Sandlovich v. State
| Decision Date | 31 January 1920 |
| Docket Number | 20733 |
| Citation | 176 N.W. 81,104 Neb. 169 |
| Parties | RAY SANDLOVICH ET AL. v. STATE OF NEBRASKA |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR to the district court for Lancaster county: FREDERICK E SHEPHERD, JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Reese & Stout, for plaintiffs in error.
Clarence A. Davis, Attorney General, and Mason Wheeler, contra.
OPINION
Defendants were convicted under section 3, ch. 201, Laws 1917, of buying stolen property. Both defendants prosecute error.
Three assignments of error are relied upon for reversal: First that the act under which the prosecution is brought is unconstitutional for the reason that the act contains more than one subject, and the same is not clearly expressed in its title; second, the information does not sufficiently describe the ownership of the property alleged to have been bought, and that the information does not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime; third, the defendants were coerced and misled by fraud and misrepresentations into entering pleas of guilty.
The title of the act in question is as follows: "An act relating to the larceny of motor vehicles and the altering or defacing of the numbers of motor vehicles, providing for the keeping of records by garage of motor vehicles, and providing penalties for the violation of this act." It is urged that the title is not sufficiently broad to include a conviction for receiving stolen motor vehicles. Section 11, art. III of the Constitution, provides: "No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in its title."
We do not think the act is open to the objection made by defendants. It was the object of the legislature to protect the public from larceny traffic in automobiles, and the title to the act is sufficient. It is well known that he who is guilty of larceny in motor vehicles, for commercial purposes, can successfully maintain his machinations only in connection with a "fence," that is, a place for keeping stolen goods for purposes of affording a market for the same. Then it is plain that both the thief, who takes and carries away the vehicle in the first instance, and the man who receives it to place it on the market are in a conspiracy to aid and abet, and to successfully carry out the original crime of stealing motor vehicles.
The object and purpose of the statute is to break up the criminal industry of stealing automobiles and affording a market for these stolen goods. This industry in crime is so intimately interwoven with the stealing of automobiles that one is indispensable to the other.
It is obvious, in creating a market for stolen automobiles, the person so engaged may be an accessory either before or after the fact. In either event the body of the act is clearly expressed and is germane to its object and purpose. The title, while not a precise epitome of the body of the act, yet is sufficiently plain and broad to accomplish the object of the legislature, and is a plenary compliance with section 11, art. III of the Constitution. State v. Ure, 91 Neb. 31; Alperson v. Whalen, 74 Neb. 680, 105 N.W. 474.
We conclude this phase of the discussion by claiming that title to a legislative act, enacted for the purpose of preventing and punishing the commission of certain crimes, is broad enough in its language to embody the acts necessary to the carrying out or causing the perpetration of the crime which the statute was created to prevent.
Defendants urge that the information does not sufficiently describe the ownership of the property alleged to have been bought, and that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime. This court has held that "where a statute states the elements of a crime, it is generally sufficient, in an information or indictment, to describe such crime in the language of the statute." Goff v. State, 89...
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