Sapko v. State , No. 18680.
Citation | 305 Conn. 360,44 A.3d 827 |
Decision Date | 12 June 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 18680. |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Parties | Christine L. SAPKO, v. STATE of Connecticut et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John J. Quinn, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was John J. Quinn, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Lawrence G. Widem, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorneygeneral, for the appellee (named defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, MCLACHLAN and HARPER, Js.
The plaintiff, Christine L. Sapko, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) upholding the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the eighth district (commissioner) denying her claim for survivor's benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31–3061 of the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31–275 et seq. The plaintiff had sought survivor's benefits following the death of her husband, Anthony S. Sapko (decedent), an employee of the named defendant, the state of Connecticut.2 The commissioner denied the plaintiff's claim following the commissioner's determination that the decedent's simultaneous ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone, which had been prescribed for compensable work injuries, and Seroquel, which had been prescribed for an unrelated case of major depression, constituted a superseding cause of his death and, therefore, that the decedent's compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. After the board upheld the commissioner's decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the board incorrectly had concluded that the commissioner's application of the superseding cause doctrine was proper in light of Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 446, 820 A.2d 258 (2003), which abrogated that doctrine in most tort contexts.3 The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that the board incorrectly had concluded that the superseding cause doctrine applied to the present case but concluded that this impropriety was harmless because the record otherwise supported the board's determination that the commissioner properly had applied the law to the facts in deciding the issue of proximate cause. See Sapko v. State, 123 Conn.App. 18, 26, 30, 1 A.3d 250 (2010). We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the determination of the compensation review board that the compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of the decedent's death?” Sapko v. State, 298 Conn. 923, 4 A.3d 1229 (2010).
We conclude, contrary to the predicate determination of the Appellate Court, that the board correctly concluded that the superseding cause doctrine applies to certain cases under the act and, further, that the commissioner's finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent's compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts. We also reject the plaintiff's claim that the commissioner's finding is incompatible with our statement in Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., 288 Conn. 392, 953 A.2d 28 (2008), that an injured employee is entitled to recovery under the act if he can demonstrate that his employment contributed to the injury “in more than a de minimus way.” Id., at 413, 953 A.2d 28. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, albeit on the basis of different reasoning.
The facts, as found by the commissioner and accepted by the board, are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court:
4 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sapko v. State, supra, 123 Conn.App. at 21–23, 1 A.3d 250.
On the basis of this evidence, the commissioner found that there was no causal relationship between the decedent's compensable injuries and his need for psychiatric treatment, including his treatment with Seroquel. He also concluded that the “[e]levated [level] of Oxycodone by itself did not cause [the decedent's] death.” Rather, the commissioner found that the decedent's “ingestion of excessive quantities of Oxycodone and Seroquel, [al]though accidental, constitute[d] a superseding cause of his death.” 5 He also concluded that “[the decedent's] work injuries of February 13, 2001, September 25, 2005, December 10, 2005, and May 16, 2006, were neither a substantial factor nor the proximate cause of [the decedent's] death.” 6
The plaintiff appealed to the board from the decision of the commissioner, claiming that, in light of our abrogation of the superseding cause doctrine in Barry, the commissioner improperly had relied on that doctrine in concluding that the decedent's compensable injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The board disagreed, explaining that, because Barry was predicated on the change in our tort law away from contributory negligence to a system of comparative fault and apportionment, Barry applies to negligence...
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