Sandoval v. State
| Decision Date | 06 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. S-09-0023.,S-09-0023. |
| Citation | 2009 WY 121,217 P.3d 393 |
| Parties | Alan Arthur SANDOVAL, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee: Bruce A Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, Assistant Attorney General.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] Alan Sandoval pled guilty to second degree murder in the beating death of his girlfriend's one year old daughter. After the district court sentenced him to serve seventy years to life in prison, he appealed. Mr. Sandoval argues that he was denied a fair sentencing when the prosecutor argued facts outside the record at the sentencing hearing and the district court failed to provide him a full right of allocution. We conclude that the vast majority of the prosecutor's statements were appropriate and the one inappropriate statement did not prejudice Mr. Sandoval. Additionally, he was afforded a sufficient opportunity of allocution.
[¶ 2] We affirm.
[¶ 3] Mr. Sandoval presents a general issue on appeal:
I. Was Mr. Sandoval's right to a fair sentencing violated?
The State's statement of the issue is similar.
[¶ 4] On April 17, 2008, Mr. Sandoval killed his girlfriend's one year old daughter, AM. He confessed the homicide to law enforcement officers and his confession was recounted in the affidavit of probable cause that accompanied the felony information charging him with second degree murder.1 Although Mr. Sandoval initially pleaded not guilty to the charge, he later changed his plea to guilty. His guilty plea was "cold," meaning it was not made pursuant to any agreement with the State. At his change of plea hearing, Mr. Sandoval recounted the events of April 17th and the district court incorporated the probable cause affidavit into the factual basis for the plea.
[¶ 5] At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that Mr. Sandoval had killed the child in a short outburst of anger and he had taken responsibility for his crime by pleading guilty. He also made an impassioned plea for mercy, asking that Mr. Sandoval be sentenced to the minimum term of twenty years to life in prison. Mr. Sandoval gave a short statement apologizing for his actions and asking for leniency. The State advocated for a significantly more severe sentence of seventy years to life in prison. In support of its position, the State argued that the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Sandoval's crime was brutal and prolonged and did not amount to a short fit of rage. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court accepted the State's recommendation and sentenced Mr. Sandoval to serve seventy years to life in prison. He appealed.
[¶ 6] At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Sandoval did not object to the district court's sentencing procedures. Our review is, therefore, limited to a search for plain error. In order to establish plain error, the defendant must show that the record patently demonstrates the district court transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law and such violation adversely affected his substantial right. Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo.2004).
[¶ 7] Although our review is for plain error, we are also guided by other principles. Sentencing decisions rest within the broad discretion of the district court. DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1233, 1237-38 (Wyo.2002). We will not reverse a sentencing decision "absent a showing by the defendant of an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances that manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct that offends the public sense of fair play." Id.
[¶ 8] Due process requires that the court consider only accurate information in imposing sentence. Manes, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d at 292. "[A] sentencing decision cannot be based upon unreliable information, undocumented information, or inaccurate information." Hubbard v. State, 2008 WY 12, ¶ 24, 175 P.3d 625, 630 (Wyo.2008). If a prosecutor brings undocumented or inaccurate allegations to the district court's attention during sentencing, he engages in misconduct. Id. Nevertheless, a showing that inaccurate information was presented to the court will not necessarily justify a reversal; "the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in sentencing to prevail." Manes, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d at 292. See also, Hubbard, ¶ 19, 175 P.3d at 629.
[¶ 9] Mr. Sandoval claims that his right to a fair sentencing was violated when the prosecutor introduced facts at the sentencing hearing that were not documented in the record. He points to several different instances which he claims amount to prosecutorial misconduct.
[¶ 10] First, Mr. Sandoval contests the prosecutor's assertion that he joked with his father about the homicide. The prosecutor stated:
Is there remorse? Does [Mr. Sandoval] feel bad? Maybe, but in a conversation he had with his father, Your Honor, his father told him, They chuckled about it.
He claims that the "chuckling incident" was undocumented and the prosecutor should not have mentioned it at sentencing.
[¶ 11] Mr. Sandoval is apparently correct in his assertion that this conversation was not documented in the record. The prosecutor, therefore, committed misconduct by referring to it at sentencing. See, DeLoge, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d at 1239. However, in order to warrant reversal, Mr. Sandoval must demonstrate that he was prejudiced because the district court relied upon the improper information in passing sentence. He concedes that there is no indication that the improper statement influenced the judge's sentencing decision. As such, he has failed to show plain error justifying reversal of his sentence.
[¶ 12] Mr. Sandoval also challenges the prosecutor's statement that "Your Honor, we've given him a concession for his taking of responsibility in the form of a second-degree murder charge." He claims this statement was inaccurate because he was never charged with anything other than second degree murder, there was no plea agreement between him and the State and, consequently, no "concession" by the State.
[¶ 13] The prosecutor's statement about the charging concession was an understandable response to defense counsel's statement that it was appropriate that Mr. Sandoval faced second degree murder penalties rather than first degree murder penalties because he did not premeditate the murder.2 Defense counsel also recognized, however, that even without premeditation the State could have charged Mr. Sandoval with felony murder, in which case Mr. Sandoval would have faced first degree murder penalties. With defense counsel's argument about the charge in mind, the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Sandoval had already received a concession in the form of a second degree murder charge makes sense and was accurate. As such, Mr. Sandoval has failed to show that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.
[¶ 14] Mr. Sandoval's third contention of prosecutorial misconduct pertains to the prosecutor's recitation of the details of the crime and the child's injuries. He claims that the prosecutor's description of the episode resulting in the child's death indicated it was far more prolonged and extensive than described in the factual basis at his change of plea hearing. For example, Mr. Sandoval pointed to the following statement by the prosecutor as being improper:
Your Honor, this was not a brief moment of lapse in judgment, an instance of a loss of control. This was a brutal attack on a helpless baby girl, an attack that from the physical evidence saw the defendant swinging this child around the room, throwing her around the room, slamming her into objects such as the crib with enough force to actually break the crib with her tiny little head.
He also contends that the prosecutor strayed from the evidence by describing the disarray in the child's room as evidence of Mr. Sandoval's prolonged fit of rage and stating that "[h]e beat this baby to death and beyond."
[¶ 15] Mr. Sandoval claims that it is clear the district court relied on the prosecutor's statements. In his reasons for imposing the lengthy sentence, the judge stated:
[M]ost troubling is, I think, the continuing nature of the rage after this child was already, I think, pretty clearly unconscious and badly injured, apparently, the beating and throwing about continued. . . . This really is not an incident—a momentary outburst of anger. This apparently went on over some nightmarish period of time in which the baby was thrown about. The apparent breaking of the crib rail by striking the baby against it is breath taking.
The district court stated that such facts justified imposing a more severe sentence.
[¶ 16] Of course, no one but Mr. Sandoval knows what actually happened during the episode that led to the child's death. At his change of plea hearing, he stated:
I continued to drink the Jack Daniels, and at one point in time, the baby was crying, and I became frustrated with her. So I grabbed her on the leg and squeezed it.
[Defense Counsel]: Did that help?
The Defendant: No. She continued to cry, and I got frustrated with her and intended to remove her away from me so I could calm down, and upon doing so, I tossed her down onto her bedroom floor.
[Defense Counsel]: Do you believe that's when she hit her head?
The Defendant: Yes, I believe that's when she hit her head.
[Defense Counsel]: You believe that's when she suffered the injuries that caused her death?
The Defendant: Yes, I believe that's when she suffered her injuries, and I rolled her...
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