Santiago-Diaz v. Laboratorio Clinico Y De

• Decision Date: 08 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-2543.,05-2543.
• Citation: 456 F.3d 272
• Parties: Lizzette SANTIAGO-DÍAZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. LABORATORIO CLÍNICO Y DE REFERENCIA DEL ESTE AND SARA LÓPEZ, M.D., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

456 F.3d 272

Lizzette SANTIAGO-DÍAZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. LABORATORIO CLÍNICO Y DE REFERENCIA DEL ESTE AND SARA LÓPEZ, M.D., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 05-2543.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Submitted August 2, 2006.

Decided August 8, 2006.

Rudolph C. Campbell Valdez and Julio Gil de Lamadrid on brief for appellant.

Arturo Díaz-Angueira, Roberto Feliberti, and Cancio, Nadal, Rivera & Díaz, P.S.C., on brief for corporate appellee.

Igor J. Dominguez and Igor J. Dominguez Law Offices on brief for individual appellee.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, SELYA, Circuit Judge, and SARIS,^* District Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

On March 26, 2003, plaintiff-appellant Lizzette Santiago-Díaz brought a diversity suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), alleging medical malpractice in connection with the performance of a total abdominal hysterectomy. Following more than two years of backing and filling on the plaintiff's part, punctuated by persistent noncompliance with court orders and discovery rules, the district judge dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

We need not tarry. The docket reflects that, under a case-management order issued on August 12, 2003, the parties were directed to adhere to the following deadlines: (i) the filing of a discovery plan by September 8, 2003; (ii) the filing of a joint case-management memorandum by October 6, 2003; (iii) the completion of discovery by March 22, 2004; and (iv) the filing of a joint pretrial order by June 7, 2004.

No discovery plan was ever filed. The defendants,¹ professing a lack of cooperation on the part of the plaintiff's attorney, filed their portions of the joint case-management memorandum with the district court. On December 10, 2003 — more than two months after the due date — the district court ordered the plaintiff to file her portion of the memorandum by December 19 or face sanctions (which, the court warned, might include dismissal of the case). When this order produced no response, the court instructed the plaintiff to show cause why her case should not be dismissed.

On January 22, 2004, the plaintiff replied. With respect to timing, she asserted that she had initially filed her portion of the joint case-management memorandum on October 9, 2003 (a date that was beyond the due date) and had attempted, in a submission dated December 17, 2003, to inform the court of that filing. She explained, however, that her counsel inadvertently filed the December submission under the wrong docket number.² With respect to substance, the plaintiff's submission merely stated that "[a]t this time, there are no expert witnesses, however, Plaintiff expects to retain one shortly." Without commenting on the plaintiff's excuses, the district court allowed the case to proceed.

On May 3, 2004, the defendants moved either to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), or to enter judgment for failure to make discovery. The defendants complained particularly that the plaintiff had neither identified an expert witness who could substantiate her medical malpractice claims nor provided any expert reports. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2).

In an untimely opposition, the plaintiff effectively conceded her failure to comply with the case-management order. Attempting to confess and avoid, she rejoined variously that she had not received the defendants' interrogatories; that she was poised to complete discovery if allowed more time; that she had her expert witnesses ready; that she had done all that she could; and that her best-foot-forward approach to the complexities of the litigation warranted a denial of the defendants' motion.

On June 7, 2004, the defendants submitted their portions of the proposed joint pretrial order, complaining, however, that they had not been able to cajole the plaintiff's participation in the process. The plaintiff made no comparable submission.

In the same time frame, the defendants again moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, for preclusion of any expert testimony in the plaintiff's behalf. The defendants premised this motion on the plaintiff's failure timely to submit her portions of the joint case-management memorandum and pretrial order, her refusal to engage with the defendants' counsel on those submissions, her unwillingness to announce her expert witnesses, and her failure to produce an expert report. The plaintiff received an extension of time to oppose this motion and, on July 6, 2004, inexplicably filed copies of the same opposition papers that she previously had submitted in response to the original dispositive motion.

Citing the plaintiff's persistent flouting of court orders and rules, the district judge granted the defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiff's expert testimony. The judge simultaneously ordered the plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed given her inability to substantiate her claims through expert testimony. The plaintiff responded that she had both identified her expert and provided his report to the defendants. In an effort to validate that claim, she submitted the curriculum vitae of José A. Rodríguez Robles, M.D. (Dr. Rodríguez), along with a one-page statement dated October 26, 2004. This statement, even if taken at face value, did not by any stretch of the most fertile imagination meet the criteria set by the Civil Rules for expert witness reports. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B).

The defendants disputed the plaintiff's claim of compliance on divers grounds. Equally unimpressed, the district court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to show good cause and dismissed the action on August 19, 2005, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 16(f), Local Rule 16(g), and its inherent authority. This timely appeal followed.

We begin our substantive discussion with the bedrock proposition that federal courts possess wide-ranging power to sanction parties who repeatedly balk at complying with court-imposed deadlines. See, e.g., Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). This authority extends to the enforcement of case-management orders. Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 45-46 (1st Cir.2002). Thus, "when noncompliance occurs, the court may choose from a broad universe of possible sanctions." Id. at 46.

Where, as here, a party aspires to disclose expert evidence out of time and the trial court opts to exclude it, we review that determination for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir.2003). This standard of review obtains both as to the finding that a discovery violation occurred and as to the appropriateness of the sanction selected. See Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 243 (1st Cir.1992). A party who strives to overturn the trial court's exercise of its discretion with respect to such a sanction order must carry a heavy burden. See Gagnon v. Teledyne Princeton, Inc., 437 F.3d 188, 191 (2006); Macaulay, 321 F.3d at 51; see also Torres-Vargas v. Pereira, 431 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir.2005).

On appeal, the plaintiff concentrates her fire on the order of preclusion. She asseverates that she substantially complied with her discovery obligations through submission of Dr. Rodríguez's one-page "written report" and that, in all events, any delinquency on her part did not prejudice the defendants. These asseverations lack force.

The plaintiff's argument that she substantially complied with her expert witness discovery obligations is substantially incorrect. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to "disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present [expert] evidence." This disclosure must be "accompanied by a written report," which is to contain:

a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B). The disclosures are to be made "at the times and in the sequence directed by the [district] court." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(C).

In the case at bar, the district court augmented this regime through its case-management order. That order prescribed the information that the case-management memorandum was to cover and required the plaintiff, among other things, to announce her expert witness within the structure of the case-management memorandum and, when doing so, to "provide a curriculum vitae and report containing a discussion of elements of cause and effect, diagnosis, and prognosis." The case-management order also required the parties to file a proposed joint pretrial order, which was to include all the disclosures anent expert witnesses mandated by both the Civil Rules and the Local Rules, "including a brief and general statement" about the anticipated testimony of each such expert witness. D.P.R.R. 16(d)(8).

Here, the discovery violations are patent. The plaintiff's filings were consistently out of time.³ Furthermore, the substance of the belated disclosures — one consisting of one line, the other consisting of one page — does not come within a country mile of satisfying the requirements of either the case-management order or the Civil Rules. After all, the case-management order and Rule 26(a)(2)(B) both called for the parties to make explicit and detailed expert disclosures. The plaintiff's one-line statement did not even identify an expert, let alone satisfy the mandated disclosure requirements. In short,...