Santos v. State, Dept. of Transp., Kauai Div.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 7640,AFL-CIO,7640
• Parties: , 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281 David SANTOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawaii, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, KAUAI DIVISION; United Public Workers, Local 646; AFSCME;; Gary Rodrigues, individually and in his capacity as Kauai Division Director of the United Public Workers; Ernest Duarte, individually and in his capacity as Highways Construction Maintenance Supervisor, State of Hawaii, Department of Transportation, Kauai Division; Edwin Nakano, individually and in his capacity as Kauai District Engineer and Branch Head, State of Hawaii, Department of Transportation; Stanley Fujiyama, individually and in his capacity as Staff Services Officer and Assistant Chief in Administration, Highways Division, State of Hawaii, Department of Transportation; Jacintho Duarte, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 962

646 P.2d 962

64 Haw. 648, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281

David SANTOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawaii, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, KAUAI

DIVISION; United Public Workers, Local 646; AFSCME; AFL-CIO;

Gary Rodrigues, individually and in his capacity as Kauai

Division Director of the United Public Workers; Ernest

Duarte, individually and in his capacity as Highways

Construction Maintenance Supervisor, State of Hawaii,

Department of Transportation, Kauai Division; Edwin Nakano,

individually and in his capacity as Kauai District Engineer

and Branch Head, State of Hawaii, Department of

Transportation; Stanley Fujiyama, individually and in his

capacity as Staff Services Officer and Assistant Chief in

Administration, Highways Division, State of Hawaii,

Department of Transportation; Jacintho Duarte, individually,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 7640.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

June 22, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary judgment will be sustained only if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Res judicata and collateral estoppel may constitute a bar to a plaintiff's claims where the issue and facts being litigated in a case are the same as those litigated by the plaintiff in an earlier case.

3. Res judicata principles apply to administrative rulings where the administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.

4. Once an administrative decision is appealed and either affirmed or reversed, res judicata and collateral estoppel attaches to the appellate court's decision.

5. As a general rule, before an employee can maintain an action against his employer for breach of contract, the employee must attempt to utilize the grievance procedure provided in his collective bargaining contract.

E. Courtney Kahr, Lihue, Kauai, on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lawrence D. Kumabe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, for State Defendants-Appellees.

James A. King, Honolulu (King & Nakamura, A Law Corp., Honolulu, of counsel), for defendants-appellees UPW, Rodrigues and Jacintho Duarte.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., LUM, PADGETT and HAYASHI, JJ., and MENOR, Retired Justice, in place of NAKAMURA, J., recused.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is taken by the Plaintiff-Appellant David Santos from the trial court's Order Granting Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

To understand this case, we feel that a brief chronicling of some of the events is necessary and helpful.

On September 15, 1975, the appellant applied for a Equipment Operator IV position with the Highways Maintenance Branch, Kauai Division, Department of Transportation, State of Hawaii (hereinafter State). The appellant was an employee of Bargaining Unit I and as such was covered by the Unit I, blue-collar nonsupervisory employees collective bargaining agreement. Jacintho Duarte (Duarte), one of the appellees herein, also applied for the same position. Appellant believed that he was entitled to be promoted to that position because he was the most senior of the employees who applied. However a three-member evaluation panel recommended Duarte for the position, and subsequently Duarte was appointed to that position.

On December 1, 1975, appellant was informed of Duarte's appointment. Ten days later, on December 10, 1975, appellant obtained the services of an attorney, E. Courtney Kahr. Although an exclusive grievance procedure was clearly set forth in the Unit I collective bargaining agreement, ¹ appellant did not raise any grievance regarding the promotion under the collective bargaining agreement. Instead, he elected to appeal to the State Civil Service Commission. On January 20, 1976, the Civil Service Commission declined to exercise jurisdiction, determining that appellant's proper remedy was through the grievance procedure in his Unit I contract. However, by that time, the period for filing a grievance under the contract had expired. On February 24, 1976, appellant appealed to the Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board (HPERB), charging that the State had engaged in prohibited practices, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 89-13(a) and at the same time charged that the United Public Workers (UPW) engaged in unfair practices by interfering with his right to file a grievance.

