Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc.

Decision Date14 October 1977
Docket NumberNo. C-76-2426 SC.,C-76-2426 SC.
Citation438 F. Supp. 1221
PartiesLinda E. SANGSTER, an Individual, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Air Line Pilots Association, International, a labor organization, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert Tollen, Chickering & Gregory, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Donald D. Connors, Jr., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant United Air Lines.

Jennings, Gartland & Tilly, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Air Line Pilots Assn.

CONTI, District Judge.

Linda Sangster sues United Air Lines, Inc. (United), and the Air Lines Pilots Association, International (ALPA), a labor organization representing stewardesses, among others, charging both with unlawful sex discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. She seeks reinstatement to the position of stewardess with full seniority and benefits, backpay with interest, attorney fees and costs. The matter comes before the court on plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and reinstatement with full seniority, and on ALPA's motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. United does not oppose plaintiff Sangster's motion except as to liability for monetary damages. All parties agree as to the material facts, though they sometimes differ as to the construction which should be placed on them.

FACTS

Plaintiff Sangster, then an unmarried woman, was employed by United Air Lines, Inc., as a stewardess or cabin attendant on November 24, 1961. On May 28, 1966, then still unmarried and thus eligible for continued flight duty, she accepted promotion to the non-flight position of stewardess supervisor. This change of status did not affect her seniority as a stewardess which continued to accrue in accordance with the provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement as though she was still on active stewardess service. Nor did it preclude a later return to stewardess status with full accrued seniority should she so choose.

On April 9, 1968, plaintiff Sangster married. She was aware that if she did so United's rules would bar her from resuming her former stewardess position, and that she would forfeit her stewardess seniority rights.1 Nevertheless, though her sole employment interest by then was to return to stewardess status, she decided to marry, to continue as a stewardess supervisor for the time being, and to await the outcome of negotiations between United and ALPA which she had reason to believe would soon terminate the "no-marriage" policy.

United and ALPA did reach such an agreement on November 7, 1968, and on November 8, 1968, Mrs. Sangster applied for transfer to stewardess status. But the agreement was only partially retroactive and it did not protect married stewardess supervisors in her circumstances. Following an announcement to that effect by ALPA and denial of her application by United, she instituted a complaint on November 9, 1968, according to company grievance procedure. After ALPA twice refused United's suggestion that the agreement be further extended to include married stewardess supervisors, she filed a charge of unlawful employment practices with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on February 6, 1969, at the suggestion of a United officer.

Plaintiff Sangster continued to work as a stewardess supervisor while her company grievance was pending, but quit United's employ on or about July 16, 1969, following its denial of her complaint on June 4, 1969. Mrs. Sangster's husband was and is a pilot for United; she desired to coordinate her schedule with his, an eventuality possible only by resuming flight status and conforming her work schedule to his (an outcome possible because of seniority preferences), or by quitting any conflicting job. Refused permission to fly, she quit her conflicting stewardess supervisor position.2

At no time, however, did Mrs. Sangster ever discontinue her efforts to obtain redress through the EEOC. But burdened by its enormous backlog and by the complications caused by a spate of related cases,3 the EEOC did not find until March 8, 1972, that there was reasonable cause to believe that her charge was true, informing her then that it would begin conciliation efforts on her behalf "as soon as possible," and advising her that she would be kept informed of progress. Nothing more transpired until October 12, 1976, when the EEOC, after some prodding from Mrs. Sangster, notified her that it had been unable to reconcile her dispute, and that she had a right to sue. This action was filed nineteen days later on November 1, 1976.

It would appear that something more should have been done during this extended period, but the fault can be laid on no one party or organization. Mrs. Sangster could after some time have removed her claim from the EEOC and come into federal court for the relief she was seeking. However, she only inadvertently learned of this option sometime in 1976, and she was under no legal obligation to bypass the EEOC in any case. Similarly, she could have pressed the EEOC for speedier action. But she is no more to blame for failing to do so than are United and ALPA, which also had means to force the issue and which, it may be assumed, had even greater interest in its outcome, being subject to a number of such charges. Again, the EEOC could have acted with greater dispatch, or, if unable to do so, could have informed all concerned of its incapacity and of the availability of other legal avenues. But to have done this it must in some sense have abdicated responsibility placed on it by Congress, which reiterated in 1972 its preference for resolution of these conflicts through the EEOC though fully aware of the EEOC's acute overload.4

No policy or rule restricting employment as stewards to single males has ever been enforced by United. Its practice and policy of refusing to employ married persons as cabin attendants was applied solely to married women, as opposed to married men. United, as previously stated, did discontinue this policy on November 7, 1968, with respect to married women generally, but it continued to bar married stewardess supervisors from transfer to stewardess positions though all other stewardess supervisors were permitted to do so. As no parallel restriction was imposed on similarly situated male employees, the change of policy simply narrowed the sweep of United's prior sexually discriminatory policy; that policy continued in effect with respect to married female stewardess supervisors who sought flight positions as cabin attendants.5 To the extent that United's policy pertained only to job classifications as to which there may have been no male counterpart, its marriage ban was not a bona fide occupational qualification.

The Air Line Pilots Association, International, shared in the maintenance of this practice and policy insofar as it affected Mrs. Sangster. Although its pressure and initiatives were responsible for the abandonment of the policy with respect to stewardesses (who were members of the union), it resisted for a time United's attempts to extend the same nondiscriminatory treatment to already married steward supervisors (who were members of management), notwithstanding contractual seniority rights afforded stewardess supervisors who were unmarried. As United's denial of Mrs. Sangster's application for transfer to stewardess status hinged on ALPA's opposition, its insistence on continuance of the discriminatory practice with respect to married stewardess supervisors renders it equally a cause of that denial, and an equal partner with United in the perpetuation of that discriminatory practice.6

The court finds that United and ALPA engaged in an unlawful discriminatory employment practice by refusing or preventing employment as stewardesses to married stewardess supervisors, in that this distinction discriminated on the basis of sex without any bona fide ground for such classification. The court further finds that United and ALPA concurred in the application of this unlawful discriminatory practice to Linda Sangster on November 8, 1968, when United denied Mrs. Sangster's application for transfer to stewardess status.

LAW

ALPA moves for summary judgment and opposes Mrs. Sangster's motion for partial summary judgment, contending that her claim under Title VII is barred because she did not file her charge with the EEOC within the filing period then in effect. In the alternative, it moves to dismiss on the ground that the action was not filed in this court within the applicable California statute of limitations, or that she was guilty of laches.

A. Timeliness of EEOC Filing.

The court has already twice rejected ALPA's contention that Mrs. Sangster's EEOC filing was untimely. But ALPA again renews its assertion, claiming as justification that the court did not then have the guidance of the Supreme Court in its decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, supra, a case arising out of the same discriminatory policy. It asserts once more that the critical date triggering the filing period was April 9, 1968, the date of plaintiff's marriage, and not November 8, 1968, the date plaintiff's application for transfer to stewardess status in fact was denied. Lest there be doubt as to the basis of the court's ruling to the contrary, the court will consider the issue anew.

Although Evans had not been decided when the court issued its first order, the decision was considered by this court prior to its reconsideration of its order on June 28, 1977. The court reaffirmed that order because, among other reasons, Evans is not on point. Nor are the other cases now cited to the court by ALPA.

In Evans, the Supreme Court ruled that a complaint filed with the EEOC five years after the person aggrieved was discharged by United Air...

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