Santoni Roig v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana

• Decision Date: 20 June 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 85-1078(RLA).
• Citation: 688 F. Supp. 810
• Parties: Félix SANTONI ROIG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE ESPAÑA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

688 F. Supp. 810

Félix SANTONI ROIG, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IBERIA LÍNEAS AÉREAS DE ESPAÑA, Defendant.

Civ. No. 85-1078(RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 20, 1988.

Carlos T. González Contreras, Vazquez, Vizcarrondo, Alvarez, Angelet & Gonzalez, Hato Rey, P.R., Miguel A. Cabrera, Santurce, P.R., Alberto Acevedo Colón, Hato Rey, P.R., for plaintiffs.

Miguel Palou Sabater, Ledesma, Palou & Miranda, Hato Rey, P.R., Edward Brill, Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, New York City, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

ACOSTA, District Judge.

BACKGROUND

This action was originally instituted in state court by individuals formerly employed with Iberia Líneas Aéreas de España ("Iberia") seeking relief pursuant to various Puerto Rico labor statutes. The case was removed to the federal forum and after a series of procedural obstacles the Puerto Rico Secretary of Labor assumed representation of the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to Puerto Rico labor laws which specifically provide claims for:

1. dismissal without just cause, 29 L.P. R.A. § 185a et seq.;

2. minimum wages, 29 L.P.R.A. § 245 et seq.; and

3. overtime, 29 L.P.R.A. § 271 et seq.

Iberia has moved the Court to enter summary judgment in its favor alleging that the state law claims are preempted by federal statutes and, in the alternative, that plaintiffs are estopped from requesting payment of sums in addition to the severance pay they have already received because all plaintiffs signed general releases in favor of Iberia in exchange for cash payments.

UNCONTESTED FACTS

According to the joint pretrial order submitted by the parties on March 4, 1987 (docket No. 105), the following facts are not in controversy.

1. Iberia is a carrier by air within the meaning of section 201 of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 181, and is subject to the provisions of the RLA.

2. The International Association of Machinists ("IAM") is the labor representative, under the RLA, of Iberia's employees in the United States, including Puerto Rico.

3. Iberia and the IAM were parties to an Agreement effective by its terms from January 1, 1981, through December 31, 1982, and subject to change thereafter in accordance with the procedures of the RLA, covering the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions.

4. On March 29, 1985, following approximately two and a half years of negotiation and mediation as required by the RLA, Iberia and the IAM reached an agreement as to changes in the 1981 Agreement. The March 29, 1985 Agreement continued in effect all provisions of the prior Agreement which were not changed.

5. The March 29, 1985 Agreement between Iberia and the IAM specifically provided that Iberia had the right to contract out all or any part of the work at the airports which was performed by employees in classifications included in the 1981 Agreement. The March 29, 1985 Agreement further provided that any employee whose employment with Iberia was terminated because the work which he had been performing was contracted out, was eligible to receive severance pay, in an amount to be computed based on a formula set forth in the Agreement. The Agreement also provided certain other benefits including an early retirement plan, extended medical insurance, and travel benefits for employees whose jobs were eliminated as a result of the contracting out of their work.

6. Beginning on March 30, 1985, Iberia contracted out most of the airport work in San Juan, Puerto Rico and at the John F. Kennedy Airport in New York, in accordance with the terms of the March 29, 1985 Agreement, and terminated the employment of airport employees in the affected classifications including the plaintiffs named in the complaint.

7. The IAM is the labor representative, under the RLA, of Iberia's employees in the United States, including Puerto Rico, in the crafts or classes of (1) Clerical, Office, Fleet and Passenger Service Employees; (2) Communications System and Lead Communications Systems Operators—Teletype; and (3) Dispatchers and Assistant Dispatchers. Each of the plaintiffs was employed by Iberia prior to March 30, 1985 in a classification within one of the three said crafts or classes, and was represented for the purposes of the RLA by the IAM.

8. None of the plaintiffs has presented any grievance pursuant to the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement over the alleged failure by Iberia to pay the amounts claimed to be due in the complaint, nor has any such claim been submitted by plaintiffs, or by the IAM, to the System Board of Adjustment, established by the Iberia-IAM Agreement.

