Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd.

• Decision Date: 16 October 1995
• Citation: 907 S.W.2d 807
• Parties: SANIFILL OF TENNESSEE, INC., Appellee, v. TENNESSEE SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL CONTROL BOARD, Appellants.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 807

907 S.W.2d 807

SANIFILL OF TENNESSEE, INC., Appellee, v. TENNESSEE SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL CONTROL BOARD, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Nashville.

Oct. 16, 1995.

Thomas V. White, Todd E. Panther, Nashville, John P. Williams, Nashville, for Appellee.

Charles W. Burson, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Barry Turner, Deputy Attorney General, Nashville, for Appellants.

OPINION

BIRCH, Justice.

We granted the application for review under Rule 11, Tenn.R.App.P., filed by the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, the defendant in the original action. ¹ At issue is whether the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-211-101 et seq. authorizes the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, in the exercise of its permit-issuing process, to restrict the number of counties from which private landfills may receive solid waste.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the statute does not confer such authority. Thus, we affirm as modified the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

A permit was issued to the original owner, William Beckham, to begin operating the subject landfill on June 1, 1990. However, the permit authorized Beckham to receive solid waste from seven counties only: Bedford, Giles, Lincoln, Marshall, Maury, Rutherford, and Williamson.

In 1991, Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. (Sanifill) purchased the landfill, and the Tennessee Department of Energy and Conservation (the Department) issued a permit on August 16, 1991, to Sanifill which reflected this change of ownership. This permit, however, limited Sanifill to the same seven-county service area as provided in the permit issued to Beckham.

On December 6, 1991, Sanifill sought to increase the number of counties from which it could receive solid waste from seven (as allowed) to forty-eight. The Department's Division of Solid Waste Management (the Division) treated this as a proposal for permit modification and on January 16, 1992, issued public notice that the Division intended to approve the permit modification. ² During the ensuing public comment period, the Marshall County Commission adopted a resolution opposing the proposed expansion of the service area of the landfill. Thereafter, on February 12, 1992, the Division informed Sanifill that it would not further consider Sanifill's request for expansion of the service area until Sanifill obtained approval from the Marshall County Commission.

Sanifill appealed this action to the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Board (the Board) seeking a declaratory order; two issues were raised:

(1) Whether Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-211-105(h) ³ prohibited the Department from processing the permit modification until the modification had been approved by the Marshall County Commission in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-211-701 et seq. ⁴ ; and

(2) Whether the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Act and its implementing regulations allowed the Department to limit the counties from which Sanifill may receive solid waste at its private landfill.

The Board ruled against Sanifill on both issues, finding (1) that Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-211-105(h) prohibited the Department from acting on Sanifill's request to expand its service area until the request had been approved by the Marshall County Commission, and (2) that the Department had the authority to limit the counties from which Sanifill may receive solid waste.

Sanifill petitioned the Davidson County Chancery Court for review of the Board's declaratory order. The trial court reversed the Board's decision on the first issue, finding that the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 69-211-701 et seq. requiring local approval of construction for landfills applied only to new landfills, not to landfills already established. The trial court ruled that Sanifill did not need local approval before seeking the Department's permission to service a larger area. The trial court affirmed the Board's decision on the second issue, holding that the Solid Waste Disposal Act ⁵ contained language broad enough to authorize the Department to restrict Sanifill's service area. The Solid Waste Disposal Board, Marshall County, and Sanifill all appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Chancery Court on the first issue, finding unanimously that the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 68-211-701 et seq. did not apply to Sanifill's request to expand its landfill's service area because there would be no "construction of a new landfill" as that phrase is commonly understood. Further review of that issue is not sought by either party.

On the remaining issue, the Court of Appeals held that the Department had the duty and power to regulate and inspect landfills to ensure that they operated within the bounds of the policies and purposes of the Solid Waste Disposal Act and that the Department had the authority to limit the receipt of waste at a given site to an amount which could be safely and expeditiously processed. However, the intermediate court held that the Department had neither the express nor implied authority to limit the size of the service area without a showing that such limitation is necessary to protect the public health and safety. No such showing having been made in this case, the Court of Appeals held that the Department was without authority to regulate the point of origin of waste.

We now consider the Board's appeal from that judgment. As stated, the sole issue is whether the Department, in the exercise of its permit-granting function, has the authority to restrict the source areas from which solid waste may be received by the operator of a private landfill. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, as herein modified.

II

When reviewing an agency decision, the appropriate standard of review is that set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act:

The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.

In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). In addition, such review is limited to the record of the case. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(g). Findings of fact made by the agency may not be reviewed de novo by the trial or appellate courts, and courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on factual issues. Southern Ry. Co. v. Tennessee Bd. of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn.1984); CF Indus. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 599 S.W.2d 536 (Tenn.1980); National Council on Compensation Ins. v. Gaddis, 786 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). However, the "substantial and material evidence standard" in Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5) requires a searching and careful inquiry that subjects the agency's decision to close scrutiny. Wayne County v. Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 756 S.W.2d 274, 280 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988). Further, construction of a statute and application of the law to the facts is a question of law that may be addressed by the courts. See Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906 (Tenn.1993). The issue of whether the Tennessee statutory scheme expressly or implicitly grants authority to the Department to regulate the service area from which a solid waste disposal facility may receive solid waste is a question of law, not of fact, and this Court's role is to interpret the law under the facts of this case.

Every action taken by an agency must be grounded in an express statutory grant of authority or must arise by necessary implication from an express statutory grant of authority. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 554 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Tenn.1977); Wayne County, 756 S.W.2d at 282. Even though statutes such as the Solid Waste Disposal Act should be construed liberally since they are remedial in nature, the authority they vest in an administrative agency must have its source in the language of the statutes themselves.

III

The Department concedes that the Solid Waste Disposal Act (the Act) does not grant express authority to the Department to limit service areas as part of its function in the issuance of solid waste disposal permits. However, it argues that the power to impose such limitations is implicit in the broad language of the Act. Specifically, it cites the duties of the Department set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 68-211-105(a), -107(a). Those provisions provide, respectively:

The department shall exercise general supervision over the construction of solid waste processing facilities and disposal facilities or sites throughout the state. Such general supervision shall apply to all features of construction of solid waste processing facilities and disposal facilities or sites which do or may affect the public health and safety or the quality of the environment, and which do or may affect the proper processing or disposal of solid wastes.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-211-105(a) (1992 & Supp.1994);

The department shall exercise general supervision over the operation and maintenance of solid waste processing facilities and disposal facilities or sites. Such general supervision shall apply to all the features of operation and maintenance which do or may affect the public health and safety or the quality...