Sandoval v. Rattikin
| Decision Date | 25 February 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 73,73 |
| Citation | 395 S.W.2d 889 |
| Parties | Matias SANDOVAL et ux., Appellants, v. Jack RATTIKIN, Trustee, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Roger Butler and Ted L. Schafer, of Law Offices of Roger Butler, Robstown, for appellants.
Richard Owens, Fort Worth, Alston Terry, Corpus Christi, for appellee.
This is a trespass to try title action filed by Jack Rattikin, Trustee, against Matias Sandoval and wife Teresa Sandoval, appellants. The appellants filed their answer, a plea of not guilty, in the trial to the court without a jury. Judgment was rendered for title and possession for appellee Rattikin. Appellants have perfected their appeal to this Court.
The record contains a statement of facts. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested by either party or filed by the trial court. The appellants do not attack the sufficiency of the evidence produced by appellee at the trial, nor do they contend that the trial court was not authorized to enter judgment.
The appellants filed a motion for new trial contending in effect that they had a complete and meritorious defense and had it not been for the lack of adequate representation by their attorney a different result would have been obtained in the trial.
The trial court conducted a complete and thorough hearing on appellants' motion for new trial. The hearing on the motion for new trial contained 128 pages of testimony in the statement of facts. The record at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that the appellee had filed suit against the appellants over three years prior to the trial of the case. Appellants immediately employed an attorney to represent them who filed the answer. Appellee made numerous requests for setting of the case. Two weeks prior to the final setting, appellants' attorney filed a motion requesting permission to withdraw for the reason that the appellants had refused to cooperate with him in the defense of the case. This attorney suggested that appellants contact another attorney. The appellants contacted the Legal Aid attorney, a Mr. Henry, a lawyer of some fifty-two years of experience who agreed to represent and did represent the appellants at the trial. He interviewed the appellants on two occasions prior to the trial. Mr. Henry did not ask for a continuance, but announced ready and proceeded to trial. He stated to the court that the appellants' original attorney had withdrawn from the case and that the appellants had come to him stating that they were unable to pay an attorney to represent them and that he agreed to represent them. He objected to the introduction of one of the deeds on the ground that the appellants claimed that it was a mortgage and not a deed, and placed both of the appellants on the stand to testify. The trial court overruled the objection and, upon the close of the testimony, rendered judgment for appellee. Appellants discharged Mr. Henry and employed a third attorney who filed a motion for new trial and prevailed on the trial court to conduct a thorough hearing on the merits of the case. This, the trial court did. During the hearing on the motion for new trial the appellants attempted to prove their defense to the main suit, contending the deed from the appellants to the appellee's predecessor in title was in reality a mortgage and that the appellee had constructive notice of such fact prior to his purchase.
A motion for new trial primarily consists of re-examination of the issues forming a basis for probable error with a view by the trial court to correct errors that have occurred in the course of the preceding trial. The object is to point out and call to the attention of the trial judge such errors complained of, so that he may have an opportunity if need be to correct them. Stillman v. Hirsch, 128 Tex. 359, 99 S.W.2d 270 (1936). Generally, the new trial may be granted and a judgment set aside where the motion shows good cause and the errors complained of affected the result of the trial, or might have reasonably affected the result, so as to justify or require the granting of a new trial. Rule 320, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaining party must show that their complaint was a material one and that injury has been done so that a fair and impartial trial has not been had. The hearing on the motion for new trial is not a means by which the case may be tried over or tried differently. Crossley v. Crossley, 306 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Civ.App.1957).
Appellants' first and second points complain of the trial court's ruling in overruling their motion for new trial because the trial court's implied findings in its order in overruling the motion was to the effect that appellee had knowledge of circumstances which would be reasonably calculated to put him on notice of a simulated conveyance. Appellants do not attack the main case, but in effect contend that sufficient evidence was presented during the hearing on the motion for new trial as would entitle them to a judgment had such defense been presented completely in the main case, and, therefore, the court erred in not granting a new trial.
The application for new trial is addressed largely to the sound discretion of the court. 41 Tex.Jur.2d 59 § 21. The hearing on the motion should be presented to the court to show that the substantial rights of the parties have been violated and to make it reasonably clear that a fair trial had not been bad. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Gladney, 335 S.W.2d 792 (). The evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion for new trial was not claimed to be newly discovered evidence. The record clearly shows that the appellants were given ample opportunity to develop the evidence that might have constituted their defense, not only during the first trial, but again during the hearing on the motion for new trial. The trial court did not find that appellants were entitled to a new trial and overruled their motion.
Trial judges should properly exercise the power of granting a new trial in order to protect a litigant from definite wrong. The discretion of a trial court in granting a new trial is practically unlimited. On appeal, however, it is not our duty to pass on the equities of the case or to substitute our discretion for that of the trial court, but to determine whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. On the hearing on the motion for new trial, based on the alleged error that appellants had a complete defense to the suit, the movants must show that they were not afforded an opportunity to present such defense, without any fault of their own, and that the failure of the trial court to grant them a new trial for this reason, was an abuse of its discretion in such matters. We do not find that appellants were not afforded an opportunity to present their defense, or that there was sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense presented during the hearing on the motion for new trial for us to say that the eminent trial judge who heard the case tried originally and presided over the hearing on the motion, abused his discretion in denying appellants a new trial.
Other facts developed at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that the appellants deeded the property in question to Bosquez in an instrument dated February 14, 1950. The deed was recorded in the Deed Records of Nueces County on the 3rd day of March, 1950. Appellee purchased the property from Bosquez on December 28, 1958. Appellants remained in possession of the property. It is undisputed that the deed from the appellants to Bosquez was on its face an absolute and unconditional conveyance of the property in question. As a general rule, when possession is held by one other than the vendor of the record title, the purchaser is charged with knowledge or put upon inquiry as to the rights of the possessor, the same as though such rights were of record. However, in the absence of knowledge of any facts to the contrary, the purchaser is not bound to make inquiry beyond the recorded deed executed by the one in possession purporting to convey the land to the person from whom the purchaser is acquiring same. Williams v. Rabb, 161 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, wr. ref.); Eylar v. Eylar, 60 Tex. 315; National Bond & Mortgage Corporation v. Davis, Tex.Com.App., 60 S.W.2d 429; Park v. Sweeten, 270 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Civ.App.1954), affirmed 154 Tex. 266, 276 S.W.2d 794; Baylor v. Ramos, 290 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Civ.App.1956, ref., n. r. e.); 43B Tex.Jur. 65 § 754; Dorsey v. Temple (Tex.Civ.App.), 103 S.W.2d 987, 995, states the applicable rule:
'A rule of property has long been established in this state that where a grantor, after executing a deed to land, absolute and unconditional on its face, continues to remain in possession, a purchaser from the grantee may rely upon the terms of the deed as a declaration of the grantor that he has parted with title, and, as a matter of law, is relieved of further inquiry.'
We do not find that there was any substantial evidence of any facts shown during the trial or the hearing on the motion for new trial that would put the appellee on notice or inquiry of any of the contended adverse rights of the appellants.
On appeal from an order overruling the motion for new trial the appellate court will take the most favorable view of the evidence that the trial court was authorized to take. The order overruling the motion for new trial amounts to an implied finding adverse to the allegations in the motion and the reviewing court will assume that the trial court found adversely as to all material facts alleged by the complainant. Liberty Cab Co. v. Green, 262 S.W.2d 522 (); 41 Tex.Jur.2d 470, § 218.
Appellants' remaining points complain of the trial court's failure...
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