Sandwich Manufacturing Company v. Krake

• Decision Date: 22 October 1896
• Docket Number: 10,136--(124)
• Citation: 68 N.W. 606,66 Minn. 110
• Parties: SANDWICH MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. JOSEPH E. KRAKE
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

68 N.W. 606

66 Minn. 110

SANDWICH MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. JOSEPH E. KRAKE

Nos. 10,136--(124)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

October 22, 1896

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Smith, J., ordering the treasurer of the city of Minneapolis to deliver to plaintiff's attorneys certain moneys and that in case of nonpayment a receiver in supplementary proceedings be appointed. Reversed.

The order of the trial court is reversed.

Christensen & Goebel, for appellant.

George E. La Clair, H. D. Stocker, and H. D. Stocker, Jr., for respondent.

OPINION

BUCK J.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $ 248.45, on certain promissory notes. Subsequently an execution was issued, and returned unsatisfied. On February 25, 1896, an order in supplementary proceedings was issued and it appears that Krake, the judgment debtor, was in the employ of the city of Minneapolis as a member of the fire department, and that there was due him as wages the sum of $ 55 from said city over and above all exemption provided by law. Thereupon the trial court ordered that said sum be applied upon the judgment, and that the city treasurer of the city of Minneapolis turn over and deliver to the plaintiff's attorneys the said sum to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in the case. From the order so made, the defendant appeals.

As to whether the defendant, as a fireman or assistant engineer in the fire department of said city, as he appears to be, is technically an "officer," within the strict meaning of that term, we need not consider. If he was an officer, the rule laid down in Roeller v. Ames, 33 Minn. 132, 22 N.W. 177, would be directly in point, to the effect that the salary of a municipal officer due him from the corporation cannot be reached by proceedings supplementary to execution by the creditors of the officer. This was placed upon the ground that public policy forbids that any legal proceedings upon the part of creditors should be allowed to intervene so as to directly or indirectly interfere with the payment of the salary of a public officer directly to himself. In that case it is further stated ^[2]

"The reason assigned for this is, in substance, that municipal corporations are auxiliary to the state government; that their officers are public servants, employed to perform public duties; that the public have a right to fill these offices by the selection of the most suitable men; that these officers are usually dependent on their salaries for the support of themselves and families; that the efficiency of their services, or even their remaining in the public service, may depend upon the prompt payment of their salaries, and the certainty that they will receive them when due. Hence, if creditors can step in by any legal proceedings, and prevent the payment of salaries directly to the officers in person, and divert the money to the satisfaction of their claims, the public service would suffer by impairing its efficiency, and perhaps depriving the public of the service of men whom it would be desired to retain. This is not an exemption in favor of the officer, but a rule for the protection of the public. It will be observed that the doctrine rests upon an entirely different reason from that assigned for exempting municipal corporations from garnishment, and is entirely independent of the question whether the corporation or its officers are made parties to the proceedings."

Upon principle, there...