Sanford v. The State
| Citation | 695 S.E.2d 579,287 Ga. 351 |
| Decision Date | 28 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. S10A0148.,S10A0148. |
| Parties | SANFORDv.The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
287 Ga. 351
695 S.E.2d 579
SANFORD
v.
The STATE.
No. S10A0148.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 17, 2010.
Reconsideration Denied June 28, 2010.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Bettieanne C. Hart, Asst. Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Reggie A. Lampkin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
HINES, Justice.
A jury found Otis Sanford guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the fatal shooting of Veronica Corbett. Following the denial of a new trial, Sanford appeals his convictions, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain out-of-court statements and in failing to properly ascertain whether he wished to exercise his right to testify, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1
The facts construed in favor of the verdicts showed the following. On October 1, 2004, Corbett was at the home of Marhna Smith, who was the father of one of her children. Corbett lived with Sanford from time to time. That day Sanford went to Smith's home to talk to Corbett and to get his cell phone and keys from her. Smith took Sanford's things outside where Sanford could retrieve them. Corbett did not want to talk to Sanford, but he would not leave. After waiting for about ten minutes, Sanford entered the house and ran past Smith, chasing Corbett through the house and down some stairs. Sanford then fired two shots at Corbett, striking her. Smith ran from the house after he heard the gunshots, and returned when he saw Sanford leave. Officer Gerjets arrived on the scene and found Corbett with a gunshot wound to the chest, but still alive and conscious. She held a pillow to her abdomen and was in obvious pain. She told the officer that Sanford had gone down into the basement and shot her. Subsequently, Smith identified Sanford from a photographic lineup as the man at his house when Corbett was shot. Corbett died at the hospital several hours after the shooting as a result of the gunshot wound.
At trial, Officer Gerjets testified that at the crime scene Corbett told him that Sanford had shot her because they had been in a
1. The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Sanford guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Prior to the start of trial, the trial court held a hearing on Sanford's motion to exclude statements made by Corbett to Officer Gerjets that Sanford had shot her. The statements were made as Corbett was waiting for help from emergency responders, and the trial court ruled that the statements were admissible into evidence as dying declarations and as part of the res gestae. Sanford contends that such ruling was error because the statements inculpating him did not qualify as dying declarations in that Corbett was not in the “article of death” when she made the statements, and, in fact, did not die until several hours later; he further argues that Corbett's statements were not admissible under the rationale of res gestae because they were made in response to police questioning, and that even if the statements qualify as either dying declarations or part of the res gestae, the analysis in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), should be applied to find them inadmissible. However, the contentions are unavailing.
One of the requirements for a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration is that the deceased must have been conscious of his condition.... OCGA § 24-3-6.2 It need only appear to the court from the circumstances of the case that there was a probability that the deceased was conscious of his condition at the time he made the statement.... The testimony introduced as dying declarations need not contain any statement by the deceased to the effect that he was conscious of impending death at the time the declarations were made, since this may be inferred from the nature of the wounds and other circumstances.
Morgan v. State, 275 Ga. 222, 224(5), 564 S.E.2d 192 (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, the circumstances amply demonstrate that Corbett was conscious of her critical condition at the time she made the statements inculpating Sanford as the shooter: it was apparent that her wounds were extremely serious; she was clutching a pillow to her abdomen to comfort her; her breathing was “stressed”; she was in great pain; and she appeared to be overwhelmed with fear. Moreover, recognizing the dire nature of her injuries, Corbett called 911 immediately after being shot and asked if she was going to die, and as the tape of the 911 call further established, Smith pleaded with her to “stay alive.” These circumstances made a prima facie showing for the admission of the subject statements as Corbett's dying declarations Ventura v. State, 284 Ga. 215, 217(2), 663 S.E.2d 149 (2008). What is more, the statements were properly admitted under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, even though they may have been in response to queries by the officer; Corbett made the statements shortly after the shooting, in the midst of the chaos of the crime scene, and while awaiting emergency treatment Morgan v. State, supra at 225(5), 564 S.E.2d 192 (2002). See OCGA § 24-3-3.3
As to Sanford's urging that this Court should apply the analysis in Crawford v. Washington, supra, to find the statements inadmissible, this Court previously has acknowledged with approval that the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly declined to extend its analysis to dying declarations. Walton v. State, 278 Ga. 432, 434(1), 603 S.E.2d 263 (2004).
3. Sanford also contends that the trial court...
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