Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction
Decision Date | 22 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 24980.,24980. |
Citation | 87 Conn.App. 568,867 A.2d 70 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Adrian D. SANTIAGO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION. |
Avery S. Chapman, New Haven, for the appellant (petitioner).
Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and, on the brief, Carolyn K. Longstreth, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
LAVERY, C.J., and FLYNN and BISHOP, Js.
The petitioner, Adrian D. Santiago, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims on appeal that (1) the court improperly denied him certification for leave to appeal and (2) the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was improper because his trial counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Because we conclude that the petitioner's first claim is moot and disagree with the second, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts and procedural history are pertinent. A jury found the petitioner guilty of murder after a trial held in February, 1996. The occurrences underlying his conviction are recounted in our Supreme Court's decision disposing of his first direct appeal:
State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301, 303-305, 715 A.2d 1 (1998).
On initial direct appeal, the petitioner's claims of error largely were rejected. The Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioner's arguments that his waiver of a probable cause hearing was invalid due to the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; see id., at 306-13, 715 A.2d 1; that he was unconstitutionally deprived of a timely probable cause hearing, see id., at 313-16, 715 A.2d 1; and that his confession was involuntary. See id., at 316-23, 715 A.2d 1. The case was remanded, however, for a hearing to conduct further inquiry on the issue of possible juror misconduct. See id., at 323-40, 715 A.2d 1. After that hearing and a second appeal, the petitioner's conviction was affirmed. State v. Santiago, 252 Conn. 635, 748 A.2d 293 (2000).
On May 6, 2002, the petitioner filed an amended petition for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective in violation of the petitioner's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights due to, inter alia, an actual conflict of interest.2 Specifically, the petitioner alleged that his counsel, various members of the Windham public defender's office (office), failed to investigate adequately and to interview possible alternate suspects and to pursue a meritorious defense of third party culpability because those suspects were current or former clients of the office. According to the petition, "all were considered suspects by the police, but were not investigated by counsel for petitioner," and "a third party guilt ... defense could have been adequately supported had the aforementioned investigation been conducted."
A hearing was held, and three attorneys from the office testified as to their representation of the petitioner before and during his trial. Through their testimony and the introduction of exhibits, the following was conveyed. Ramon J. Canning was the supervisor of the office and the ultimate decision maker; Pamala J. Favreau and Mark Shapera worked for Canning. Favreau was employed by the office until April, 1995, at which time she was replaced by Shapera. The office was small and had a heavy caseload covering several courts. Each attorney there would work on any of the office files as need and availability dictated. The office did not have the resources to segregate cases by attorney or to institute a formal conflict checking procedure. Canning and Favreau represented the petitioner on pretrial matters and during discovery; Shapera represented him during discovery and at trial.3 Two other clients of the office, Paul Casanova and Edwin Mendez, were among the group of people who in some way were involved with the investigation of the murder of Ilarraza. A third such individual, Ray Soto, was alleged but not shown to be a public defender client. Casanova, for some time, was represented concurrently with the petitioner, although on an unrelated charge.4 Mendez was a former client, also on an unrelated matter, and briefly was represented concurrently with the petitioner when Mendez violated his probation.5 Neither Casanova, Mendez nor Soto ever were arrested or charged with anything in connection with the murder.
The petitioner was arraigned and charged with murder on November 4, 1993. On February 16, 1994, on the advice of the office, the petitioner waived a hearing in probable cause. The state had made its witnesses, Aviles and Negron, available to the office, and the office investigator, Ray Condon, interviewed them. The office made a strategic decision to waive the hearing because they viewed Aviles and Negron as transient, i.e., if there were no hearing and the two witnesses thereafter left the area, their testimony would not be preserved in the record.
Favreau testified that at the time of the waiver, the office probably was unaware that it was representing Casanova, although it considered him a possible witness for the defense. She did not then consider the petitioner's and Casanova's interests to be adverse. When asked whether the advice to the petitioner to waive the hearing was "influenced in any way by [her] relationship as attorney to Soto, Mendez and Casanova," Favreau answered, "No."
During discovery in the petitioner's case, the relationship between the prosecution and the defense apparently was something less than cooperative. The prosecution sought a protective order for its file, which Favreau opposed. Ultimately, on September 2, 1994, the trial court ordered the state to disclose material from its file. The disclosed material included (1) a police report of a complaint made by two women, ten days prior to the murder, that Casanova had threatened to shoot the victim, (2) a police report of an interview with Mendez in which he recounted Soto's purported confession6 and relayed a street rumor that connected Soto with the gun that was used in the shooting,7 (3) a police report of an interview with Soto in which he stated that the victim was nothing but trouble, indicated that he had fought with the victim two to three weeks prior to the murder and gave an alibi for the night of the murder, (4) a statement taken from the victim's girlfriend in which she claimed that he had in the recent past fought with Soto, Mendez and the petitioner, and that Mendez had been looking for the victim on the night of the murder, asking about a bicycle8 and looking nervous, and (5) a statement of a security guard at a school attended by the victim's nephew in which the guard recounted the nephew's telling him that five people were in a car when the murder occurred, including two girls, Mendez, the petitioner and an unknown male, and that the petitioner had shot the victim because Soto wanted...
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