Sandoval v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 05 October 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 8:09-cv-1528-T-23MAP
• Parties: VINCENT SANDOVAL, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

VINCENT SANDOVAL, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Case No. 8:09-cv-1528-T-23MAP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

Dated: October 5, 2012

ORDER

Sandoval petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for sexual battery on a child under the age of twelve, for which convictions Sandoval serves life imprisonment. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit __") support the response. (Doc. 19) The respondent argues that some grounds are not fully exhausted. The respondent incorrectly argues that a portion of ground one is unexhausted. The respondent admits the petition's timeliness. (Response at 10, Doc. 19)

FACTS

Sandoval v. State, 884 So. 2d 214, 215 (2DCA Fla. 2004), recites the following facts:

Approximately eighteen years after the fact, Sandoval's great nephew accused Sandoval of fondling him when the nephew was seven years old. Based on the nephew's testimony at trial, the jury convicted Sandoval of capital sexual battery. . . . Sandoval maintains his innocence of the charge and asserts that

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his nephew had a drug problem, stole from him, and concocted false allegations of sexual battery when Sandoval threatened to report the theft to police.

Although not revealed to the jury, the nephew reported his abuse after seeing a story in a newspaper that defendant was arrested for lewd and lascivious behavior.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied--the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly

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established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to decide."). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). A

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federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants—and federal courts—from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) ("This is a 'difficult to meet,' . . . and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' . . . .") (citations omitted).

On his direct appeal Sandoval succeeded in having his sentence vacated. Sandoval v. State, 884 So. 2d 214 (2nd DCA 2004). Upon remand, the same sentence was imposed. In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court on direct appeal affirmed Sandoval's convictions and sentence. (Respondent's Exhibit 16) Similarly, in another per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Sandoval's subsequent Rule 3.850 motion to vacate. (Respondent's Exhibit 37) The state appellate court's per curiam affirmances warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85 ("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the

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claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.").

Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court.

We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Sandoval bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001). The state court's rejection of Sandoval's post-conviction claims warrants deference in this case. (Order Denying Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent's Exhibits 32 and 33)

EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

The respondent contends that part of ground one is unexhausted because Sandoval failed to present the claim to the state courts. A petitioner must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. "[E]xhaustion of

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state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982) ("A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error."), and Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1995) ("...