Santi v. Santi, 00-0181.

• Decision Date: 06 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-0181.,00-0181.
• Citation: 633 N.W.2d 312
• Parties: Joe and Lois SANTI, Appellants, v. Mike and Heather SANTI, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

633 N.W.2d 312

Joe and Lois SANTI, Appellants, v. Mike and Heather SANTI, Appellees.

No. 00-0181.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

September 6, 2001.

Thomas P. Schlapkohl of Brick, Gentry, Bowers, Swartz, Stoltze, Schuling & Levis, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.

Thomas J. Berg, Des Moines, for appellees.

Karen A. Wyle, Bloomington, Indiana, for amicus curiae Coalition for the Restoration of Parental Rights.

Rochelle Bobroff and Michael Schuster, Washington, D.C. for amicus curiae AARP.

NEUMAN, Justice.

This appeal concerns that portion of Iowa's grandparent visitation statute that permits court-ordered visits regardless of whether circumstances such as divorce, the death of a parent, or an adoption have otherwise prompted court intervention in the family's affairs. See Iowa Code § 598.35(7) (1999). Here, married parents in an intact nuclear family oppose, on constitutional grounds, the paternal grandparents' asserted right to visit their three-year-old granddaughter over the parents' objection.

The district court was convinced following hearing that the grandparents met the statutory criteria justifying court-ordered visits. It nevertheless ruled section 598.35(7) unconstitutional on its face because the statute authorizes visits without a threshold finding that the parents are unfit or their decision to deny visits poses substantial harm to the child. In the court's words, "the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental and natural rights of parents to raise their children as they see fit."

On our de novo review, we agree that the statute cannot withstand strict scrutiny under article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution. We therefore affirm the court's dismissal of the grandparents' petition, a decision rendering moot the parents' cross-appeal.

I. Background Facts.

Appellants, Joe and Lois Santi, are the parents of appellee, Mike Santi. Mike and his wife, appellee Heather Santi, are the parents of Taylor Janene Santi. At the time of trial, Joe and Lois were in their mid-fifties, Mike and Heather were in their mid-twenties, and little Taylor was three and a half. All are lifelong residents of Des Moines. Joe works as a scheduling supervisor at Firestone. Lois is an administrative assistant at Drake University. Mike holds an associate degree from Des Moines Area Community College. Heather, a CPA, works as an accounts receivables manager for a local company. Taylor is a happy, well-adjusted child who is adored by her parents and grandparents alike.

So why are these nice folks embroiled in this litigation? The answer is both baffling and heartbreaking. Feelings were hurt early on when Joe and Lois reneged on a promised honeymoon cruise for the newlyweds because Taylor, then an infant, would not be left in their care. After patching up this spat, the parties enjoyed a period of relative harmony during which Joe began routinely babysitting for Taylor on his days off. Old resentments surfaced, however, when Joe and Lois bought Taylor's first shoes and took her to see Santa Claus without Mike and Heather's permission. Other disagreements arose over seemingly minor matters such as how much "fast food" Taylor was permitted to eat while staying at her grandma and grandpa's.

As with many families, there has been tension over how much time must be spent with in-laws at the holidays. But unlike most families, the Santis—both elder and younger—seem unable to get beyond their disagreements, whether great or small. Over time, communication broke down completely. Counseling proved to be of no avail. By the time the case came to trial, Mike and Heather had not permitted Joe and Lois to see Taylor for nearly a year. They simply believed their lives—and, accordingly, Taylor's—were less stressful without the interaction. Joe and Lois were devastated.

II. Legal Proceedings.

Joe and Lois petitioned for grandparent visitation under Iowa Code section 598.35(7). The statute states:

The grandparent or great-grandparent of a child may petition the district court for grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights when any of the following circumstances occur:

7. A parent of the child unreasonably refuses to allow visitation by the grandparent or great-grandparent or unreasonably restricts visitation. This subsection applies to but is not limited in application to a situation in which the parents of the child are divorced and the parent who is the child of the grandparent or who is the grandchild of the great-grandparent has legal custody of the child.

