Sands & Co. Inc v. Norvell

• Decision Date: 20 November 1919
• Citation: 101 S.E. 569
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: SANDS & CO., Inc. v. NORVELL.

101 S.E. 569

SANDS & CO., Inc.

v.NORVELL.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 20, 1919.

Error to Circuit Court, Amherst County.

Action by Andrew Norvell against Sands & Co., Incorporated, and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant named brings error. Judgment affirmed.

Instructions were tendered by plaintiff and given as follows:

No. 1. The court instructs the jury that an improper motive may be inferred from a wrongful act based upon no reasonable ground, and that such improper motive constitutes malice in law; and to constitute such malice it is not necessary that such wrongful act should be prompted by anger, malevolence or vindictiveness, but such inference of malice may be removed by the evidence in the case.

No. 2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants were guilty of the wrongful act or acts alleged in the declaration, they must award to the plaintiff such compensation in damages as he may prove for the loss of time, for suffering, bodily and mentally, the humiliation and damage, if any, to his reputation, sustained by reason of such wrongful act or acts. And if the jury believe, from the evidence, the said wrongful act or acts to have been committed by the defendants with malice, they may also award to the plaintiff punitive damages.

No. 3. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the defendants, or either of them, caused the plaintiff to be taken to Lynchburg in order to extract from him evidence as to the guilt of another person, or of himself, or other persons, that then under the evidence in this case such detention in Lynchburg constituted false imprisonment and they must find a verdict against the defendants, or the one who caused, or aided, abetted, counseled, advised, or ratified, such imprisonment, in favor of the plaintiff for such sums as may be proper.

No. 4. The court instructs the jury that when a public officer holds a warrant for the arrest of any person charged with an offense that it is the duty of such officer as speedily as may be to carry such person before some justice of the peace for examination by the said justice, and that the officer has no right to retain the prisoner in his custody for the purpose of eliciting from him evidence to be used in the prosecution of some other person, or of himself; and if they believe from the evidence that E. C. Rand, undertaking to act as an officer, did hold the plaintiff and confined him to jail, or station house, of the city of Lynchburg with that view, then such conduct on the part of the said Rand was a wrongful act, and constituted false imprisonment; and if they further believe from the evidence that W. H. Cook, agent of the defendant Sands & Co., came to the town of Monroe for the purpose of aiding in the investigation of the alleged robbery of the store of Sands & Co., and of recovering the stolen goods and prosecuting the guilty parties, and in furtherance of said object the said Cook approved the action of the said Rand in detaining the plaintiff for the purposes aforesaid, and accompanied the said Rand to the city of Lynchburg, and aided him in the effort to elicit information from the plaintiff while so detained in Lynchburg, then the said Sands & Co. are responsible for the acts of said agent, and the jury must so find.

No. 5. The court instructs the jury that even though they may believe from the evidence that the defendants had the plaintiff arrested, and that they had reasonable grounds for procuring a warrant of arrest, and were justified under the law in doing so, yet the defendants were bound under the law, after procuring the arrest of the plaintiff, to deal with the plaintiff in a legal and proper manner; and if they further believe from the evidence that after the arrest of the said plaintiff by C. W. Campbell, a constable of the county of Amherst, E. C. Rand, who was aiding in the investigation of the robbery of the store of the defendant Sands & Co., objected to having the plaintiff's case dealt with promptly by a justice, or objected to granting him bail, but took possession of the plaintiff, either with or without the consent of the said Campbell, and in connection with W. H. Cook, agent of Sands & Co., sought to hold the plaintiff in custody, in order to elicit from him evidence tending either to the conviction of the plaintiff or any other person, and with that view carried him from the county of Amherst to the city of Lynchburg, and placed or detained him in the jail, or station house, of the said city, where he was confined during the night, and the next morning took the plaintiff to the Carroll Hotel, and there sought to extract from him a confession of guilt, or evidence tending to show the guilt of some other person, and then conveyed him back to Monroe, where the plaintiff was released from custody, then the custody of the plaintiff by the said Rand was illegal, and constituted a false imprisonment; and if the jury further believefrom the evidence that W. H. Cook, as agent of Sands & Co., counseled and advised, or aided and abetted, or assisted in or encouraged, or ratified the detention of the plaintiff for the purposes aforesaid, then the said Sands & Co. are responsible for the false imprisonment of the plaintiff, and the jury must find the said Sands & Co. liable in this action.

