Sanner v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital

• Decision Date: 02 January 1968
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 17989.
• Citation: 278 F. Supp. 138
• Parties: Mary W. SANNER and Cecil B. Sanner v. The TRUSTEES OF the SHEPPARD AND ENOCH PRATT HOSPITAL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

278 F. Supp. 138

Mary W. SANNER and Cecil B. Sanner v. The TRUSTEES OF the SHEPPARD AND ENOCH PRATT HOSPITAL.

Civ. A. No. 17989.

United States District Court D. Maryland.

January 2, 1968.

Joseph I. Huesman, Baltimore, Md., and D. Robert Cervera, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Norman P. Ramsey, James D. Peacock, Cleaveland D. Miller, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

NORTHROP, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Mary W. and Cecil B. Sanner, bring this suit against the defendant, the Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital (hereinafter referred to as the Hospital), because of injuries suffered by Mary W. Sanner as a result of the alleged negligence of the Hospital's employees.

Plaintiffs allege that on or about December 9, 1963, they entered into an agreement with the Hospital for the commission of Mary Sanner to the Hospital for care and treatment, and that as a result of the negligent care of Mary Sanner, she fell from an unlocked or unbarred window or door and sustained serious and permanent injuries.

The defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the basis of charitable immunity.

Jurisdiction is based on diversity. Therefore, the court must follow the substantive law, both decisional and statutory, of the State of Maryland on the question of the applicability of the doctrine of charitable immunity. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).

Since 1885, when the doctrine of charitable immunity was established in the case of Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885), the Maryland courts have consistently held that an eleemosynary corporation is immune from tort liability. Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301, L.R.A. 1917, D., 967 (1917); Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948); Thomas v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Md. 554, 92 A.2d 452 (1952); State for Use of Cavanaugh v. Arundel Park Corporation, 218 Md. 484, 147 A.2d 427 (1958); Cornelius v. Sinai Hospital, 219 Md. 116, 148 A.2d 567 (1958). To fully effectuate this policy the immunity is complete, extending to all tortious activity. Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, supra. And it matters not that the plaintiff is a paying patient and not a beneficiary of the charity. In the Howard case, the court said:

"The appellant attempts to distinguish the Maryland cases cited on the grounds that plaintiff in the House of Refuge was an incorrigible boy, sent to the reformatory at public expense, and in the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt case, a city fireman injured on account of a known defect in the premises owned by the hospital. But we think the fact the plaintiff in the instant case was a `pay patient', injured through negligence of a servant, is without significance. We think the cases cited are controlling."

The defendant points out that recently this court summarily dismissed several cases brought against the defendant. In Hannay v. The Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, Civil Action No. 14398, D.Md., March 4, 1964, summary judgment was granted in an oral opinion of the then District Judge Winter. In that case the court said:

"This is a diversity case, and from the allegations, it is alleged that the tort occurred in Maryland. Certainly, Maryland law would apply and Maryland law in a case of this type, that is, tort liability on behalf of a hospital, is perfectly clear and that is that the hospital, being a charitable institution, is not amenable to suit for tort."

The holding of the court in Cooper v. The Trustees of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, Civil Action No. 17891, D.Md., March 10, 1967, oral opinion of the undersigned, was to the same effect. Behind this doctrine of immunity is that damages for tortious acts should be recoverable from the wrongdoer and not from the trust funds which are devoted to charitable purposes.

"In the final analysis it seems that the immunity of eleemosynary institutions to tort claims is grounded on an assumed public policy against the enervation of public charities, established for the benefit of the whole community, by compensation of isolated individuals for injuries inflicted by the negligence of the charities and their agents." 5 Md.L.Rev. 336, 340 (1941).

This argument has lost its persuasiveness with courts in recent years in light of modern conditions, both in law and philanthropy. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U. S.App.D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810 (1942). In the Georgetown case the court observed:

"What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is the cost of reasonable protection, the amount of the insurance premium as an added burden on its finances, not the awarding over in damages of its entire assets.

