen. The automobile was later recovered in a damaged condition.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover for the damage done to his automobile on the ground of negligence of the defendant. The case was tried in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston and there was a finding for the plaintiff. A report of rulings made by the trial judge was dismissed in the Appellate Division.

The transaction of the parties was not merely the letting of a space where the plaintiff might leave his automobile. Upon the payment of the required charge, the defendant, through its agent, took possession of the automobile and, by reason of the requirement that the keys be left therein, the defendant could move the automobile to such part or parts of the public parking station as might from time to time suit the convenience of the defendant in the conduct of its business. On these facts relating to the character of the transaction between the parties a finding was warranted that the defendant was a bailee for hire. Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341 , 343, 344. Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed.) Section 1065A. The defendant, as such a bailee, would not become an insurer of the automobile. It would, however, be bound to use the quantity and quality of care which, under similar circumstances, a reasonably careful man would use with respect to his own automobile. Rourke v. Cadillac Automobile Co. of Boston, 268 Mass. 7, 8. Morse v. Homer's Inc. 295 Mass. 606 , 608.

In addition to the facts above related the trial judge found the following facts: The defendant's parking place accommodated about thirty-five automobiles and was of such a size and shape that an attendant there had a view of all automobiles therein at all times. So far as appears the only thing said, at the time when the plaintiff's automobile was left at the defendant's parking station, either by the plaintiff or by the attendant, was the request of the latter that the keys to the automobile be left in the ignition switch. The attendant fastened a part of a "parking ticket" to the door of the automobile and gave a part detached therefrom, referred to as a "stub," to the plaintiff, who without examining it put it in his pocket. Previously to that day the plaintiff had parked his automobile in the defendant's parking station five or six times and had been given a "stub." He did not read what was on such a "stub" at any time before his automobile was stolen. The "stub" contained the following words: "Parking Contract, Read It. We are not responsible for the car, its accessories or contents while parked on our lot. No employee has any authority to vary or increase our liability. Additional parking charge begins 7 A.M. No attendant on duty after 6 P.M." The limitation on the defendant's liability by the language appearing on the "stub" given to the plaintiff, but not read by him, did not as matter of law require a finding for the defendant. A finding was warranted that a person of ordinary intelligence in the position of the plaintiff might properly assume, from the requirement of a fee and the delivery of possession and control of the automobile to the owner of a public parking station, that the owner assumed responsibility for its care. Nothing was said indicating that the defendant was not to be responsible, and no signs to that effect were displayed at the parking station. It could be found to be a reasonable assumption by the plaintiff that the stub that was given him was a receipt for his automobile, or a means of identifying him when he should return to get his automobile, rather than a contract freeing an apparent...