The defendants tendered and offered instructions as follows:

1. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that J. A. Duncan, acting as a man of common prudence, had reasonable and probable cause for believing that Andrew L. Norvell was guilty of the offense charged in the warrant in evidence, and was justified in so believing from the circumstances then known to him, and so believing in good faith swore out the warrant in evidence against the said Norvell, and if the jury further believe from the evidence that the detention and imprisonment of the said Norvell was by B. C. Rand, as special constable and officer deputized for Amherst county as special constable by W. R. Watts, justice of the peace, and C. W. Campbell, constable, of Amherst county, or other constable, only, they should find for the defendants.

The court instructs the jury that the measure of responsibility for swearing out a criminal warrant is a reasonable belief that a man of common prudence might in good faith entertain and be justified in believing from circumstances known to him at thetime of the issuance of the warrant. It is not necessary that the facts which he believed should be known to have been actually true; but it is necessary that he should have believed them to be true, and that as a prudent man under the circumstances then known to him he was warranted in entertaining that belief. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence that the said J. A. Duncan so acted in having the warrant against the plaintiff in evidence issued, and if the jury further believe that the arrest, detention, and imprisonment complained of by the plaintiff were by officers of the law only, pursuant to the said warrant, they should find for the defendants.

4. The court further instructs the jury that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence in all respects.

6. The court instructs the jury that any person, acting as a man of ordinary prudence, who reasonably believes that another has committed a criminal offense, has the right, without rendering himself liable in an action for damages, to swear out a warrant for such other, who, if arrested and held by the officers of the law under a proper warrant so issued, until discharged by proper authority, has no right to maintain an action for damages for such detention or imprisonment under such warrant.

8. The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that J. A. Duncan, acting as a reasonable man, under probable cause, swore out a warrant against the plaintiff, Andrew L. Norvell, and in pursuance of such warrant the officers arrested and detained and imprisoned said Norvell, even though they should believe that W. H. Cook, or other agents of Sands & Co., Incorporated, accom panied the said officers while they had the said Norvell so arrested, detained, and imprisoned, and the said Norvell was held and imprisoned by the officers in their official capacity, and under and because of said warrant alone, then the defendants are not liable, and they must so find.

10. The court further instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that E. C. Rand was an officer duly deputized for Amherst county in charge of the said prisoner, and if they believe from the evidence that after the prisoners were brought before the justice of the peace the case was continued until the next day, and the prisoners were left in the custody of the officers, and the said E. C. Rand found it proper to carry the said prisoners to Lynchburg to keep them overnight, and to return them to Monroe before a justice of the peace the next day, such an officer had the right so to take the prisoners to Lynchburg for safe-keeping.

13. If the jury believe from the evidence that E. C. Rand was an officer in charge of A. L. Norvell and Pete Norvell, and found it necessary or convenient to have W. H. Cook, or other citizen, assist him in keeping them in custody to, in, and from Lynchburg, the mere fact that W. H. Cook may have so assisted the said E. C. Rand does not render the defendants liable in this action.

These were given by the court to the jury, and were all the instructions given by the court to the jury at the instance of the defendants.

Defendants also tendered and offered instructions as follows, which were not given:

3. The court instructs the jury that in arriving at their verdict in this case they should disregard any and all testimony offered for or on behalf of the plaintiff tending to show any interference by the defendants with any right that the plaintiff may have had or claimed to have...