Sanjivini K., Matter of
| Decision Date | 20 December 1976 |
| Citation | 40 N.Y.2d 1025,359 N.E.2d 1330,391 N.Y.S.2d 535 |
| Parties | , 359 N.E.2d 1330 In the Matter of SANJIVINI K., a child alleged to be neglected. ROCKLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellant, v. USHA K., Respondent. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Louis J. Artale, Spring Valley, Law Guardian, and Ivan Blecher, Spring Valley, for infant.
Alan M. Simon, New York, for respondent.
The order of the Appellate Division shou be reversed and the order of Family Court reinstated. Because of the pendency of two related proceedings there are some procedural complexities to be sorted out. What is paramount, however, is the proper resolution of the interests of a young girl, her natural mother and her foster parents.
The proceeding now before us was instituted by the Rockland County Department of Social Services under section 382 of the Social Services Law for a periodic Family Court review of the foster care placement of this child. Family Court found that the best interests of the child required that her permanent status be ascertained as soon as possible; to that end, pursuant to the provisions of section 392 (subd. 7, par. (c)), the court directed the prompt institution of a proceeding to legally free her for adoption. We agree with both the objective and the procedural disposition of Family Court. Because of the restricted focus of the foster care review proceeding, the limitation of findings by Family Court to those appropriate to the review of the foster care status of the child, and the insufficiency of the record in general, the present foster care review proceeding is not the appropriate judicial vehicle in which to determine the permanent status of the child. For this reason we reverse the disposition at the Appellate Division.
There is pending, however, another proceeding. Pursuant to the direction of Family Court and pending the appeal to the Appellate Division in the present foster care review proceeding, a second, independent proceeding was instituted under part 1 of article 6 of the Family Court Act which resulted on March 4, 1976 in an adjudication that the child was a permanently neglected child. That proceeding is now on appeal to the Appellate Division. The interests of the child, her natural mother and her foster parents will best be served by resolving the status of the child and the rights and obligations of the parties in that permanent neglect proceeding in conformity with the standards we have enunciated (Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277). Accordingly, we do not now reach or express any view with respect to the issues which will ultimately be resolved in the permanent neglect proceeding, and our reversal of the disposition at the Appellate Division in the present proceeding should in no way be taken as indicating whether the child should remain with her foster parents or be returned to her mother.
We are prompted, however, in the circumstances disclosed in the record now before us to urge that all proceedin concerning the child be conducted to their final conclusions with dispatch, in the best interests of the child. To accomplish that result both the Family Court, because of its wide original jurisdiction, and the Appellate Division, given its broad power of review over facts and its equally extensive power to exercise discretion, may choose to initiate, consolidate, or review all proceedings heretofore initiated and any which may hereafter be brought. The subject of all these proceedings is a young child, and ingenuity and energy should be brought to bear, within the limits of due process of law and the applicable statutes, promptly to make appropriate provision for her welfare. It is not mere rhetoric to say that a child in need of distress is a ward of the State which exercises its powers Parens patriae through the judicial branch.
In any event the order of the Appellate Division in this proceeding should not be affirmed, in view of its reliance on a result and Ratio decidendi recently overturned by this court in Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys (40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277 Supra).
While I agree with the dissent's view that the instant proceeding under section 392 of the Social Services Law is appropriate for the resolution of the issues, I concur with the majority to the extent that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that the order of the Family Court be reinstated. Such a reversal is required because of the Appellate Division's emphasis on the interests of the natural mother rather than on the best interests of the child.
I dissent and vote to affirm, for all the well-documented reasons stated by the Appellate Division.
First, I do not agree with the majority that the present proceeding, instituted pursuant to section 392 of the Social Services Law, is not the 'appropriate judicial vehicle in which to determine the permanent status of the child.' Unmentioned are the detailed findings of the Appellate Division founded upon a substantial record; and the result of a reversal here is to embrace the 'objective' of the Family Court whose findings are disturbingly meager and woefully inadequate. As will be noted, that result will have effectively predetermined the outcome of the proceeding and foreclosed any real hope the natural mother may have had in regaining the custody of her child.
Section 384--a of the Social Services Law authorizes the Family Court to periodically review the foster care status of, Inter alia, a child whose custody has been transferred temporarily to an agency by a parent pursuant to section 392 of the Social Services Law, and provides for the following alternative dispositions:
'7. At the conclusion of * * * (a) hearing, the court shall, upon the proof adduced, in accordance with the best interest of the child, enter an order of disposition:
'(a) directing that foster care of the child be continued; or
'(b) in the case of a child who has been committed temporarily to the care of an authorized agency by a parent, guardian or relative, directing that the child be returned to such parent, guardian or relative; or
'(c) in the case of a child who has been committed temporarily to the care of an authorized agency by a parent, guardian or relative, directing that the agency institute a proceeding to legally free such child for adoption, and upon a failure by such agency to institute such a proceeding within thirty days after entry of such order, permitting the foster parent or parents in whose home the child resides to institute such a proceeding; or
'(d) in the case of a child whose guardianship and custody have been committed to an authorized agency by an order of a surrogate or judge of the family court or by a surrender instrument or who has been judicially declared to be a permanently neglected child, directing that such child be placed for adoption in the foster family home where he resides or has resided or with any other person or persons.'
While section 392 provides that temporary foster care may be prolonged, an order may be made pursuant to paragraph (b) of subdivision 7 for a permanent disposition of custody by directing that the child be returned to a natural parent who...
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... Page 514 ... 419 N.Y.S.2d 514 ... 69 A.D.2d 612 ... In the Matter of JUNE B., Petitioner-Appellant, ... EDWARD L., Respondent-Respondent ... Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department ... July 10, ... The child should not be kept in limbo. Matter of Sanjivini K., 40 N.Y.2d 1025, 1026-27, 391 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536-537, 359 N.E.2d 1330, 1331-1332 ... The order of the Family Court, New York ... ...
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... ... In Matter of Sanjivini K, 40 N.Y.2d 1025, 391 N.Y.S.2d 535, 359 N.E.2d 1330, the Court of Appeals directed that the rationale of Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys (supra) be applied to proceedings to terminate parental rights. Thus, the courts have held that there exists a common law standard for termination of parental ... ...
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