Santos v. Superior Court, A024469
Decision Date | 06 April 1984 |
Docket Number | No. A024469,A024469 |
Citation | 202 Cal.Rptr. 6,154 Cal.App.3d 1178 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Julio Horonto SANTOS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Santa Clara County, Respondent, PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. |
Sheldon Portman, Public Defender, Robert A. Weeks, F. Benjamin Rice, Deputy Public Defenders, John M. Wadsworth, Bar Certified Law Student, County of Santa Clara, San Jose, for petitioner.
John K. Van De Kamp, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Brady, Karl W. Payne, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for real party in interest.
This petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition challenges a trial court ruling denying petitioner's motion to suppress evidence. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.)
Two issues require our attention:
(1) Did the officers have sufficient grounds to detain petitioner when his two companions were seen passing objects in a closed-off parking lot at 10:00 p.m.?
(2) If the detention was proper, was pat search of petitioner justified by the circumstances?
Petitioner had been charged by information filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court with burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496) and possession of a dirk or dagger (Pen.Code, § 12020, subd. (a)). In superior court he moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of his detention by the police. The motion was based upon evidence presented at a de novo hearing held August 29, 1983. At the hearing, the court denied the motion to suppress. This petition followed.
Officer Vincent Di Corti was patrolling with his partner, Officer Mike Maier, at 10:00 p.m. on Friday, May 27, 1983. In the area of Pomeroy and El Camino in Santa Clara he noticed three people standing in a parking lot, talking. His attention was attracted by the fact that they were in an area that was barricaded off with street barricades that indicated that that portion of the parking lot was closed to the public. Also, a man later identified as a Mr. Gervais was exchanging something from his wallet with an unidentified man. Businesses were near the parking lot, but only a liquor store west of the cordoned off area was open at that time of the night. A different parking area was provided for the liquor store.
Officer Di Corti felt there was "some type of possible illegal activity going on between the passing of the item, whatever it was, and plus the fact that they were in the closed-off portion of the parking lot." He was aware of a municipal ordinance prohibiting loitering around closed businesses. As he approached the three individuals to make contact, they were leaving the parking lot. Petitioner and Mr. Gervais left in one direction, and the unidentified person, whom the officers did not stop, left in the opposite direction.
Officer Di Corti stopped Mr. Gervais while Officer Maier stopped petitioner. Officer Maier testified that he was working as a reserve police officer on the evening in question (his usual occupation is supervisor for an electronic firm). When he and Officer Di Corti contacted the two men, Officer Maier took petitioner off about ten feet from Officer Di Corti and began to talk to him and pat search him. Officer Maier first asked petitioner for identification and to explain what he was doing there. (The record does not reveal petitioner's answer.) He also pat searched him. At the hearing, he explained the reason for his pat search as follows:
During the pat search, Officer Maier felt a hard object on petitioner's right lower back, stuck in his belt. It felt like it might be a knife handle or the handle of a small gun. He removed it, discovering that it was a double-edged knife in a sheath. After removing the knife, Officer Maier "finished the pat-down search, pulling a number of other objects out of his pockets and his coat." Petitioner had not yet been placed under arrest.
On cross-examination by petitioner's counsel, Officer Maier explained his actions a little further: Officer Maier explained why he took other items from petitioner's pockets after finding the knife:
Petitioner contends that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him for violation of the loitering statute because in the context of a penal statute "loiter" requires a sinister purpose for presence in a particular place. He argues that the observation of something being passed from Mr. Gervais to the unidentified person does not satisfy the requirement of a sinister purpose because the officers could not tell what that "something" was.
Real party correctly perceives that the initial question is not whether there was probable cause to arrest for loitering, but whether the observations of the officers justified a temporary detention for the purpose of investigation. Real party argues that the officers had sufficient grounds to suspect a violation of the loitering ordinance and were entitled to investigate.
(In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.)
By focusing on the question of probable cause to arrest, petitioner fails to present any theory for why the officers could not reasonably suspect criminal activity and detain petitioner to investigate. While an exchange of unidentified objects in a high narcotics area may not provide probable cause for arrest (see Cunha v Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 352, 357, 85 Cal.Rptr. 160, 466 P.2d 704; Filitti v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 930, 933-934, 100 Cal.Rptr. 583), that activity and the possible violation of the municipal ordinance furnished grounds for detaining petitioner for questioning. 1 The more serious question is whether those observations plus petitioner's failure to produce identification add up to grounds for the further intrusion of a pat-search.
(2) IF THE DETENTION WAS PROPER, WAS PAT SEARCH OF PETITIONER JUSTIFIED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES?
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