"Against this, we weigh the costs to the victim of bearing the full burden of his injury." at p. 824.

The prevalence of insurance and its low cost has had a profound influence on the law of tort immunity in general, both charitable and governmental immunity. Most recently the Indiana Appeals Court in Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 231 N.E.2d 169 (1967) in striking down the doctrine of governmental immunity, said:

"The inherent inequities found in the governmental-proprietary distinction and the availability of liability insurance as a substitute for and a supplement to governmental liability, have caused many states to abrogate the doctrine of municipal tort immunity. "* * * The unfairness to the innocent victim of a principle of complete tort immunity and the social desirability of spreading the loss — a trend now evident in many fields — have been often advanced as arguments in favor of extending the scope of liability. * * * After careful consideration we are of the opinion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no proper place in the administration of a municipal corporation."

The vitality of the doctrine in Maryland, until the recent statutory change in 1966, even in the wake of widespread reevaluation of the doctrine and total abandonment by an increasing number of courts, can be attributed to several factors. First, the Maryland court prefers that long-established rules of law be changed by legislative action rather than by judicial fiat. Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 125 A. 512 (1924); Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 186 Md. 406, 47 A.2d 365 (1946). Second, stare decisis with respect to this doctrine takes on added significance for the Maryland court has held that the legislative recognition of the judicial rule prevented the court from overruling its prior decisions. In Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital the appellant contended, as the present plaintiffs argue, that the doctrine established in the Perry case and reaffirmed in Loeffler were wrongly decided and out of line with the modern trend. The court said:

"Whatever the merits of the argument as an original proposition, we are not warranted in overruling our prior decisions. There are special reasons why the doctrine of stare decisis should be adhered to in this case. To withdraw immunity from this type of corporation at this time would be an act of judicial legislation in the face of a contrary policy declared by the legislature itself.

"Not only has the legislature granted exemptions to charitable corporations from various forms of taxation, in order that their field of usefulness might be enlarged, but it has made direct appropriations to the same end. To establish a liability at this time would run counter to legislative policy and increase potential demands upon the State.

"In 1947, House Bill 99 proposed, in its original form, to estop any charitable corporation from pleading as a defense to tort claims the fact that it was such an institution, and further provided that the liability should not exceed the amount of liability insurance carried. The bill failed of passage (Senate Journal p. 1462) S.B. 411, at the same session, was introduced as a substitute (Senate Journal 1408) and was adopted as § 68B of Article 48A, Acts 1947, ch. 900. This Section provides that `each policy issued to cover the liability of any charitable institution for negligence or any other tort shall contain a provision to the effect that the insurer shall be estopped from asserting, as a defense to any claim covered by said policy, that such institution is immune from liability on the ground that it is a charitable institution.' It is clear that the legislature has accepted the doctrine announced by this court and dealt with the matter in its own fashion. The plaintiff here has not brought himself within the terms of the section quoted."

More recently, in 1966, the Maryland Legislature dealt with charitable immunity by enacting the following provision:

"Immunity from tort liability. No hospital or related institution as defined in this subtitle shall be immune from liability for negligence or any other tort on the grounds that it is a charitable institution; provided, however, that a hospital or related institution which is a charitable institution and which is insured against such liability in an amount not less than $100,000 shall not be liable for damages in excess of the limits of such insurance." Md.Code Ann.Art. 43 § 556A (Supp. 1966).

This latter provision is not relevant to the present case for Section 2, ch. 673, Acts 1966, provides that "nothing in this act shall apply to claims for acts of negligence or other torts occurring before June 1, 1966." The acts complained of by the plaintiffs occurred on or about December 8, 1963. It is cited here only to complete the historical development of charitable immunity in Maryland to the present time.

What distinguishes the present case from those cited above, and what has necessitated a review of the background of charitable immunity in Maryland, is that this appears to be the first constitutional...