SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Development Corp.

Decision Date05 October 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-1509,89-1509
Citation921 F.2d 360
Parties1991 Copr.L.Dec. P 26,692, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1146 SAPC, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Mark A. Michelson with whom Brian A. Davis, Kenneth W. Gurge, and Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Henry C. Dinger with whom Stephen D. Poss and Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellee Mitchell D. Kapor.

Henry B. Gutman with whom Kerry L. Konrad, Karen F. Conway, O'Sullivan Graev & Karabell, New York City, Thomas F. Dougherty, and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Boston, Mass., were on brief for defendant, appellee Lotus Development Corp.

Before BOWNES and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, * Senior Circuit Judge.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

In 1985, Lotus Development Corp. (Lotus) purchased the entire software business of Software Arts (SAPC). 1 Less than two years later, SAPC filed suit alleging that Lotus, and its founder Kapor, had violated SAPC's copyright and misappropriated trade secrets in SAPC's program "Visicalc" prior to the sale of that copyright to Lotus. We affirm the trial court's holding that the Asset Purchase Agreement unambiguously transferred or extinguished all of SAPC's rights as part of the transaction pursuant to which Lotus acquired all rights related to the Visicalc program. 699 F.Supp. 1009.

A Tangled Web

The trial judge found the most significant background facts undisputed. 2 We adopt these factfindings, which are not clearly erroneous. F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

SAPC originated and held the copyright on a computer software program called "Visicalc," the first interactive computerized spreadsheet. In 1980, Kapor worked for Personal Software, Inc., the exclusive marketing agent for Visicalc.

In 1982, Kapor formed Lotus and developed "Lotus 1-2-3" ("1-2-3"). All parties agree that "1-2-3" had a severe if not fatal impact on Visicalc sales.

In March and April, 1985, SAPC and Lotus began negotiations for the purchase and sale of Visicalc and other SAPC assets. The Asset Purchase Agreement was executed on June 7, 1985 to consummate the deal.

Less than two years later, in April 1987, SAPC filed suit against Lotus and Kapor, alleging (i) copyright infringement, (ii) breach of contract, (iii) unjust enrichment, (iv) misappropriation, and (v) violation of Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 93A Secs. 2 and 11. 3

The trial judge bifurcated the trial. Phase I was to determine whether the Agreement had the effect of terminating SAPC's claims for copyright infringement, and the related claims, against Lotus and Kapor. Because the trial court determined that it did, Phase II, which would have involved application of the Copyright Laws to determine infringement was never tried.

The Art of the Deal

Both parties assert that the Asset Purchase Agreement (the Agreement) is an unambiguous, integrated agreement. 4 This creates the presumption that the parties intended the contract to be the complete and final statement of their agreement. See Charles A. Wright, Inc. v. F.D. Rich Co., 354 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960, 86 S.Ct. 1586, 16 L.Ed.2d 673 (1966). The trial judge concluded that the Agreement was "manifestly meant to be a complete and integrated document." He determined as well that the contract was not ambiguous and therefore, no extrinsic evidence could be considered to vary or modify its meaning. 5 We agree. See RCI Northeast Services Div. v. Boston Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 202 (1st Cir.1987) (whether writing is ambiguous is a question of law for the court and is subject to plenary review).

The critical provision of the contract is Section 2.1, Acquired Assets. In this section, Lotus agreed to:

acquire, purchase and accept from [SAPC], all of [SAPC's] right, title and interest in and to the following assets of [SAPC], wherever located, as the same shall exist at the Closing Date, including, whether tangible or intangible or mixed:

(a) all trademarks, patents, servicemarks (together with the goodwill of the business in connection with which such trademarks, servicemarks and patents are used), copyrights (and applications for any of the foregoing), logos, tradenames and all other names or slogans used by [SAPC] in connection with its business and goodwill ...;

(b) all computer programs (in whatever form embodied or in whatever stage of completion) ... and all trade secrets and intellectual property embodied in, related to or underlying such computer programs, all recorded know-how or know-how within [SAPC's] control, trade secrets, test data, processes, formulae, inventions, designs, prototypes, drawings, manufacturing data, test and quality control data, and technical reports pertaining to such computer programs, and the exclusive right and license to manufacture any and all products manufactured by [SAPC]....

....

(e) any prepaid item related to any of the above assets; provided, however, that

(1) [Lotus] is not acquiring any other asset of [SAPC], including, but not limited to:

(i) assets which are Tax Attributes ...;

(ii) cash, cash equivalents and securities;

(iii) accounts or notes receivable in dispute or in litigation ...;

(iv) finished goods inventory relating to Radio Shack (Tandy) versions of [SAPC's] products; or

(v) stock of SAI.

(Emphasis added in introduction and subparagraphs (a) and (b)).

