Sandra C. R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 12 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5:20-CV-0923 (GTS/DEP) |
| Parties | SANDRA C. R. o/b/o Y.E.O.C., a minor, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
FOR PLAINTIFF OLINSKY LAW GROUP
HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ. SUSAN HURLBURT, ESQ.
FOR DEFENDANT SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
JAMES J. NAGELBERG, ESQ.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding, pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), to challenge a determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) finding that her minor son, Y.E.O.C. (“claimant”), was not disabled at the relevant times and, accordingly, ineligible for the supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits for which she applied on his behalf. The matter has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend a finding that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence.
Claimant was born in July of 2014, and is currently seven years of age. He was two years old at the date of his mother's application for benefits. Claimant was measured between three feet in height at the date of his application and three feet and seven inches in August 2019, and has weighed between twenty-eight and forty-two pounds. Claimant resides in a house in Syracuse with his mother and father.
Claimant has been at various times during the relevant period in an early childhood intervention program and pre-kindergarten, and at the time of the ALJ's decision was beginning kindergarten. He is subject to a Section 504[1] plan for kindergarten, which includes modifications and accommodations such as positive reinforcement, special seating arrangements, a modified curriculum, visual cues, checks for understanding, refocusing and redirection, access to water and the nurse's office bathroom as needed, breaking of materials into smaller segments, and a separate testing location with breaks.
Physically, plaintiff alleges that claimant suffers from asthma, sensory issues (particularly to food textures), gastrointestinal issues including constipation, and motor skill delays. During the relevant period, claimant has been treated for these conditions by professionals at Bright Futures Pediatrics and the Upstate University Health System.
Mentally, plaintiff maintains that claimant suffers from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) that causes behavioral, attentional, and hyperactivity issues, speech and language delays, and anxiety. During the relevant period, claimant has been treated for these conditions by therapist Leighanne Hibbard, Dr. Mihai Simonescu, and Dr. Louis Pellegrino.
Claimant has been prescribed several medications over time including, though not limited to, Adderall, Hydroxyzine, Symbicort, and Singulair.
Plaintiff reported during the administrative hearing held to address her claim for benefits on claimant's behalf that her son is constantly running around their home, likes to play with balls and toy cars and trucks (primarily by himself), likes to ride his bicycle, does not sleep consistently because of nightmares, does not like to go to the bathroom by himself out of fear, requires the lights to be on in the house, and needs help for self-care activities such as getting dressed, brushing his teeth, and wiping himself after a bowel movement. Plaintiff reported, however, that claimant is “a perfect cleaner” and organizes all of his monster truck toys. Plaintiff additionally noted that claimant likes to watch cartoons, but often walks away from them to play, and likes to have the volume on the television set loudly enough that he can hear the cartoons in another room.
Plaintiff applied for Child SSI payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on February 16, 2017. In support of that application, she alleged a disability onset date of October 1, 2016, and asserted that claimant is disabled based on speech language delays, motor skill delays, and asthma.[2]
A video hearing was conducted on July 15, 2019, by administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Melissa Hammock, to address plaintiff's application, at which plaintiff appeared without assistance after affirmatively waiving her right to representation. Following that hearing, ALJ Hammock issued an unfavorable decision on October 2, 2019. That opinion became a final determination of the agency on June 10, 2020, when the Social Security Appeals Council (“Appeals Council”) denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision.
At step three, ALJ Hammock examined the governing regulations of the Commissioner setting forth presumptively disabling conditions (the “Listings”), see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, and concluded that claimant's conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed, presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the regulations, specifically considering Listings 103.03, 112.04, 112.08, and 112.11. ALJ Hammock went on to find that claimant also did not functionally equal any of the childhood listings, determining that he has less than marked limitations in all of the six relevant domains of functioning.
Based upon these findings, ALJ Hammock concluded that claimant is not disabled.
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 13, 2020.[3] In support of her challenge to the ALJ's determination, plaintiff raises two arguments, contending that (1) the ALJ erred in affording only partial weight to the opinion from claimant's early childhood intervention teacher, Kathleen Porillo, and (2) the ALJ erred in concluding that claimant had less than marked limitations in the domains of functioning related to attending and completing tasks and interacting and relating with others.
Oral argument was conducted in this matter, by telephone, on November 10, 2021, at which time decision was reserved.
A court's review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of a final decision by the Commissioner is subject to a “very deferential” standard of review, and is limited to analyzing whether the correct legal standards were applied, and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998). Where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards, the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion reached is arguably supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987). If, however, the correct legal standards have been applied, and the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, those findings are conclusive, and the decision will withstand judicial scrutiny regardless of whether the reviewing court might have reached a contrary result if acting as the trier of fact. Veino, 312 F.3d at 586; Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The term “substantial evidence” has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 390, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); accord, Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). To be substantial, there must be “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted); Williams, 859 F.3d at 258. “To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides, because an analysis on the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight.” Williams, 859 F.2d at 258 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Mongeur v. Hechler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983)).
An individual under the age of eighteen is disabled, and thus eligible for SSI benefits, if he or she has not engaged in substantial gainful activity and has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); see Hudson v. Astrue, 1:06-CV-1342, 2009 WL 1212114, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009) ().
The agency has developed a three-step protocol to be employed in determining whether a child can meet the statutory definition of disability. 20 C.F.R. §...
To continue reading
Request your trial