Sanford v. Sanford

Decision Date31 October 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2010–CT–00873–SCT.,2010–CT–00873–SCT.
Citation124 So.3d 647
PartiesSamantha Louise SANFORD v. Leslie SANFORD.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

S. Christopher Farris, attorney for appellant.

David Alan Pumford, Erik M. Lowrey, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PIERCE, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. It is often said that bad facts make bad law—but inattention to detail also can make bad law. There are two distinct paths to an irreconcilable-differences divorce under Mississippi law. One option is for the couple to provide a written agreement settling the custody and maintenance of any children of the marriage and property rights; if the chancellor deems the terms adequate and sufficient, he or she may incorporate the agreement in the judgment and grant a divorce. Miss.Code Ann. § 93–5–2(2) (Rev.2013). A second option is for the couple to consent to allow a chancellor to decide certain disputed issues. Miss.Code Ann. § 93–5–2(3) (Rev.2013). The consent must: (1) be in a writing signed by both parties; (2) state that the couple voluntarily agrees to permit the chancellor to decide the issues designated in their written consent; and (3) state that the parties understand that the chancellor's decision will be binding and lawful. Id. All matters involving the custody and maintenance of any children of the marriage and property rights must then be either adjudicated by the chancellor or agreed upon by the parties and deemed adequate and sufficient before a divorce can be granted. Id.

¶ 2. Every divorce based on irreconcilable differences must proceed under either Section 93–5–2(2) or Section 93–5–2(3), but not both. In this case, the two distinct subsections were conflated and confused. The parties attempted to “switch horses” in the middle of a volatile stream not once, but multiple times. Ultimately, they failed to saddle either horse successfully; hence, they are being swept back into chancery court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3. The facts below were drawn heavily from the Court of Appeals' decision. Sanford v. Sanford, 124 So.3d 664 (Miss.Ct.App.2012).

¶ 4. On January 28, 2008, Samantha Sanford filed a complaint for divorce and temporary relief against Leslie Sanford in the Chancery Court of Lamar County. Samantha asserted that her and Leslie's marriage was “irretrievably destroyed.” As fault grounds, she cited Leslie's habitual cruel and inhuman treatment of her, his habitual and excessive drug use, and his habitual drunkenness. Alternatively, she alleged irreconcilable differences. And in her request for relief, she sought custody of their minor child.

¶ 5. On June 19, 2008, the chancellor entered a temporary order granting Samantha temporary physical custody of the minor child, temporary child support, and temporary alimony. Leslie was granted temporary visitation. Trial eventually was set for September 10, 2009.

¶ 6. Several events occurred on the day of trial. First, as permitted under Section 93–5–2(3), Samantha and Leslie executed a joint motion to withdraw fault grounds and a consent to divorce. Consequently, the chancellor signed an order dismissing fault grounds so the Sanfords could proceed with a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In their consent to divorce, they agreed to permit the chancellor to decide several designated issues. But before filing their consent, they struck through those designated issues; underneath, either Leslie or Samantha or one of their attorneys wrote that [a]ll issues are settled and will be dictated into the record.” At that point, the Sanfords sought to travel under Section 93–5–2(2), not (3).

¶ 7. Later, after court was called to order, Leslie stated that the parties had settled. Still, he noted that the chancellor might have to decide the division of household goods, which is impermissible under Section 93–5–2(2). As the proceedings continued, it is clear from the record that the Sanfords once again began invoking the provisions of Section 93–5–2(3). Disagreements arose about tax-related issues and whether Leslie would have to pay child support during the summers. Their back-and-forth finally prompted the chancellor to ask, “Well, have y'all got an agreement or not?” In response, Samantha said that she would submit the issue of summer child support to the chancellor for his consideration. At that point, understandably frustrated, the chancellor recessed for lunch: “I'm going to lunch. I'll be back at 2:00. Get ready to go to trial. We'll hear everything you want to hear.”

¶ 8. Following the noon recess, the Sanfords announced a settlement. The chancellor and the Sanfords' attorneys read the settlement agreement into the record, and Samantha and Leslie agreed to be bound by it:

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sanford you stood there and heard what was dictated by your attorney and concurred in by Mrs. Sanford's attorney as a proposed agreement between you and her for the settlement of all issues. Did you hear all of it?

