Santaniello v. Warden

Decision Date18 December 2012
Docket NumberCV094003005S.
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
PartiesAnthony SANTANIELLO v. WARDEN.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

COBB J.

The petitioner, Anthony Santaniello, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective, and as a result his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. The court finds that the petitioner has failed to establish his claims and therefore, finds the issues for the respondent.

On January 20, 2004, after a jury trial, the petitioner was found guilty of the following charges in two consolidated cases: (1) in docket number 02-122734, sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1) and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92(a)(2)(a); and (2) in in docket number CR 02-125860, attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-54a, inciting injuries to another person in violation of General Statutes § 53a-179a(a), and intimidating a witness in violation of General Statutes § 53a-151a(a)(1). On March 19, 2005, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty years imprisonment on the sexual assault and kidnapping charges and twenty-two years imprisonment on the attempted murder and related convictions. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively for a total effective sentence of forty-two years imprisonment.

The petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court and claimed that the trial court improperly (1) abused its discretion in joining and refusing to sever two separate informations, (2) denied the defendant's motion to suppress, (3) failed to conduct an in camera review of documents and (4) refused to consider the defendant's post-verdict letter requesting a new trial. The Appellate Court rejected these claims and affirmed the conviction. State v. Santaniello, 96 Conn.App. 646, 902 A.2d 1 cert. denied, 280 Conn. 920, 908 A.2d 545 (2006).

The Appellate Court found that the jury could reasonably found the following facts:

The victim lived in a single-family dwelling with her daughter and a female friend, S. On January 12, 2002, the defendant and the victim spent part of the day together, and the victim told the defendant that she planned to go to a local pub in the evening. The victim went to the pub at approximately 9 p.m., where she met several friends including the defendant and S. They remained at the pub until it closed at approximately 2 a.m. Thereafter, the victim returned to her apartment alone, where she left the door unlocked in case S returned later and she went to bed. She spoke with the defendant, via the telephone, during the night.
Sometime thereafter, the defendant appeared in the victim's bedroom. He sat on her bed and proceeded to make advances toward her. The victim repeatedly told the defendant to stop, but he became forceful and overcame the victim removing her sweatpants, tearing her panties and sexually assaulting her. The victim was left bruised and had a rope like burn on her hip where her panties had been torn from her.
When S returned home later that afternoon, she knew that something was wrong with the victim. When S questioned the victim, the victim became emotional and " lost it." She then told S what had happened. S urged the victim to telephone the police, but the victim did not want to report the incident because she was afraid of the defendant. S however, continued to urge the victim to report the incident, and four days later, the victim filed a complaint with the Enfield police. A forensic examination of the victim's panties revealed a stain that contained the defendant's DNA. The defendant was arrested on February 22, 2002. In an amended long-form information, the defendant was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, burglary in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree (sexual assault case).
Following the defendant's arrest, he was incarcerated at the Cheshire Correctional Institute, where he shared a cell with Thomas Marra from May 13 until July 30, 2002. In August 2002, Marra contacted George Nobile, an inspector with the division of criminal justice, informing Nobile that he had a cell mate who wanted to have a witness killed. Nobile and a supervisor, Gregory Dillon, met with Marra on September 4, 2002, and Marra informed them that the defendant wanted to have the victim killed so that she could not testify against him. Marra provided a letter written by the defendant and explained the code words used in the letter. Subsequently, Marra also provided Nobile and Dillon with further correspondence from and to the defendant concerning the defendant's desire to have the victim killed.
On October 9, 2002, Marra telephoned the defendant and told him he could put the defendant in contact with an assassin. Nobile then assumed the undercover role of the assassin and contacted the defendant on October 14 and 18, 2002. Nobile set up a meeting with the defendant for the morning of October 21, 2002, but the defendant did not appear for that meeting.
The defendant was arrested on October 25, 2002, and was held at the Bridgeport Correctional Center, where he shared a cell with Andre Holeman. The defendant told Holeman that he was facing sexual assault charges and that he had wanted the victim killed so that she could not testify against him. He also told Holeman about Marra and his arranging a meeting with an assassin. He further explained to Holeman that he was supposed to pay the assassin $7, 500 to kill the victim but that he did not have the funds and, therefore, was considering killing the victim himself. The defendant also asked Holeman to telephone the defendant's attorney to report that the defendant had been set up by Marra. In an amended long-form information, the defendant was charged with attempt to commit murder, inciting injury to another person and intimidating a witness (attempted murder case).

The petitioner filed this petition for habeas relief on April 15, 2009. In his amended petition, he claims: (1) in count one, that his trial attorney failed to explain the evidence and recommend a plea offer, failed to explain the right to testify and failed to call Dennis Rollins and Michael Pajak as witnesses at trial; [1] and (2) in count two, that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to claim that there was insufficient evidence for the attempted murder conviction.

As to count three, at the outset of the habeas trial, the parties entered into a stipulation that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decisions in Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299 Conn. 740, 12 A.3d 817 (2011) and State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008), the petitioner's kidnapping conviction would be restored to the trial docket in the superior court for the Judicial District of Hartford. The petitioner withdrew count four, alleging actual innocence.

DISCUSSION

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel the petitioner has the burden to establish that " (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance." (Emphasis in original.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 575, 941 A.2d 248 (2008); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 667, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). " To satisfy the ‘ performance prong, ’ a claimant must demonstrate that ‘ counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘ counsel guaranteed ... by Sixth Amendment.' " Ledbetter v. Commissioner of Correction, 275 Conn. 451, 458, 880 A.2d 160 (2005), cert. denied sub nom. Ledbetter v. Lantz, 546 U.S. 1187, 126 S.Ct. 1368, 164 L.Ed.2d 77 (2006), quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 667. It is not enough for the petitioner to simply prove the underlying facts that his attorney failed to take a certain action. Rather, petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel's acts or omissions were so serious that counsel was not functioning as " counsel" as guaranteed by Sixth Amendment and as a result, he was deprived of a fair trial. Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 833, 845-46, 947 A.2d 7, cert. denied, 288 Conn. 908, 953 A.2d 652 (2008); Giannotti v. Warden, 26 Conn.App. 125, 120, 599 A.2d 26 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 905, 600 A.2d 1359 (1992).

Under the second prong of the test, prejudice, the petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687; Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 830, 835, 970 A.2d 721 (2009).

Ultimately, the " benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 686. When assessing counsel's performance, the habeas court is required to " indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance ..." Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 689-90.

A. Claims related to trial counsel

The petitioner first claims that his trial attorney, Kevin Randolph, failed to explain the evidence and a plea offer, and that had he done so, the petitioner would have accepted the plea offer and pleaded guilty, forgoing a trial.

The United States Supreme Court has...

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