9. All of the plaintiffs have accepted payment by Iberia as full and complete satisfaction of any and all amounts which may be owed by Iberia, arising out of their employment therewith, and have duly executed a General Release in favor of Iberia.

ARGUMENT

RAILWAY LABOR ACT

We shall first discuss what effect, if any, the Railway Labor Act ("RLA" or "the Act") 45 U.S.C. § 151-163, has on local wrongful dismissal claims.

Iberia contends that the controversy over the propriety of plaintiffs' discharge is a "minor dispute" which under the provisions of the RLA must be resolved by way of arbitration and is thus preempted by the Act.

The RLA embodies a federal labor policy securing the right of self-organization among employees of interstate carriers and promoting the orderly settlement of controversies concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions through a compulsory arbitration process. The statute seeks to avoid any interruption of commerce or of the operation of carriers engaged therein. 45 U.S.C. § 151a. The RLA was extended to air carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and employees of such air carriers, 45 U.S.C. § 181. The benefits, duties, and privileges are specified in 45 U.S.C. § 182.

Pursuant to the RLA, "minor disputes" are controversies arising from the "interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ..." 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i). See also Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1414, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987); Miller v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 834 F.2d 556, 561 (6th Cir.1987).

"Major disputes" are those which pertain to the formation or modification of agreements establishing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Atchinson, 107 S.Ct. at 1414.

The exclusive jurisdiction for resolution of "minor disputes" lies with the arbitration mechanism and those proceedings will provide the only remedy available to a claimant. Atchinson, 107 S.Ct. n. 9 at 1414; Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 406 U.S. 320, 325, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972); Miller v. Norfolk, 834 F.2d at 561; Mayon v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1251 (5th Cir.1986).

In other words, an arbitration board must resolve all "minor disputes" and neither the federal nor the state court have jurisdiction to entertain them. Miller v. Norfolk, 834 F.2d at 561; Carroll v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 647 F.Supp. 1319, 1320 (M.D.Ala.1986).

Judicial review from resolutions by an arbitration board of "minor disputes" is extremely narrow. Atchinson, supra, 107 S.Ct. at 1414; Andrews, supra, 406 U.S. at 325, 92 S.Ct. at 1565.

The practical effect is that when a court finds an issue presented for resolution to be a minor dispute it must dismiss the claim for want of jurisdiction.

A plaintiff may not avoid the mandatory arbitration process by asserting a state cause of action. Artful pleading cannot disguise what is truly a minor dispute under the RLA. Miller v. Norfolk, 834 F.2d at 562.

However, different considerations apply when the claims asserted in a complaint are based on independent statutory rights rather than disputes over conditions which appear exclusively in an agreement. So long as plaintiffs allege to be entitled to a relief provided by a legal source other than a collective bargaining agreement promoting fair employment practices or legitimate government concerns, the claim will not be preempted by the mandatory arbitration proceedings under the RLA.

A. Preemption

The issue of preemption of state wrongful discharge claims by the RLA was addressed by the Supreme Court in Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 406 U.S. 320, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972). Plaintiff commenced a suit against a railroad, his former employer, for wrongful discharge based on state law. The Court ruled that regardless of plaintiff's characterization of his claim as "wrongful discharge," given the fact that "the only source of plaintiff's right not to be discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a `wrongful' one that entitles him to damages, is the collective-bargaining agreement" claimant's exclusive remedy was the arbitration process. 406 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 1565.

Andrews thus held that the determination of the extent of the railroad's obligation to keep plaintiff within its employ revolved on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement and hence, was a "minor dispute" and had to be resolved by way of arbitration. In other words, since the right to employment stemmed from the contract itself, the wrongful discharge claim was a "minor dispute" subject to the exclusive arbitration forum because the controversy hinged on the interpretation of the agreement.

In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court moved away from mandatory arbitration in cases dealing with disputes that, even though part of the collective bargaining agreement, sought to vindicate a right that arose not from the agreement itself, but from an independent statute.

In Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1415, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987), a railroad employee sued his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S. C. § 51 et seq., for injuries resulting from harrassment by his superior...