Sandoval v. Industrial Com'n

• Decision Date: 02 November 1942
• Docket Number: 15060-15065.
• Citation: 110 Colo. 108,130 P.2d 930
• Parties: SANDOVAL et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. and five other cases.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

130 P.2d 930

110 Colo. 108

SANDOVAL et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. and five other cases.

Nos. 15060-15065.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

November 2, 1942

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Robert W Steele, Judge.

Action by Alfonso Sandoval, and others against the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission) and another, and by Ray R Montgomery and others against the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission) and another, and by Gust Ahoe and others against the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission) and another, and by Richard Monks and others against the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission) and another, and by Ray Lewis and others against the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission) and another, and by Victor Bazanele and others against the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission) and another, to set aside a decision of the Industrial Commission. The cases were consolidated. To review an adverse judgment, the plaintiffs bring error.

Affirmed.

HILLIARD J, dissenting.

Philip Hornbein and Philip Hornbein, Jr., both of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

Gail L. Ireland, Atty. Gen., H. Lawrence Hinkley, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Henry E. Zarlengo, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error Industrial Commission and another.

Lewis & Grant and Stephen H. Hart, all of Denver, for defendant in error Huerfano Coal Co. and another.

Dines, Dines & Holme and Robert E. More, all of Denver, for defendant in error Colorado-Utah Coal Co. and another.

Yeaman, Gove & Huffman, Frank J. Trelease, Jr., and S. A. Sutliff, all of Denver, for defendant in error Victor-American Fuel Co.

YOUNG Chief Justice.

For the purposes of this review, six cases have been consolidated by agreement of the parties. Our examination of the records convinces us that they are all controlled by the same general propositions of law and that they may be disposed of by one opinion.

The employees of the coal mining companies made application for unemployment benefits under the Colorado Employment Security Act, chapter 167A, '41 Supp. '35 C.S.A. For convenience, reference will be made to employee claimants as claimants, or the men, and to the employer companies as operators.

The unemployment involved in the litigation arose out of the following situation: The United Mine Workers of America as the bargaining agency for the men, and the various coal companies, parties hereto, on April 1, 1939, entered into contracts as to wages, hours and working conditions, which expired March 31, 1941. Prior to their expiration, there were negotiations between the parties for new contracts. Due to the fact that there was an understanding between the men and the Colorado operators that the new contracts would fix wages, hours, and working conditions by the application of a certain proportionate scale to the agreement by the United Mine Workers of Emerica and the Appalachian coal operators, and to the further fact that this so-called Appalachian agreement, although negotiations were pending, had not been consummated, it was not possible on April 1, 1941, to determine what the new Colorado contracts would provide. The men, through the United Mine Workers of America as their bargaining agency, demanded that they be given the benefits of the new contracts when entered into, retroactive to April 1, 1941. The operators refused this demand, but offered to renew the expired contract for two years. The men declined to accept this offer; were unwilling to work without a contract; and the resulting unemployment is the basis of their claim.

The finding and decision of the Industrial Commission on the claim for compensation made by the men so unemployed, was as follows: 'The Commission Therefore Finds: That the cessation of work in the bituminous coal industry in the State of Colorado existing on April 2, 1941, constitutes a bona-fide labor dispute, and all claimants whose total or partial unemployment is due to this strike are ineligible for benefits under Section 5(d) of the Colorado Employment Security Act.'

Claimants subsequently instituted appropriate actions in the district court asking, 'that the decision of the commission be set aside and that the court enter such order and judgment as the law requires.' Upon due hearing judgments were rendered in favor of the commission and against claimants, to reverse which the latter have sued out writs of error.

There is evidence in some of the records tending to show that some of the operators of the mines did not work their properties following the termination of the agreements because they had no present demand for coal, but apparently the commission was not impressed by this evidence and the necessary implication from its decision is that on this point it did not deem the contention sustained by the evidence. It appears clearly from the records that the bargaining agency, the United Mine Workers of America, would not permit the men to continue work even during the interim, without a new contract.

It will be observed that the commission, in rendering its decision, used, apparently as of interchangeable significance, the words 'labor dispute' and 'strike.' It will be further observed that if found that the unemployment following the cessation of work 'due to this strike,' was not compensable, and that claimants for this reason were barred from benefits under section 5(d) of the Colorado Employment Security Act. This section makes unemployment due to a strike noncompensable.

We think it clear that the proper construction to be placed upon the commission's finding is that it found the unemployment was due to a strike, rather than to a labor dispute which is the broader term, and conceivably may exist without a strike. We are the more persuaded to this view of the decision because the commission found facts which are hereinafter recited as a basis for its decision from which the conclusion that a strike existed follows; furthermore, the last specific finding preceding the decision is 'that the cessation of work commencing on April 1, 1941, was caused by a strike.'

The point specified as ground for reversal, which we consider raises the only issue in the case, is whether the decision of the commission is supported by the evidence. If so, the unemployment is noncompensable; if not, it is compensable.

Counsel for claimants rely strongly on the case of United States Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 66 Ohio App. 329, 32 N.E.2d 763, 764. The Ohio statute is similar to our Colorado law, in that compensation is not payable if the unemployment is due to a strike. The case is authority for claimants' contention, but the opinion is based, as we think, on the fallacious assumption that in the absence of a contractual obligation to work, and to employ for contractually specified wages and hours and under contractually specified conditions, there can be no strike. That such was the court's view is indicated by the following excerpt from the opinion:

'We find this definition of 'strike' in Baldwin's Century Edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, page 1140, to-wit:

"A combined effort by workmen to obtain highter wages or other concessions from their employer by stopping work at a preconcerted time.'

'The facts in the instant case do not bring the acts of these employees within this definition, which definition we regard as excellent. Here, there was no combined effort to stop work at a preconcerted time. There was simply a conference attempting to work out an agreement between the interested parties.

'The only contract existing between them had ended. No duty rested upon either the operators or the miners. The operators were under no obligation to keep the mines open. The miners were under no obligation to work. There was no contractual obligation.'

The definition of a strike as given in Restatement of the Law--Torts, section 797, quoted by claimants in their brief, is as follows: 'A strike is a concerted refusal by employees to do any work for their employer, or to work at their customary rate of speed, until the object of the strike is attained, that is, until the employer grants the concession demanded. * * *'

This definition emphasizes as the essential of a strike the concerted refusal of employees to work for their employer, rather than the concerted cessation of work. It is more comprehensive than the definition quoted in the Ohio Court's opinion, and we think is applicable to the present situation. While there may have been no preconcert in the cessation of work, the record before us does disclose a concerted refusal to work in the interim pending the consummation of the Appalachian agreement until certain concessions during such interim were obtained.

We are not persuaded by the reasoning of the Ohio Court of the correctness of its decision.

The Utah case of Employees of Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 88, 104 P.2d 197, under a statute similar to ours, is relied upon by counsel for the operators as direct authority supporting their contention that there was a strike in the instant case. We do not so construe it. It is not necessarily inconsistent with the Ohio case, supra, for in the Utah situation an interim contract pending the consummation of the Appalachian agreement was entered into, and on notice as therein provided, the men stopped work 'at a preconcerted time.' It throws little light on the problem here presented.

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