Santa Teresa Citizen v. Cal. Energy Com.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. C041090.,C041090.
• Citation: 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 392,105 Cal.App.4th 1441
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SANTA TERESA CITIZEN ACTION GROUP et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMISSION, Defendant and Respondent; Calpine Corporation, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

130 Cal.Rptr.2d 392

105 Cal.App.4th 1441

SANTA TERESA CITIZEN ACTION GROUP et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMISSION, Defendant and Respondent Calpine Corporation, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

No. C041090.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

February 5, 2003.

As Modified February 24, 2003.

Review Denied May 14, 2003.

Law Offices of Stephan C. Volker, Stephan C. Volker, San Francisco, and Eileen M. Rice, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

William M. Chamberlain, Jonathan Blees, Sacramento, Richard C. Ratliff and Kerry Willis, for Defendant and Respondent.

Ellison, Schneider & Harris, Jeffery D. Harris and Christopher T. Ellison, Sacramento, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

ROBIE, J.

Is the statute that grants exclusive jurisdiction to the California Supreme Court to review power plant certification decisions of the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (the Energy Commission) constitutional? Yes.

In this mandate proceeding, several parties opposed to the construction of a power plant in Santa Clara County sought to overturn a decision by the Energy Commission approving the project, contending the commission's decision violated their constitutional rights. The superior court concluded the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the Energy Commission's decision and sustained its demurrer and that of real party in interest Calpine Corporation without leave to amend.

On appeal from the judgment of dismissal, plaintiffs contend that because the Supreme Court summarily denied their petition for a writ of mandate seeking review of the Energy Commission's decision in that court without reviewing the agency record, the superior court had jurisdiction to review their constitutional challenges to the decision.¹ We disagree and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1999, Calpine applied to the Energy Commission for certification of a power plant, the Metcalf Energy Center (MEC), to be located in the Coyote Valley in Santa Clara County. Despite plaintiffs' opposition, on September 24, 2001, the Energy Commission approved Calpine's application. Plaintiffs petitioned for reconsideration but the Energy Commission denied their petition on November 19, 2001. (Pub. Resources Code, § 25530; all further section references are to this code unless otherwise noted.)

On December 19, 2001, plaintiffs simultaneously filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court and a petition for a writ of mandate in the Sacramento County Superior Court, both of which sought to set aside the Energy Commission's certification of the MEC. In both petitions, plaintiffs alleged the Energy Commission had: (1) violated their state Band federal constitutional due process rights by failing to provide them with a fair hearing; (2) violated the public trust doctrine in the California Constitution; and (3) violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by certifying the MEC, in conflict with federal laws and regulations.²

Calpine and the Energy Commission demurred to plaintiffs' superior court petition on the ground the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the Energy Commission's certification of thermal power plants.³ In opposition to the demurrers, plaintiffs contended they filed the writ petition in superior court for the limited purpose of obtaining review of their constitutional claims in the event the Supreme Court summarily denied review of their writ petition to that court. Plaintiffs contended that if the Supreme Court denied review of their petition, superior court review of their constitutional claims was constitutionally required.

The superior court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, concluding exclusive jurisdiction lies in the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs timely appealed the resulting judgment of dismissal.

Five days after the hearing on the demurrers, the Supreme Court summarily denied plaintiffs' writ petition to that court.

DISCUSSION

I Standard of Review

On review of an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, our standard of review is de novo, "i.e., we exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law." (Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 790, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 598.) Here, the question is whether the superior court had jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the commission's certification of the MEC. We begin our analysis with the relevant statutes.

II Judicial Review of Power Plant Certification Decisions Lies Exclusively In The Supreme Court

Subdivision (a) of section 25901 provides for review of decisions by the Energy Commission, as follows: "Within 30 days after the commission issues its determination on any matter specified in this division [(§ 25000 et seq.)], except as provided in Section 25531, any aggrieved person may file with the superior court a petition for a writ of mandate for review thereof." (Italics added.) The exception provided for in section 25531 applies to power plant certification decisions, like the one at issue here. Subdivision (a) of section 25531 provides: "The decisions of the commission on any application for certification of a site and related facility are subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court of California."⁴ Subdivision (b) of the statute provides in relevant part: "No new or additional evidence may be introduced upon review and the cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified to by it. The review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the petitioner under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution. The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact are final and are not subject to review, except as provided in this article. These questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission." Subdivision (c) of the statute provides: "Subject to the right of judicial review of decisions of the commission, no court in this state has jurisdiction to hear or determine any case or controversy concerning any matter which was, or could have been, determined in a proceeding before the commission, or to stop or delay the construction or operation of any thermal powerplant except to enforce compliance with the provisions of a decision of the commission."

Read together, sections 25531 and 25901 allow a person aggrieved by a decision of the Energy Commission to seek judicial review of that decision by filing a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court, unless the decision is one on an application for certification of a thermal power plant, in which case the petition must be filed in the Supreme Court.

III Supreme Court Review of Power Plant Certification Decisions is on the Merits

A. There is no Due Process Violation

Plaintiffs recognize the foregoing statutes required them to seek review of the Energy Commission's decision in the Supreme Court rather than in the superior court; however, they contend that "to sustain the constitutionality of [the statutes], ... sections 25531 and 25901 must be read together to assure that either the Supreme Court, or if it summarily denies review, then the superior court, has jurisdiction over constitutional claims arising out of [the Energy Commission's] proceedings." (Italics omitted.) Plaintiffs base their argument on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough (1920) 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527, 64 L.Ed. 908 (Ben Avon).

In Ben Avon, a case involving a decision by the Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania setting a rate schedule for a water company, the United States Supreme Court held "that if one attacks a rate as confiscatory, thereby asserting its unconstitutionality as a deprivation of property without due process of law, the complaining party must be given an opportunity to submit that constitutional question to a judicial tribunal for its independent judgment on both the facts and the law." (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 157, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242 (cone. opn. of Burke, J.), discussing Ben Avon, supra, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527, 64 L.Ed. 908.)

Ben Avon is inapposite because plaintiffs' complaint is not that they were denied independent (as opposed to deferential) judicial review of the Energy Commission's decision to certify the MEC, but that they were denied judicial review of their constitutional claims altogether. Specifically, plaintiffs assert they were denied their due process right to judicial review of their constitutional claims because of "the California Supreme Court's complete failure to exercise any substantive review at all—as confirmed by its failure to request and to consider [the Commission's] record of proceedings." The flaw in this argument is plaintiffs' assumption that the Supreme Court failed to conduct any substantive review of their constitutional claims when the court summarily denied their petition for a writ of mandate. This assumption is unwarranted.

If a writ petition in the California Supreme Court is the exclusive means of obtaining review of a quasi-judicial decision, the Supreme Court's summary denial of such a petition is a final judicial determination on the merits. In re Rose (2000) 22 Cal.4th 430, 444, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 298, 993 P.2d 956.) As the Supreme Court explained in Rose: "An order summarily denying a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition generally reflects a discretionary refusal to exercise original jurisdiction over a matter that properly may be pursued in the lower courts. [Citation.] When the sole means of review is a petition in this court, however, our denial of the petition—with...