Santini v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 4-485,4-485
• Citation: 505 N.E.2d 832
• Parties: Aida Ortiz SANTINI, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania Corporation; Elkhart County 4-H Fair Board, D.M. Shorling and R.L. Elliott, Appellees (Defendants Below). A 109.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 832

505 N.E.2d 832

Aida Ortiz SANTINI, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania Corporation Elkhart County 4-H Fair Board, D.M. Shorling and R.L. Elliott, Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 4-485 A 109.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fourth District.

March 31, 1987.

Jack P. Cittadine, Elkhart, for appellant.

Edward J. Chester, Chester & Chester, Elkhart, for appellees.

MILLER, Judge.

Aida Ortiz Santini sued Conrail and its train engineer and brakeman for the wrongful death of her 11 year old daughter, Nancy--after the warning signal began to blink--Nancy attempted to cross a triple Conrail track when her sandal became caught on the third track and she was struck by a Conrail train traveling 50 miles per hour through the crossing. Santini claimed Conrail and its agents were negligent in operating the train and in constructing and maintaining the crossing. The jury rendered a general verdict for all defendants. Santini appeals, claiming the trial court erred in excluding evidence of two City ordinances, the first limits train speed to 25 miles per hour in the City and the second requires Conrail to erect and maintain a safety gate across the Monroe Street crossing. Santini also argues the trial court erred in refusing to give her jury instruction number 7 and in giving final instruction no. 22 on the proper measure of damages for the wrongful death of a minor child.

We find the city speed ordinance is preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 434, and by the Federal Railroad Administration regulations contained in 49 C.F.R. Sec. 213.9; the city crossing safety gate ordinance is invalid as the Indiana legislature has vested exclusive authority pursuant to I.C. 8-6-3-1 and I.C. 8-6-7.7-2 in the Public Service Commission to declare as dangerous any grade crossing in the state which requires installation of crossing safety devices; and Santini has failed to preserve error on appeal regarding the final jury instruction on the measure of damages for the wrongful death of a child.

Affirmed.

FACTS

At 6:00 p.m. on July 23, 1978, 11 year old Nancy Santini, her 15 year old aunt Nydia Ortiz, and her 12 year old uncle Jose Ortiz were walking south on Monroe Street on their way to the Elkhart County Fair. Monroe Street is intersected by three separate sets of railroad tracks and the railroad crossing is 100 feet wide. The Monroe Street crossing was the primary entrance and exit to the fairgrounds used by most of the 36,500 persons who attended the Fair on July 23, 1978.

As the three children approached the crossing, the warning lights began to blink. Pedestrians had approximately 18 to 20 seconds to complete crossing the three sets of tracks before the train, traveling at 50 miles per hour, would arrive.

Jose and Nydia Ortiz ran safely across to the east side of the Monroe Street tracks. Nancy caught her sandal in the crossing boards on the third track and was unable to extricate her foot. The train approached the crossing at 50 miles per hour. The train engineer saw Nancy hesitate on the track but did not immediately apply the brakes. The train struck Nancy and threw her into the air. Nancy died as a result of her injuries.

Nancy's mother, Aida Ortiz Santini, brought suit against Conrail and its train engineer and brakeman for the wrongful death of Nancy. Santini alleged Conrail and its agents were negligent in operating the train in violation of a Goshen City ordinance No. 163 which limits maximum train speed to 25 miles per hour within the City, and that Conrail and its agents were negligent in constructing and maintaining the triple crossing in violation of Goshen City Ordinance No. 14-1 which requires Conrail to erect and maintain a safety gate across the Monroe Street Crossing. ¹ Before trial, Conrail made a Motion in Limine to exclude these two ordinances from evidence alleging they are invalid, and therefore inadmissible as a matter of law, because these two ordinances regulate railroad safety and are preempted by the 1970 Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 421 et seq. Alternately, Conrail argued the city was without authority to enact the speed and safety gate ordinances because the state enabling legislation permitting the city to continue to enforce these ordinances had been repealed so all ordinances adopted under the enabling act were null and void. ² The trial court initially granted Conrail's Motion in Limine and excluded evidence of the two city ordinances on grounds the Railroad Safety Act of 1970 specifically preempted both ordinances because the local speed and safety gate regulations were an unconstitutional interference with and burden upon interstate commerce. Santini objected at trial to the exclusion from evidence of these two ordinances. Santini filed a Motion to Correct Errors after trial and argued the trial court's grant of Conrail's Motion in Limine and the later exclusion of these two ordinances from evidence at trial was error and prevented Santini from arguing Conrail was negligent per se in its operation of the train and its maintenance of the crossing. Santini pointed to the testimony of the Goshen City Attorney, out of the presence of the jury, that both ordinances were valid and in force at the time of Nancy's death and at least one speeding citation had been issued to a train. Santini argued this is sufficient foundation for the admission of the ordinances as evidence and therefore exclusion was improper.

