Herrod v. Metal Powder Prods.

• Decision Date: 07 June 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:07–cv–00023 CW.
• Citation: 886 F.Supp.2d 1271
• Parties: Catherine HERROD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. METAL POWDER PRODUCTS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

886 F.Supp.2d 1271

Catherine HERROD, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.METAL POWDER PRODUCTS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:07–cv–00023 CW.

United States District Court,

D. Utah,

Northern Division.

June 7, 2012.

Alain C. Balmanno, Kelly H. MacFarlane, L. Rich Humpherys, Roger P. Christensen, Christensen & Jensen PC, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiffs.

John R. Lund, Julianne P. Blanch, Tsutomu L. Johnson, Snow Christensen & Martineau, Michael L. Ford, Strong & Hanni, Steven T. Densley, Union Pacific Railroad Law Department, Salt Lake City, UT, Clinton A. McAdams, Joseph J. Joyce, Ryan J. Schriever, J. Joyce & Associates, South Jordan, UT, Robert L. Janicki, Strong & Hanni, Sandy, UT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

CLARK WADDOUPS, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendants Timpte, Inc. and Timpte Industries, Inc.'s (collectively “Timpte”) second motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 100.) Plaintiffs are seeking damages from Timpte for personal injury and wrongful death on theories of negligence, strict liability for product defect, and a failure to warn. For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS Timpte's second motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought the current suit against several defendants, including Timpte, in connection with an automobile accident that occurred on January 30, 2005. The accident occurred in Davis County, Utah when a rear wheel came off a semi-trailer and struck a vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs who were traveling in the opposite direction. See Mem. Supp. Second Mot. for Summ. J. 3 (Dkt. No. 101.) The accident caused Plaintiffs Catherine, Scott, Taylor, Matthew, and Elizabeth Herrod to sustain serious personal injuries and killed Kimball Herrod, the husband and father of the plaintiffs injured in the accident and son of Plaintiffs Niles and Janet Herrod.

The trailer involved in the accident had been manufactured by Timpte as part of a special order of 210 semi-trailers placed by Northwest Transport Service, Inc. (“Northwest”) on September 26, 1985. Each of the trailers, including the trailer at issue in this case, was to be built according to detailed specifications provided to Timpte by Northwest. These specifications indicated that, among other things, each trailer was to use Pro–Torq nuts to secure the wheels to the axles. Timpte neither recommended or suggested the use of the Pro–Torq wheel retention system in the trailers ordered by Northwest. Construction of the trailer at issue was completed in March of 1986.

Timpte was not aware of any safety concerns, alleged defects or design issues, or accidents involving the Pro–Torq wheel retention system at any time before the automobile accident that gave rise to the current suit. However, in November of 2005, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a report, based on a manufacturer's report dated June 21, 2002, indicating that certain semi-trailers equipped with the Pro–Torq wheel retention system were subject to wheel separation due to improper installation.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” if “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” Thom v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir.2003). A fact is “material” if it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Id. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, as “evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the [nonmovant's favor].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

ANALYSIS

In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege negligence and strict liability causes of action against Timpte and other defendants. As Plaintiffs have conceded that their claims against Timpte are not based on negligence, see Mem. Opp. Second Mot. Summ. J. 3 (Dkt. No. 106.), the court will focus its analysis on the strict liability claims alleged against Timpte. Timpte will be granted summary judgment on any negligence claims brought against it in the complaint.

More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Timpte should be held strictly liable as a manufacturer for placing the defective Pro–Torq wheel retention system in the stream of commerce. Plaintiffs also allege that Timpte is liable for failing to warn of the latent dangers associated with use of the Pro–Torq wheel retention system on semi-trailers.

I. STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT DEFECTS

Utah generally follows the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998) in its application of strict liability for product defects. See, e.g., Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, ¶ 18, 167 P.3d 1058;Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp., 2007 UT 71, ¶ 6, 168 P.3d 814;Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 2002 UT 36, ¶ 25, 48 P.3d 218;Dimick v. OHC Liquidation Trust, 2007 UT App 73, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 347. Section 1 of the Restatement states:

One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 (1998). In general, this liability is imposed on any sellers or distributors of products, “even when such nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors do not themselves render the products defective and regardless of whether they are in a position to prevent defects from occurring.” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 1 cmt. e. Utah follows the general tort law principle that “as between an injured buyer of a product, and the seller of the product, the seller must bear the liability.” Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 2004 UT App 203, ¶ 15, 94 P.3d 301 (citing Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, 2003 UT 43, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d 922).See also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 cmt. o (“[S]trict liability is imposed on a wholesale or retail seller who neither knew nor should have known of the relevant risks, nor was in a position to have taken action to avoid them....”).

However, the general rule that all distributors and sellers of a defective product will be held strictly liable, regardless of their fault, is not without exceptions and the Restatement recognizes that “[l]egislation has been enacted in many jurisdictions that, to some extent, immunizes nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors from strict liability.” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 1 cmt. e. Utah is among the states that has adopted such legislation. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78B–5–820(1) (2012) (abolishing joint and several liability in Utah and limiting apportionment of liability to the portion of fault attributable to any particular defendant).

Timpte identifies two defenses which they claim preclude any application of liability to it as a matter of law. First, Timpte claims that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because it is qualified for the protection of the contract specifications defense. Second, Timpte claims that Utah's statutory abolition of joint and several liability and fault-based apportionment scheme precludes the imposition of any liability on Timpte in this case. Plaintiffs argue that neither defense is applicable.

Timpte argues that the court should grant its summary judgment motion on the design defect claim because the contract specifications defense entitles it to judgment as a matter of law. The contract specifications defense protects manufacturers from being held liable for injuries caused by design defects in products they manufacture in accordance with directions and specifications supplied by the purchaser of the products, unless the danger associated with following the specifications is obvious. See 2 David G. Owen, M. Stuart Madden, and Mary J. Davis, Madden & Owen on Products Liability § 19:4 (3d ed.2011). See also Mesman v. Crane Pro Services, 512 F.3d 352, 358–59 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 404 cmt. a (1977)) (under Indiana law, a contractor is “not required to sit in judgment on the plans and specifications or the materials provided by his employer” and “is not subject to liability if the specified design or material turns out to be insufficient to make the chattel safe for use, unless it is so obviously bad that a competent contractor would realize that there was a grave chance that his product would be dangerously unsafe.”); Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir.1973); McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Ky.1980); Houlihan v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 2 A.D.3d 493, 768 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (2003); Bloemer v. Art Welding Co., 884 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo.Ct.App.1994).

The contract specifications defense was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Leininger v. Stearns–Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33, 36 (1965). In Leininger, the court affirmed a summary judgment order entered by the trial court in favor of a general contractor on claims of negligence and contractual breach of warranty. Leininger, 404 P.2d at 39. The contractor, which had been hired to construct a uranium ore processing plant, had installed two defective fans in accordance with the specifications of the company that hired it. Id. at 39–40. The court held that because the contractor was “a mere vehicle, a conduit through which the [fans] passed [that] did not design, sell or recommend the installation of such fans, and had no discretion in their selection,” it could not be held liable for an injury caused by a defect in the fans in the absence of proof of the contractor's negligence. Id. at 41. Furthermore, the court held that there was “no basis for an implied warranty of fitness since the contractor provided the identical fans which he was required to furnish.” Id. at 42.

Because Leininger was decided before strict...