Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Decision Date | 18 March 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 296,METRO-NORTH,D,296 |
Citation | 81 F.3d 265 |
Parties | George G. SANTA MARIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.COMMUTER RAILROAD, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 95-7230. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Kevin T. Duffy, Judge, entered after a jury verdict against the appellant on his Federal Employers' Liability Act claim.
Joseph Smukler, Philadelphia, PA (Fox, Rothchild, O'Brien & Frankel, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
William G. Ballaine, New York City (Edward Flores, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.
Before FEINBERG, OAKES and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
Santa Maria worked as a trainman and conductor for Metro-North at the time of his alleged accident. He claims that on December 19, 1990, he was alone in a cubicle in Grand Central Station, napping on a cot supplied by Metro-North for conductors, when the cot suddenly collapsed. Santa Maria sued Metro-North under FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1994), for neck and back injuries sustained during the collapse and for depression caused by his disability.
Santa Maria was not unfamiliar with personal injury suits: he had previously sued Metro-North four times for accidents on the job. In each case, as in the present action, he hired the same lawyer, Joseph Smukler of Philadelphia. The case went to trial before a jury on January 23, 1995.
Because this appeal concerns the fairness of the jury trial, we must examine the trial proceedings, which involved fairly complex medical disagreements among a battery of experts over the plaintiff's neck injuries, in some detail. Santa Maria claims that the court continually badgered Smukler and cast doubt on the veracity of Santa Maria's case by its treatment of witnesses, including the plaintiff. Given these claims and our decision to remand for a new trial, we focus our attention primarily on the actions of the court during the trial proceedings.
The first indication of a potential problem between the court and Smukler came during the direct examination of the plaintiff's first witness, a medical expert. The witness testified that "I had him see a colleague also for a second neurological opinion as to surgery, and he concurred that he felt this was--" whereupon there was a sustained objection. The witness apologized, but Smukler went on to ask, "You said you sent him to someone else who concurred--." The court sustained an objection, adding,
During the recess with the jury not present, the court gave Smukler a warning in the following language:
There were no further problems before the jury that day until Smukler took exhibits consisting of x-ray enlargements and attempted to use them through the next witness, a neuroradiologist. Metro-North's counsel objected and the court admonished, Smukler replied, "Sure, all right."
On redirect, Smukler inquired, "Has any question or any information given to you changed your opinion that this man has a herniated disc at C4-5 and C5-6?" and received a negative answer. He continued, "It still remains your opinion based on--." The court interrupted, After the jury was excused, the court said to Smukler,
Plaintiff's third witness was a certified neurosurgeon who, when asked by counsel which hospitals he worked in, answered, The court said, "I'm sorry, is that the name of a hospital, outpatient?" The witness said, The court: "So you're not working At the end of the examination of the third witness, the following exchange occurred in the presence of the jury:
The third day of trial began with Smukler calling fellow employees of the plaintiff, who described the cots in the sleeping cubicles at Grand Central. Smukler said to a witness, Metro-North's counsel objected and the court said (apparently to Smukler),
Later that same day, Santa Maria testified to his treatment and care by various doctors. After Santa Maria's testimony that he had seen Metro-North doctors every month from February 1991 to 1993, Smukler started to repeat the answer, "So from February of '91 to the summer of '93--." The court interrupted to say, Smukler: "Okay, all I wanted to--." The Court: "Remember what I told you yesterday about summations?" Smukler: "No, I wanted to ask him the name of the doctor that he saw." The Court: "Yes, that's fine, that's a question." Smukler: "Judge,--." The Court:
When the jury had left the courtroom, the following exchange occurred:
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