Sankey v. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1902
• Parties: F. SANKEY, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

91 N.W. 820

118 Iowa 39

F. SANKEY, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 13, 1902

Appeal from Pottawattamie District Court.--HON. W. R. GREEN, Judge.

ACTION at law for damages on account of personal injuries occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendant. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Carroll Wright, John I. Dille and A. L. Preston for appellant

Thomas A. Cheshire for appellee.

OPINION

WEAVER, J.

Plaintiff was in the employ of defendant as head brakeman on a freight train. On the morning of January 6, 1899, the train pulled in upon the side track of the defendant's railroad at the station of Earlham, and plaintiff, in the performance of his duty, undertook to couple the engine to certain cars standing upon such track. In so doing he stepped in front of the moving cars and slipped, as it is claimed upon a ridge of ice which had formed or accumulated inside of the rail, causing him to fall, and resulting in his feet being crushed beneath the wheels, whereby he was seriously and permanently crippled. This accident, he alleges, was caused by the negligence of the defendant in so grading and maintaining its yards at Earlham that water would settle and freeze at the point where plaintiff's foot slipped, and where brakemen were required to walk in the performance of their duties, and in permitting the ice to remain thereon and become rough and uneven of surface, thus rendering the yard at that point slippery and dangerous to walk over. The defendant denies plaintiff's claim, and further alleges that the plaintiff had been in its employ for several years and was well acquainted with the condition of the road and tracks with respect to snow and ice; that the condition of the yard and tracks at Earlham at the time of the accident was the same as at other yards generally upon the road where plaintiff worked, and with which he was familiar; that he knew, or with the exercise of reasonable care ought to have known, that ice and snow did at times accumulate thereon, and that, by remaining in the company's employment with such knowledge and means of knowledge concerning the alleged danger, he assumed the risk of all such perils, and waived any right of recovery which he otherwise might have had. Many errors are assigned, but the argument of appellant is confined to a few propositions, which we will briefly consider:

1. It is first urged that defendant cannot be held negligent because of the presence or accumulation of ice and snow upon its tracks and yards. Within certain limitations, this is the correct doctrine. Climatic conditions--heat, cold, rain snow, and ice--are beyond the control of the employer; and the mere fact of their existence or occurrence does not tend to negative the exercise of reasonable care. But it does not follow that a case cannot arise where the presence or existence of some of these elements is so combined with want of reasonable care by a railroad company in the maintenance of its tracks and yards as to create a danger which is not naturally or necessarily incident to a brakeman's labor. The work of coupling and uncoupling cars, making up trains, taking and discharging freight, opening and closing switches, is done almost exclusively within the yard limits of the stations along the line of road, and, within reasonable limits, the obligation of the master to furnish his servant a safe place in which to work applies to these yards as imperatively as to the repair shops or to the general offices of the company. Reasonable safety, however, does not necessarily mean the absence of danger; for, paradoxical as it may seem, a place of great danger may be "safe," within the terms of the law, if reasonable care has been used to guard against so much of the peril as ordinary prudence would anticipate, and ordinary effort avoid. As we have said, the mere falling of snow or formation of ice is not in itself evidence of negligence on part of the company; but if by reason of the structures or improvements placed upon the yards, or by reason of the method for caring for or maintaining such yard or by reason of public travel across the same, such snow or ice accumulates in heaps or ridges in places where brakemen are required to go in performing the work required of them, thereby exposing them to danger of slipping beneath the wheels of moving cars, and such obstructions are allowed to remain an unreasonable length of time without effort to remove them, it cannot then be said, as a matter of law, that such company is not negligent. In the case at bar, while the testimony was conflicting, there was sufficient to justify the jury in finding that plaintiff's injury was occasioned by his foot slipping upon ice as he was in the act of coupling cars; that this ice had formed several weeks before the accident; and that by reason of public travel, or by reason of the shade of the rail retarding the thawing process at that point, it had assumed the form of an uneven ridge just inside of the south rail, and sloping towards the center of the track. The height of this ridge is variously stated by witnesses as being from two inches to the full height of the rail. Other patches of ice are shown near the same point, but outside of the track; and the evidence, while not entirely clear as to the identical spot upon which plaintiff slipped, is sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury in this respect. There is evidence, also, that it was the custom of the defendant to clear its tracks in station grounds, to some extent, of snow and ice, but this labor, it would seem, was generally confined to "flanging;" that is, to the removal of snow and ice to the width of an ordinary shovel blade just inside of each rail,--a process which the jury might have found would have prevented or removed a ridge of ice of the dimensions and location described by several witnesses. In view of these facts, we think the trial court was right in submitting the question of negligence to the jury. Cities and towns are charged with the duty of providing safe streets and walks for the use of the public. The responsibility of public corporations is in this respect no greater in degree than that which rests upon railroad companies to provide their employes a safe place in which to perform the work required of them. The measure of the duty in each instance is reasonable diligence and care. This is not to be understood as holding the railroad company to the performance of...