Sanford v. Goodridge

• Citation: 13 N.W.2d 40,234 Iowa 1036
• Decision Date: 10 February 1944
• Docket Number: 46395.
• Parties: SANFORD v. GOODRIDGE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

13 N.W.2d 40

234 Iowa 1036

SANFORD v. GOODRIDGE et al.

No. 46395.

Supreme Court of Iowa

February 10, 1944

Carr, Cox, Evans & Riley, of Des Moines, and Kenneth H. Davenport, of Creston, for appellants.

Thomas E. Mullin, of Creston, and Harvey J. Kittleman, of Corning for appellee.

MULRONEY Justice.

Shortly after noon on August 6, 1940 Robert Goodridge was driving his pick-up truck in a westerly direction on a dirt road southeast of Creston, Iowa. At about the same time, plaintiff was driving a pick-up truck in a southerly direction on another dirt road known as the Pole Road. Somewhere in the intersection of these two roads the trucks collided. As a result of the collision plaintiff suffered injuries and was confined in the hospital at Creston and later at his home. In his suit against Goodridge he joined Armour Creameries and Armour & Company who he alleged were Goodridge's employers. The jury returned a verdict against all of the defendants in favor of the plaintiff for $4,000.

Upon this appeal the defendants assign error in the giving of one instruction and the failure to direct the verdict for defendants on the ground that plaintiff was shown to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The defendants Armour Creameries and Armour & Company assign additional error in the refusal of the trial court to sustain their motions for directed verdicts made at the close of plaintiff's testimony, and at the close of all the testimony, on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove Goodridge was their employee and that all the evidence showed him to be an independent contractor. These defendants also alleged error, in submitting to the jury a written contract between Goodridge and Armours, on the ground that the relationship between the parties and the construction of the contract were questions for the court to decide as questions of law.

I. The instruction complained of is No. 11 where, in enumerating the grounds of negligence that were submitted, the court stated in ground 2: "That the defendant, approaching such intersection from the left, failed to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff who was approaching said intersection on the right." The statute governing the right-of-way at intersections on August 6, 1940, section 5026.01, Code of 1939, provided that the first vehicle in the intersection had the right of way and in the event the two vehicles entered the intersection at the same time, the one on the right should have the right of way. But this statute was quoted and the rights and duties thereunder explained in instruction No 13, which was given for the express purpose of explaining this second ground of negligence. Since defendants admit that instruction 13 correctly states the law with regard to the right-of-way at the intersection and since instruction 13 states that it is for the purpose of explaining the law "as to the second ground of negligence", we hold that no prejudicial error occurred.

II. Under the record in this case the question of contributory negligence was for the jury. The accident happened at a blind intersection, in that there was a corn field on the northeast corner of the intersection. Neither party could see the other until they entered the intersection. Plaintiff said he was going 25 miles an hour; that he entered the intersection first and that Goodridge was traveling 50 miles an hour. Goodridge said he was going 15 miles an hour; that he entered the intersection first and that plaintiff was travelling 50 miles an hour. Plaintiff testified he was 20 or 30 feet into the intersection (from the fence line) when he first saw Goodridge about 30 feet east of his car. Goodridge said he was 20 feet from the travelled portion of the intersection when he first saw plaintiff 30 feet north of the main travelled part of the intersection and he stated "I was intending to turn north at this intersection. When I looked to the north I saw a truck approaching and knew I couldn't stay on my right side of the road without swinging over into the middle causing a head-on collision, so (I) started to turn south but didn't make it. I used my brakes also." The evidence of all the witnesses would indicate that the collision occurred at the southwest corner of the intersection although Goodridge at one place said it occurred "on the west side of the north and south road and in the middle of the intersection." With such sharply conflicting testimony the court could not rule that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Whether he was travelling too fast when he entered the intersection and whether he entered the intersection first were questions for the jury. Surely under this record the jury would be warranted in finding Goodridge was traveling faster than 15 miles an hour. Admittedly he was traveling so fast that he could not make his intended right turn and stay on his own right side of the Pole Road. While the evidence of the defendant Goodridge's negligence is not important in considering the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we feel it has some importance in this case as an explanation of the physical facts which defendants claim aid in the establishment of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Defendants point to the evidence that after the collision plaintiff's truck proceeded across a ditch, up over a bank, and into a fence where it broke off a corner post 8 or 10 inches in diameter. Also that Goodridge's truck spun around, headed east, and turned upside down. In their argument defendants urge that "this court has the right to look at the (these) physical facts in deciding whether the appellee (plaintiff) was approaching and traversing this intersection with his vehicle under control." The trouble with this argument is that we are unable to state as a matter of law that the momentum that propelled plaintiff's truck was not imparted to it by the Goodridge truck running into it at a high rate of speed. The argument that the position of the Goodridge truck after the collision refutes such a claim is not conclusive. It will be remembered this truck was turning north and the collision near its right front wheel might have upset it in the position it was in after the collision even if it were travelling at a higher rate of speed than 15 miles an hour.

This case well illustrates the wisdom of the rule that ordinarily the question of contributory negligence is for the jury. It would have been error to direct the verdict on this ground. Rogers v. Jefferson, 224 Iowa 324, 275 N.W. 874.

III. The record of the trial below and the briefs and arguments filed in this court indicate that the major battle raged around the issue of whether Goodridge was an employee of Armour Creameries and Armour & Company or an independent contractor.

Armour & Company operated under the trade name of Armour Creameries, so they will hereinafter be referred to as Armours.

The issue of whether Goodridge was an employee was presented in the motions for directed verdict made by Armours at the close of plaintiff's testimony and at the close of defendants' testimony. We will only consider the ruling upon the motion made at the close of all the testimony.

The defendants' evidence on this issue consisted of a written contract entered into between Armours and Goodridge. The contract designated Armour's Creamery at Creston as the "factory" and Goodridge as the "carrier". It described Goodridge as "engaged in the hauling business as an independent contractor." It provided that the carrier should haul cream to the factory from certain designated farms within a radius of 30 miles from the factory by means of his own truck. The carrier was to haul whatever cream was tendered to him by the "patrons" (sometimes called farmers, producers, or customers) from day to day for transportation to the factory and he was also to haul to the patrons such empty cans as the company desired sent to them. By the terms of the contract the carrier's remuneration was based on the pounds of butter-fat delivered to the factory. The carrier agreed to protect the cream from heat and freezing and agreed that cream spilled by him would be paid for out of his compensation. Paragraph 6 of the contract provided: "The Carrier shall have full and complete liberty to use his own free and uncontrolled will, judgment and discretion as to the methods and manner of his performance of each and every obligation hereunder, without any right whatever on the part of the Company to direct or control, in any way or in any degree, the methods or manner of the performance of any of said obligations; and the same may be done or performed by any person or persons appointed by him. It is understood and agreed that, anything herein or in the previous relationship (if any) between the parties hereto to the contrary notwithstanding, the Company expressly disclaims possession by it of any rights with respect to the Carrier except the rights conferred by law upon one who has made a contract with an independant contractor; and the Carrier likewise expressly disclaims possession of any rights with respect to the Company except those to which an independent contractor is entitled by law. The Carrier shall at all times be free to do such other hauling or other business as he may desire; except that, during the term hereof, he shall not haul cream from any of the Company's patrons to any other factory."

In the succeeding paragraphs of the contract, provision was made for the carrier to carry workmen's compensation insurance on his own employees and for...