Santillan v. Henao

• Decision Date: 30 September 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 10–CV–3128 (FB)(MDG).
• Parties: Juan Jose SANTILLAN, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Walter HENAO and Custom Stainless Steel Corp. doing business as Center's Restaurant Equipment, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

822 F.Supp.2d 284

Juan Jose SANTILLAN, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.Walter HENAO and Custom Stainless Steel Corp. doing business as Center's Restaurant Equipment, Defendants.

Case No. 10–CV–3128 (FB)(MDG).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Sept. 30, 2011.

Michael A. Faillace, Esq., Michael Faillace & Associates, P.C., New York, NY, for the Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BLOCK, Senior District Judge:

On September 12, 2011, Magistrate Judge Go issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that the Court award default judgment against defendants in the total amount of $60,193.42, consisting of $44,242.94 in damages for unpaid overtime wages, spread of hours pay and liquidated damages under the FLSA and Labor Law, $7,734 in prejudgment interest up to September 30, 2011 and at a daily rate of $4.81 per day until entry of judgment, $7,770 in attorneys' fees and $440 in costs. See R & R at 27. The R & R also stated that defendants' failure to object by September 29, 2011 would preclude appellate review. See id. All parties received notice of the R & R, electronically or by regular mail, on the date it was filed. See id.

If clear notice has been given of the consequences of failure to object, and there are no objections, the Court may adopt the R & R without de novo review. See Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir.2002) (“Where parties receive clear notice of the consequences, failure timely to object to a magistrate's report and recommendation operates as a waiver of further judicial review of the magistrate's decision.”). The Court will excuse the failure to object and conduct de novo review if it appears that the magistrate judge may have committed plain error, see Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir.2000); no such error appears here. Accordingly, the Court adopts the R & R without de novo review and directs the Clerk to enter judgment in accordance with the R & R.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARILYN D. GO, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Juan Jose Santillan seeks recovery of unpaid wages from defendants Custom Stainless Steel Corp. (“Custom Steel”) and Walter Henao (collectively “defendants”), asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., as well as pendent state claims under the New York Labor Law. After entry of default against the defendants, Judge Block referred this action to me to report and recommend on liability and damages. Defendants have not filed opposition to the plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, nor have they appeared at any point in these proceedings.

After review of the submissions, this Court recommends an award of damages to Juan Jose Santillan as set forth more fully below.

PERTINENT FACTS

The following facts adduced from plaintiff's submissions are undisputed and this Court takes them as true for purposes of deciding this motion. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir.1992).

From approximately May 2000 until on or about March 1, 2010, Plaintiff Juan Jose Santillan was employed by defendants to weld, bend, and polish stainless steel, as well as clean the company's bathroom. Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 27, 29. Although Santillan regularly worked more than forty hours per week, the defendants failed to “pay[ ] him the proper regular rate of pay, overtime wages, or spread of hours compensation.” Id. at ¶¶ 32, 43. Although bringing this action as a putative class action on behalf of other employees, Mr. Santillan seeks in his submissions damages for only himself and has neither submitted any information on the propriety of class relief or amounts due to class members.

Plaintiff also seeks an award of prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs.

The details of the work performed and amounts claimed will be discussed below.

DISCUSSION

I. Governing Legal Standards

In deciding whether a default judgment should be entered, a court may accept all well-pleaded allegations in the unanswered complaint as true but must still satisfy itself that the plaintiff has established a sound legal basis upon which liability may be imposed. Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1981) (“[A] district court has discretion under Rule 55(b)(2) once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action”).

A defendant's default is an admission of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint except those relating to damages. See Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 158; Au Bon Pain, 653 F.2d at 65. Nevertheless, “it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit conclusions of law.” Leider v. Ralfe, No. 01 Civ. 3137, 2004 WL 1773330, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2004) (quoting In re Indus. Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 119 F.Supp.2d 418, 420 (S.D.N.Y.2000)).

A default also effectively constitutes an admission that damages were proximately caused by the defaulting party's conduct; that is, the acts pleaded in a complaint violated the laws upon which a claim is based and caused injuries as alleged. See Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 159. The movant need prove “only that the compensation sought relate[s] to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pleaded.” Id. The court must determine the amount of damages, actual or statutory, that may be assessed. The court must also ensure that there is a reasonable basis for the damages specified in a default judgment. The court has the discretion to require an evidentiary hearing or to rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence in making this determination. See Chun Jie Yin v. Kim, No. 07 CV 1236(DLI)(JO), 2008 WL 906736, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008) (collecting cases); Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). The moving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the evidence it offers. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2009); Au Bon Pain, 653 F.2d at 65 (citing TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F.Supp. 679, 683 (S.D.N.Y.1969)).

II. LiabilityA. Fair Labor Standards Act

Plaintiff brings three claims under the FLSA, alleging that defendants violated sections 206, 207 and 211. See Compl. at ¶¶ 18–24, 37–41. The FLSA was enacted by Congress “to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours, ‘labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.’ ” Barrentine v. Arkansas–Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)) (footnote omitted). Section 206 of the FLSA sets forth a minimum hourly wage employers ¹ must pay their employees who engage in work affecting interstate commerce, id. § 206(a)(1)(C).

Section 207 specifies that an employer must pay employees who work in excess of forty hours during a workweek for the excess hours “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Employers in violation of this provision “shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of ... their unpaid overtime compensation ... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. § 216(b).

In addition, section 211(c) of the FLSA requires that covered employers “make, keep and preserve ... records” of their employees with respect to “wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment” for a certain period of time. Id. § 211(c). The information that must be kept in these records is set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(1)-(12).² Section 215(a)(5) of the FLSA makes it unlawful for any employer covered under the statute to violate any of these record-keeping provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(5).

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that defendants employed him and other similarly situated employees during the period from approximately May 2000 through March 1, 2010 in connection with a business in Brooklyn that produced customized stainless steel countertops and cabinets. Compl. at ¶¶ 16–20. During this period, the defendants were directly engaged in interstate commerce and had gross sales of at least $500,000. Id. at ¶¶ 24–25. From approximately June 2004 until December 2005, defendants paid Santillan $650.00 per week, $700.00 per week from approximately January 2006 until December 2007, and $740.00 per week from approximately January 2008 until on or about March 1, 2010. Id. at ¶¶ 37–39.

During that time, Santillan typically worked more than 40 hours per week—working approximately 58 hours per week from about June 2004 to December 31, 2007, approximately 49 hours per week from on or about January 1, 2008 to on or about January 31, 2009 and approximately 45 hours per week from February 1, 2009 to March 1, 2010. Id. at ¶¶ 32–35; Santillan Aff. at ¶¶ 13–18. Specifically, he states that from June 2004 until December 31, 2007, he typically worked nine hours a day, six days a week for a total of 54 hours, but was required to work “one or two hours past [his] scheduled departure time twice a week and three hours past [his] scheduled departure time two or three times per month.” Santillan Aff. at ¶¶ 13–16. From January 1, 2008 until “prior to approximately February 2009,” he typically worked nine hours a day, five days a week for a total of 45 hours, but was also required to work “one or two hours past [his] scheduled departure time twice a week and three hours past [his] scheduled departure time two or three times per month.” Santillan Aff. at ¶¶ 17–18. Given the inexactness of plaintiff's estimate of the frequency and duration of instances when he was asked to work beyond his regular schedule for the period from June 2004 to January 2009, I recommend...