SAPC's argument boils down to the proposition that the broad and general granting provisions of Section 2.1(a) and (b), by which Lotus acquired all of SAPC's tangible and intangible rights and interest relating to its copyrights and computer programs, did not convey causes of action for prior infringement of the copyrights it was selling. On the contrary, SAPC asserts that the specific references of the proviso in Section 2.1(e), because the proviso was "including, but not limited to" those specific references, evidence the parties' intent to reserve as well to SAPC a pre-existing infringement claim against Lotus.

We recognize that none of these provisions explicitly deals with the claim at issue here. However, we determine that SAPC's interpretation of the contract is strained and contrary to the clear intent of the parties that Lotus was to acquire "everything the seller has" 6 in relation to Visicalc.

By Section 2.1(a) and (b), Lotus acquired all SAPC's intangible property relating to any of its copyrights and computer programs, including all rights relating to trade secrets or other intellectual property. By transferring all rights and interests related to all of SAPC's intellectual property, this language unambiguously assigns not only the Visicalc copyrights, but any then existing claims for infringement. See Rohauer v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.1962) (assignment of "all right title and interest" transferred both the copyright and the right to renew by its "all inclusive" language); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826, 89 S.Ct. 86, 21 L.Ed.2d 96 (1968) (broad conveyance of motion picture rights encompassed all uses that might reasonably fall within the medium described by the license).

The party seeking to deviate from the terms of a broad and general conveyance, such as that in Section 2.1(a) and (b) has the burden of proving the asserted specific exception. See Rohauer, 306 F.2d at 936 (given all-inclusive language of assignment, no evidence in record supports conclusion that seller intended to retain rights in copyright); cf. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155 (given words broad enough to cover new use, it is grantor's burden to negotiate exception). SAPC failed to do so. All the proviso accomplished was to reserve to SAPC those assets not transferred in the prior paragraphs. Since Section 2.1(a) and (b) transferred to Lotus all rights related to Visicalc, Section 2.1(e) is irrelevant here.

SAPC's copyright standing cases, which it presses for the proposition that the transfer of a copyright does not convey claims for infringement that accrued prior to the transfer unless such claims are explicitly referenced in the agreement, avail them not. 7 Because the agreement unambiguously transferred accrued claims for infringement as well as SAPC's copyrights, this general rule of Copyright law need not be reached. 8

The rule in the First Circuit is that in construing a written agreement, courts must consider every phrase and clause in light of all the others in the instrument, "which must be considered as a workable and harmonious means for carrying out and effectuating the intent of the parties." Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 365 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795, 494 N.E.2d 374, 378 (1986)). In applying this standard, we find several other clauses of the Agreement and ancillary documents which harmonize with our interpretation.

First, the Assignment of Copyrights executed by SAPC supports the view that the parties intended a transfer of rights broader than just the copyrights alone. The Assignment states that SAPC is "the holder of copyrights and owner of all rights in the works set forth." It further states that Lotus "desires to acquire the entire interest of [SAPC] in the Works." Finally, in the language of assignment, SAPC assigns to Lotus "all its interest in the Works, including the copyrights thereon...." R. 972.

Second, a reservation by SAPC of a claim against Lotus would be inconsistent with the meaning and intent of the representations and warranties made by SAPC in the Agreement. For example, in Section 4.16, SAPC warranted:

Except as otherwise set forth on Exhibit 4.16 hereto, there are no actions, suits, proceedings, claims or investigations formally instituted and pending, or threatened against [SAPC] or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Davis v. Dawson, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 9 Junio 1998
    ...preclude consideration of background facts that explain the context in which the agreement was made." SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Development Corporation, 921 F.2d 360, 361 n. 2 (1st Cir.1990). In the event the court determines that contract language is ambiguous then the court may consider extrins......
  • Parfums Givenchy v. C & C BEAUTY SALES
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • 1 Septiembre 1993
    ...presumption is not conclusive, but instead depends on the particular circumstances of the assignment. See SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Development Corp., 921 F.2d 360, 363 (1st Cir.1990); Custom Decor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts, Inc., 502 F.Supp. 154, 157 (E.D.Pa.1980). Here, the assignment from Given......
  • Itofca, Inc. v. Megatrans Logistics, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 7 Marzo 2003
    ...284-85 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Bieg v. Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc., 157 F.Supp.2d 475, 479-80 (E.D.Pa.2001); cf. SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Development Corp., 921 F.2d 360, 362-63 (1st Cir.1990). It can use terminology such as "all assets" that clearly includes copyrights. Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nord......
  • John G. Danielson v. Winchester-Conant Properties
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 27 Febrero 2002
    ...be considered as a workable and harmonious means for carrying out and effectuating the intent of the parties.'" SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 921 F.2d 360, 363 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795, 494 N.E.2d 374 Here, the agreement between Danie......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT