Santoro v. State, 93-2404

Decision Date28 October 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-2404,93-2404
Citation644 So.2d 585
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals
Parties19 Fla. L. Weekly D2302 Joseph SANTORO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Asst. Public Defender Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Myra J. Fried, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

HARRIS, Chief Justice.

Once again we are faced with an alleged Ashley 1 violation. In this case, the State concedes that Joseph Santoro did not receive the requisite written notice of intent to habitualize prior to his plea as required by Ashley. Nor did he receive the actual (oral) notice during the sentencing proceeding that we held adequate in Grasso v. State, 639 So.2d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) and Voth v. State, 638 So.2d 121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

Here, the State claims that the Ashley requirement has been satisfied because the plea agreement contains the following provision:

My attorney has explained to me the total maximum penalties for the charge(s) and as a result I understand the following:

* * * * * *

c. That a hearing may hereafter be set and conducted in this case to determine if I qualify to be classified as a Habitual Felony Offender or a Violent Habitual Felony Offender, and:

1. That should I be determined by the Judge to be a Violent Habitual Felony Offender, and should the Judge sentence me as such, I could receive up to a maximum sentence of ___ years imprisonment and a mandatory minimum of ___ years imprisonment and that as to any habitual offender sentence I would not be entitled to receive any basic gain time.

2. That should I be determined by the Judge to be a Non-Violent Habitual Felony Offender, and should the Judge sentence me as such, I could receive up to a maximum sentence of ___ years imprisonment and a mandatory minimum of ___ years imprisonment and that as to any habitual offender sentence I would not be entitled to receive any basic gain time.

d. That whether a guidelines sentence or departure sentence or habitual offender sentence, I will receive a mandatory minimum sentence of ___ years imprisonment. 2

Although the form provision in this case is somewhat expanded from a similar provision in the plea agreement that we rejected in Thompson v. State, 638 So.2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), it still does not comply with what we considered to be the Ashley mandate: that the defendant be made aware prior to pleading that his habitualization will be sought. The only notice given in this new version of the plea agreement is that "a hearing may hereafter be set" to determine if the defendant qualifies as a habitual offender. As we stated in Thompson, the statute itself informs him of this possibility. 3 What the supreme court required in Ashley, and what we required in Thompson, was that the defendant be advised, prior to plea, that someone (the State or the judge) 4 will subject him to habitual consideration. This does not mean that the defendant must be advised that he will be habitualized. It only requires that the State advise the defendant prior to plea that he will be considered for habitualization. This requirement can easily be accomplished (though it may cut down on the number of pleas) by placing in the negotiated plea form a provision that states: "We will request that the court conduct a hearing to determine whether you should be sentenced...

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15 cases
  • Young v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 1, 1995
    ...would not be so qualified under the criteria established by the state attorney? 1 This court raised this issue in Santoro v. State, 644 So.2d 585, 586 n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Our opinion in Santoro was quashed by the supreme court in State v. Santoro, 657 So.2d 1161 (Fla.1995), based on S......
  • Kirk v. State, 94-2089
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 1, 1995
    ...by the state attorney. A deviation from the adopted criteria is not subject to appellate review. This court noted in Santoro v. State, 644 So.2d 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), rev. granted, 652 So.2d 818 (1995), that "[t]he judge's ability to initiate a habitual offender treatment has been placed......
  • McRae v. State, 95-2705
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 26, 1996
    ...5th DCA 1996); Young v. State, 663 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kirk v. State, 663 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Santoro v. State, 644 So.2d 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Although we have struck the imposition of payments to First Step in the past, section 948.03(1)(n), Florida Statutes, no......
  • Booth v. State, 94-1268
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 7, 1995
    ...Giving notice that the possibility exists that a defendant may be sentenced as an habitual offender is not sufficient. Santoro v. State, 644 So.2d 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Jones v. State, 639 So.2d 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Blackwell v. State, 638 So.2d 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Thompson v. S......
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