Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 20030497-CA.
Decision Date | 17 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 20030497-CA.,20030497-CA. |
Citation | 2004 UT App 203,94 P.3d 301 |
Parties | Barry SANNS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BUTTERFIELD FORD, a Utah corporation; Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation; and Does 1 through 30, Defendants and Appellee. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
David R. Olsen and Paul M. Simmons, Dewsnup King & Olson, Salt Lake City, and Timothy J. Ryan, Timothy J Ryan & Associates, Huntington Beach, California, for Appellant.
Bryon J. Benevento, Brian C. Cheney, and David N. Wolf, Snell & Wilmer, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before BENCH, Associate P.J., GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.
¶ 1 Appellant Barry Sanns (Sanns) appeals the trial court's grant of Appellee Butterfield Ford's (Butterfield Ford) Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Sanns argues that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford was negligent in selling a fifteen-passenger van to the State of Utah without adequately warning of the van's propensity to roll over when loaded. Sanns further argues that even if Butterfield Ford was not negligent in selling the van, the Utah Liability Reform Act (ULRA) nevertheless allows Butterfield Ford to be apportioned fault under the doctrine of strict liability. We affirm.
¶ 2 On December 7, 2000, Sanns, a guard for the Utah Department of Corrections, was riding as a passenger in a 1999 Ford Econoline E-350 van when the van rolled several times, seriously injuring Sanns and other passengers. The van was designed and manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford) and delivered to Butterfield Ford. Butterfield Ford sold the van in June 1999, in a fleet sale, to the Utah Department of Corrections.
¶ 3 In June 2002, Sanns brought this action against Ford and Butterfield Ford asserting claims for strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence.1 Butterfield Ford moved for summary judgment and submitted an affidavit of its president, Brent E. Butterfield, in support of its motion. The trial court initially denied the motion for summary judgment and granted Sanns 240 days to conduct discovery in order to controvert the assertions in Mr. Butterfield's affidavit. After additional discovery, including Sanns deposing Mr. Butterfield, Butterfield Ford renewed its motion for summary judgment. The trial court then granted Butterfield Ford's renewed motion for summary judgment. The court found that (i) Sanns failed to present any credible evidence to show that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive distributor of the van; (ii) Butterfield Ford did not design, manufacture, test, assemble, package, alter, or ship the vehicle; (iii) the fact that Butterfield Ford acknowledged that a van has a higher center of gravity than a sports car does not create a genuine issue of material fact that the dealer knew of any design defects in the van; and (iv) the ULRA does not permit a cause of action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party in the action.
¶ 4 When reviewing an appeal from a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we view the facts Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157,¶ 7, 71 P.3d 631.
¶ 5 The determination of whether a passive seller of a product can be held strictly liable under the ULRA is based on the trial court's interpretation of a statute, which we review for correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87,¶ 10, 977 P.2d 518
.
¶ 6 Sanns argues the trial court erred in granting Butterfield Ford summary judgment on Sanns's negligence claim because there existed genuine issues of material fact. "A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, "the mere existence of genuine issues of fact... does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case." Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 7 Sanns first asserts that there is an issue of material fact about whether Butterfield Ford knew or should have known of the alleged defective nature of the van. In support of this argument, Sanns presented Mr. Butterfield's deposition testimony where he stated in part:
¶ 8 Butterfield Ford does not dispute that it knew that this van had a higher center of gravity and handled differently than passenger vehicles. This commonsense observation could be made by many people inside and outside of the automotive industry. Sanns has failed to explain how, with this recognition that most vans have a higher center of gravity than most cars, Butterfield Ford knew or should have known that this particular van model had a manufacturing defect increasing the likelihood the van could roll over. The trial court was correct in concluding that this evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Butterfield Ford knew or should have known of any alleged design defects in the van.2
¶ 9 Furthermore, when a party fails to produce evidence sufficient to meet one of the elements of a claim, "`there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Burns, 876 P.2d at 419-20 ( ); see also Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., 875 P.2d 570, 578 (Utah Ct.App.1994)
(. ) A duty to warn a consumer of a defective product lies with a seller or manufacturer of a product "who knows or should know of a risk associated with its product." House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 547 (Utah Ct.App.1994). The trial court found that Sanns "failed to present any credible evidence to show that Butterfield Ford was anything but a passive distributer of the vehicle in question." We agree. Butterfield Ford, as a passive retailer and not the van's manufacturer, did not owe a duty to its customers to warn them of a manufacturing defect that it did not know of itself. Furthermore, Sanns has provided no legal authority holding that the seller of a product, who does not know of nor should know of a defect in that product, nonetheless owes a duty of care to the purchaser.3
¶ 10 The evidence presented by Sanns is insufficient to create an issue of material fact as to whether Butterfield Ford knew or should have known of the alleged defect in the van. Therefore, the trial court was correct when it granted summary judgment in favor of Butterfield Ford on Sanns's negligence claim.
¶ 11 Sanns next challenges the trial court's determination that the ULRA, Utah Code Annotated sections 78-27-37 to -43 (2002 & Supp.2003),4 "does not provide a cause of action for strict liability against a purely passive distributor where the fault complained of arises out of a design or manufacturing defect, and where the manufacturer/designer of the product is a named party to the action."
¶ 13 Prior to passage of the ULRA, and under the common law doctrine of joint and several liability, "a tortfeasor was potentially liable for the entire amount of a plaintiff's damages, irrespective of what proportion of fault was actually attributable to that individual tortfeasor as opposed to another joint tortfeasor." National Serv. Indus. v. B.W. Norton Mfg. Co., 937 P.2d 551, 554 (Utah Ct.App.1997). In 1986, the Utah Legislature enacted the ULRA, eliminating joint and several liability. See id. at 554-55. Specifically, the Act states, "the maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40(1) (2002).
¶ 14 While the ULRA limits a party's liability to its proportion of fault, this does not prohibit a factfinder from assigning liability to a party under a claim for strict liability. See S.H. ex rel. Robinson v....
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