The trial court denied Santini's Motion to Correct Errors and ruled the Goshen City ordinances were inadmissible because the Indiana 1905 State Enabling Statute was repealed, invalidating the two city ordinances which were adopted under this statute. Santini now appeals from the denial of her Motion to Correct Errors.

Issues

Santini raises the following issues, restated, for review on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the City ordinance limiting the speed of locomotives to twenty-five (25) m.p.h.

II. Whether the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the City ordinance requiring Conrail to erect and maintain a safety gate across its Monroe Street crossing.

III. Whether the trial court erred in refusing Santini's instruction regarding the proper measure of damages for wrongful death of a minor child.

DECISION

Where the trial court sustains an objection to the admission of evidence, it will be upheld on appeal if there is any basis upon which the ruling is correct. Hahn v. Ford Motor Company (1982), Ind.App., 434 N.E.2d 943; Sheets v. Garringer (1963), 135 Ind.App. 488, 194 N.E.2d 757. Any valid theory of exclusion will suffice to sustain the trial court's ruling. It is equally well-settled that the appellant has the burden not only of proving that error occurred in the exclusion of evidence, but also that such error was prejudicial because it affected the substantial rights of the parties. City of Indianapolis v. Robinson (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 902; Richardson v. Brown (1977), 173 Ind.App. 50, 362 N.E.2d 197. With this standard of review in mind, we examine appellant's contentions.

I. City Speed Ordinance

Santini argues the trial court incorrectly excluded from evidence Goshen City Ordinance No. 163 which requires trains to limit their speed to 25 m.p.h. within Goshen City limits. Santini maintains this ordinance is not preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 because no federal authority has been exercised to limit train speed and therefore both states and municipalities are free to regulate in this subject area. Conrail responds that the Federal Railroad Administration has acted to limit train speed by adopting and promulgating the regulations contained in 49 C.F.R. Sec. 213.9.

The Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, nullifies state laws that "interfere with or are contrary to" federal law. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (1985), 471 U.S. 707, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23). Congress is authorized to absolutely preempt state and local rulemaking authority in a particular field. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Commission (1983), 461 U.S. 190, 203-04, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1721-22, 75 L.Ed.2d 752; Jones v. Rath Packing Co. (1977), 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604. "Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state and local rulemaking in a specific area, these lower laws are preempted to the extent that they conflict with federal law. Where a lower law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,' Hines v. Davidowitz (1941), 312 U.S. 52, 67 [61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581], it is preempted." Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Parish of St. James (5th Cir.1985), 775 F.2d 627, 634. Congressional intent to preempt state law in a given subject area may be inferred from the existence of a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation. Hillsborough, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 2375. Preemption is also inferred when the area of law is one in which "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co. (1947), 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447. State laws may be preempted by federal regulation as well as by federal statute. Hillsborough, supra, 105 S.Ct. 2375 (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (1984), 467 U.S. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 81 L.Ed.2d 580.). However, it will not be presumed that a federal statute or regulation was intended to supersede the exercise of state rulemaking authority unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines (1972), 405 U.S. 707, 92 S.Ct. 1349, 31 L.Ed.2d 620. Federal regulation of a field of commerce should...