HPERB then proceeded to hold a lengthy four-day hearing on the merits of the charges and determined that "the State did not make reasonable efforts to ascertain the relative qualifications of Santos and Duarte; and its selection of Duarte over Santos was, therefore, unjustified. Accordingly, the Board holds that the State violated Section 16.06 ² of the Unit 1 collective bargaining agreement, thereby committing a prohibited practice under sec. 89-13(a)(8), ³ HRS." (Footnote added.) HPERB then ordered the State to redo the selection for the Equipment Operator IV position.

As to the charges against the UPW, HPERB ruled that it could find no unlawful interference in the nature of undue influence or collusion by the union, either in the grievance procedure or in the promotion process, and dismissed all breach of duty of fair representation charges against UPW.

The State appealed HPERB's decision to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. ⁴ The court reversed HPERB on the grounds that HPERB should have deferred to the grievance procedure set forth in the Unit 1 contract. Santos never appealed either HPERB's decision regarding the UPW ⁵ or the circuit court's decision regarding the State. ⁶

On July 20, 1977, appellant filed an action for injunctive and declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit ⁷ regarding the State's improper promotion of Duarte when Duarte allegedly falsified his application. On May 25, 1978, the court issued an order as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:

1) The State of Hawaii, Office of the Attorney General is mandated to investigate the alleged illegality of the employment of Jacintho Duarte, and if appropriate and applicable, to prosecute the enforcement of the law, more specifically Hawaii Revised Statutes sections 76-12, 76-29 and 26-7.

2) The State of Hawaii, Department of Personnel Services, is not mandated to carry out the provisions of Hawaii Revised Statutes, section 76-48, since Plaintiff did not exhaust the remedies available to him.

On February 14, 1979, the court dismissed the action against the State attorney general after the filing of his investigative report. Again, no appeal was taken by appellant.

In addition to the action for injunctive and declaratory relief filed by appellant in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit on July 20, 1977, on the same date appellant instituted the instant action in circuit court seeking to overturn the promotion of Duarte and to obtain damages from the State, the UPW, their representatives, and Duarte. Appellees filed motions for summary judgment on the grounds that appellant's action should be barred because he failed to exhaust his contractual and administrative remedies or, alternatively, because the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel applied as he had already had his day in court. The circuit court granted appellees' motions. This appeal followed.

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel provide that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in another court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter. It precludes the relitigation, not only of the issues that were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense which might have been litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided. Gomes v. Tyau, 57 Haw. 163, 167-68, 552 P.2d 640, 643 (1976); Morneau v. Stark Enterprises, Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 422-23, 539 P.2d 472, 475 (1975); Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 55, 451 P.2d 814, 822 (1969); In re Bishop Estate, 36 Haw. 403, 416 (1943).

The res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines have been articulated by this court in Gomes v. Tyau, supra.

Consequently, under traditional rules plaintiff may be barred from pursuing successive suits where the same issue has been litigated or could have been litigated.

But in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel we have in this jurisdiction partially abandoned the traditional requirement of identity of parties. In Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 451 P.2d 814 (1969), we stated:

"Collateral estoppel is an aspect of res judicata which precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was previously determined in a prior suit on a different claim between the same parties or their privies. Yuen v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., 40 Haw. 213, 223 (1953); Henderson v. Pence, 50 Haw. 162, 163, 434 P.2d 309, 310 (1967). Collateral estoppel also precludes relitigation of facts or issues previously determined when it is raised defensively by one not a party in a prior suit against one who was a party in that suit and who himself raised and litigated the fact or issue."

Id., 51 Haw. at 55-56, 451 P.2d at 822. We applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel most recently in Morneau v. Stark Enterprises, Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 539 P.2d 472 (1975), where we held:

"(W)e will not permit a plaintiff to have another opportunity to rehash the same claim the second time around by switching adversaries. Plaintiff through his own choosing is now precluded in the present action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating the same issue (whether a ramp had been negligently constructed) which was determined by the judgment in the first action." Id., 56 Haw. at 424, 539 P.2d at 476.

Id. at 167-68, 552 P.2d at 643.

This court also explained the policy reason underlying res judicata and collateral...