MR SANFORD: Yes, sir, I did.

THE COURT: Did you understand all of that?

MR. SANFORD: Yes, sir, I did.

THE COURT: Is that a correct statement of your agreement?

MR. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: It will be reduced to writing. Do you commit to the Court that when it is reduced to writing you will sign it—

MR. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT:—as an agreement?

MR. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that having made that commitment that you are not at liberty to back out?

MR. SANFORD: I understand, sir.

THE COURT: An effort to back out may result in imposition of sanctions.

MR. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mrs. Sanford, you stood there while it was being dictated by [Leslie's attorney] and with some additions by your attorney. Did you hear all of it?

MRS. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Did you understand all of it?

MRS. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that your agreement and commitment?

MRS. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand and commit to the Court that when it is reduced to writing and submitted to you for signature that you will sign it?

MRS. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You do not have the privilege of backing out or changing your mind.

MRS. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If you do so, you may subject yourself to imposition of sanctions by the Court.

MRS. SANFORD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. On those assurances and what's dictated, I will be pleased to approve it. It is approved and is the order of the Court as of now. It will be reduced to writing and signed by the parties.

¶ 9. One issue remained unresolved, however: the division of household goods. The plan was for Samantha to go through the couple's home and make a list of items that she wished to keep. Leslie, in turn, was to review Samantha's list and submit his own list if he disagreed. The parties represented in court that the division of household goods “may be one thing which is left that the [c]ourt can make a determination on one day.”

¶ 10. One month after the divorce hearing, on October 12, 2009, Samantha moved to withdraw her consent to divorce and to have the case tried. Leslie responded by moving for a contempt citation and to enforce their settlement agreement. He alleged that Samantha had inventoried the home and had listed its entire contents for herself. He argued that her actions violated the chancellor's order and the parties' agreement. Further, he asserted that Samantha had waived any right to withdraw her consent to the settlement agreement.

¶ 11. On December 2, 2009, the chancellor entered an order refusing to allow Samantha to withdraw her consent from the September 10, 2009, settlement agreement. Further, he appointed a commissioner to supervise a bidding process between Samantha and Leslie for the household goods and found Samantha to be in direct contempt of court.

¶ 12. On April 7, 2010, Samantha requested an on-the-record finding that the settlement agreement was inadequate and insufficient. Leslie responded by moving to dismiss and for sanctions. A short time later, he moved again to have Samantha cited for contempt.

¶ 13. At a hearing on May 24, 2010, the chancellor found Samantha in contempt for failing to sign the settlement agreement. In his bench ruling, he ordered that Samantha be incarcerated until she purged herself of contempt “by execut [ing] ... the settlement agreement that was submitted on March 25, 2010, which the [c]ourt has found fully and completely complies with all terms and provisions of the announced agreement on September 10, 2009, to which she indicated her consent and understanding.”

¶ 14. The following day, Samantha moved to stay the judgment of contempt and for a determination of supersedeas bond pending her appeal. Days later, she filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court. On May 28, 2010, a panel of this Court granted Samantha's petition and ordered that she be released immediately from the Lamar County jail.

¶ 15. On June 1, 2010, the chancellor entered an order on all pending motions filed by Samantha and incorporated his bench ruling and the transcript of the May 24, 2010, hearing as part of the order.

¶ 16. Two weeks later, on June 16, 2010, Samantha moved to have the chancellor recused from the case. She noticed a hearing on her recusal motion for July 21, 2010. And, on June 29, 2010, she moved to have Leslie cited for contempt, alleging that he had not paid his alimony obligations.

¶ 17. On September 21, 2010, a final judgment of divorce was entered. The final judgment stated, in part, that:

This matter came on for trial on September 10, 2009. The parties executed and filed with the [c]ourt a[c]onsent wherein they agreed that they would withdraw any and all fault grounds and, in writing, signed by both parties and their attorneys, stated[:] “The designated issues are settled. All issues are settled and will be dictated into the record,” and [the parties will] proceed pursuant to [Section] 93–5–2 ... with a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable...

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