A petition for grandchild or great-grandchild visitation rights shall be granted only upon a finding that the visitation is in the best interests of the child and that the grandparent or great-grandparent had established a substantial relationship with the child prior to the filing of the petition.

Iowa Code § 598.35(7).

In a preliminary procedural skirmish, Mike and Heather urged the court to find that Joe and Lois had no standing to seek visitation over the parents' objection. The court ruled that grandparents' standing was expressly authorized by the statute. It also noted, however, that Mike and Heather raised no constitutional infirmities. Following the court's cue, Mike and Heather amended their answer to allege the unconstitutionality of section 598.35(7), on its face and as applied to them.

A two-day trial yielded the facts sketched out above. All of the parties testified, as well as interested family members. In addition, Joe and Lois called a psychologist who had counseled the parties over the visitation issue. He ascribed the families' estrangement principally to Heather's stubbornness in the face of what she perceived to be controlling behaviors by Joe and Lois. Although he had never met or observed Taylor, he offered his general opinion that severing the bonds between grandchild and grandparent could be potentially detrimental to the child.

After reaffirming the earlier determination that Joe and Lois had standing to sue for visitation, the court addressed the constitutionality of section 598.35(7). It first determined that a parent's right to the care, custody and control of his or her children is a fundamental right protected by article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. It then determined that the state's power of parens patriae is implicated only upon a threshold showing of substantial harm to the child. Applying a strict-scrutiny analysis, the court concluded "absent a requirement of harm, Iowa Code § 598.35(7) is unconstitutional because it deprives parents in an intact nuclear family of the fundamental right to determine their child's upbringing." Accordingly, the court did not address the issue of whether the statute was unconstitutional as applied.

Joe and Lois moved to expand and enlarge the court's findings pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b). They asked the court to rule whether they had met their burden of proof under the statute as well as to reconsider its ruling on the statute's constitutionality. They argued in district court, as they do on appeal, that section 598.35(7) embraces the concept of harm the court found lacking.

The court rejected Joe and Lois's harm analysis and refused to reconsider its ruling on the statute's constitutionality. It did, however, find by a preponderance of evidence that (1) Joe and Lois had established a substantial relationship with Taylor before the petition was filed, (2) Mike and Heather had unreasonably denied visitation, and (3) visitation with Joe and Lois would be in Taylor's best interest. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

III. Issues on Appeal.

Joe and Lois urge several grounds for reversal. First they contend the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), holding Washington's grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional as applied, is not controlling insofar as Iowa's statute is concerned. Second they challenge the district court's decision to apply strict scrutiny in its review of section 598.35(7), arguing the intrusion on families posed by grandparent visitation is minimal and requires only satisfaction of the rational basis test. Third they contend that, even applying strict scrutiny, the statute passes constitutional muster because the state need not make a threshold showing of harm to establish a compelling interest in maintaining grandparent-grandchild bonds. Alternatively, if proof of substantial harm must be shown to justify the state's intrusion in a parent's decision, they claim the requirement is already embodied in the protections section 598.35(7) affords parents.

Mike and Heather counter that, while Troxel may not control the outcome of this appeal, infirmities identified by the Court in the Washington statute apply with equal force to the statute before us, particularly the fact that section 598.35(7) accords no deference to parental decision making. They also contend the district court properly applied strict scrutiny, stressing Troxel's reaffirmation of the fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children without state interference. In doing so, Mike and Heather argue, the Court thereby rejected any argument that court-ordered grandparent visitation creates only minimal intrusion warranting lower-level scrutiny.

IV. Scope of Review.

Because this appeal poses questions of substantive due process and liberty interests in the context of statutory interpretation, we are obliged to review the record de novo, making our own evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Stanley v. Fitzgerald, 580 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1998). Statutes are presumed constitutional, imposing on the challenger the heavy burden of rebutting that presumption. Id. Moreover, if a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, one of which is constitutional and the other not, we are obliged to adopt the construction which will uphold...