Sandoval v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 28 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. M2018-01148-SC-R3-WC,M2018-01148-SC-R3-WC |
| Parties | SALVADOR SANDOVAL v. MARK WILLIAMSON, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Appeal from the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Salvador Sandoval ("Employee"), an undocumented immigrant, suffered an injury while working for Tennessee Steel Structures ("Employer"). The parties settled the claim, and Employee failed to return to work at the end of the initial compensation period. Employee now seeks additional permanent disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-207(3)(B) because Employee cannot return to work after the injury as he is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States under Federal Immigration Law.1 Employee challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) which does not allow for additional benefits set forth in subdivision (3)(B) for any employee who is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States. The Court of Workers' Compensations Claims held that it had no jurisdiction to make this determination and denied Employee's request for increased benefits. Employee appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Rule of the Supreme Court 51 section 1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) is constitutional.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(a) (2014) () Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims AffirmedROBERT E. LEE DAVIES, SR. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., and WILLIAM B. ACREE, SR. J., joined.
James Higgens and Donald Byrd, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Salvador Sandoval.
Michael L. Haynie, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mark Williamson.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; and Alexander S. Rieger, Assistant Attorney General for the Appellee, Attorney General of Tennessee.
OPINIONThe facts of this case are undisputed. Employee suffered an injury while working for Employer, and the parties settled the claim. However, Employee failed to return to work at the end of the initial compensation period. On September 12, 2017, Employee filed a petition for additional benefits, and Employer filed a dispute certification notice on November 17, 2017.
The parties stipulated that Employee was not eligible or authorized to work in the United States under Federal Immigration Law and that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F), Employer had no liability for increased benefits under section 50-6-207(3)(B). However, Employee argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) is facially unconstitutional.
Finally, the parties stipulated that should the statute be determined unconstitutional, Employee would be entitled to $12,398.86 in additional benefits.
The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims was correct in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the facial constitutional validity of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F). Administrative tribunals "have no authority to determine the facial constitutionality of a statute." Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 455 (Tenn. 1995). However, this Special Workers'Compensation Appeals Panel does have jurisdiction to adjudicate this constitutional question of law.
The issue presented to this Court is whether the Federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") preempts Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F). Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (codified primarily in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a and 1324b). IRCA is a comprehensive federal law aimed at "combating the employment of illegal aliens." Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). IRCA imposes a series of civil penalties on employers who hire or continue to employ illegal immigrants who are not authorized to work in the United States.
Under IRCA, an employer who knowingly hires an unauthorized alien shall be ordered to cease and desist the violation, and to pay between $250 and $2[,]000 per unauthorized alien for a first offense, between, $2[,]000 and $5[,]000 per unauthorized alien for a second offense, and between $3[,]000 and $10[,]000 per unauthorized alien for a third or greater offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4). An employer who fails to verify the work authorization of its employees can be ordered to pay between $100 and $1[,]000 for each person whose authorization it failed to authenticate. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (e)(5). Employers who engage in a "pattern or practice" of hiring unauthorized aliens shall be fined up to $3[,]000 per unauthorized alien, imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. 8 U.S. C. § 1324a(f)(1).
Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 199 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 563 U.S. 1030, (2011).
The statute that Employee challenges in this case is a component of Tennessee's statutory system for awarding workers' compensation benefits. Under our workers' compensation law, if an employee is not found to be permanently and totally disabled, the court will award a number of weeks of permanent partial disability based upon the employee's weekly wages and impairment rating. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(A) (2014 & Supp. 2018). If the employee has not returned to work by the expiration of the permanent partial disability award (or returned to work at a lower wage), the employee may file a claim for increased benefits set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B). These increased benefits are determined using multipliers based upon return to work, education, age, and unemployment rate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(3)(B).
However, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) provides that the increased benefits available under subdivision (3)(B) "shall not apply to injuries sustained by an employee who is not eligible or authorized to work in the United States under federal immigration laws." Thus, while every person who is injured on the job will receive the initial permanent partial disability award, undocumented workers are not eligible to receive increased benefits.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law preempts state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819). Employee asserts that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) is preempted by both field and conflict preemptions under IRCA. The Supreme Court has held that "the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration," by creating a "full set of standards governing alien registration, including the punishment for non-compliance." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012). In Arizona, the Supreme Court struck down four state statutes on preemption grounds. Id. at 416. In doing so, the Court found that the State of Arizona could not enact parallel penalties for IRCA violations since the field of alien registration had been occupied by Congress. Id. at 402.
Preemption may occur through "express" or "implied" preemption. Express preemption occurs when Congress "indicate[s] pre-emptive intent through a statute's express language." Atria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008). Implied preemption may occur in the absence of express language through either conflict preemption or field preemption. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002) (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)). Conflict preemption applies where it is not possible to comply with both state and federal law or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Field preemption occurs when Congress regulates conduct in a particular field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. Arizona., 567 U.S. at 399. "The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation 'so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it' or where there is a 'federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'" Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). If field preemption exists, then it makes no difference whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with the federal law, Congress has forbidden the States to take action in that particular field and the federal statute preempts. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015).
There are two presumptions that courts apply in cases involving preemption analysis: (1) "the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent," and (2) a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will apply a presumption against federal preemption of state authority. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993). Therefore, preemption will not be found unless it is "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice., 331 U.S. at 230.
Although workers compensation is a field traditionally occupied by the States, in an unpublished opinion, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel examined a prior, similar...
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