Saponari v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 838,838
• Citation: 727 A.2d 396,125 Md. App. 25
• Parties: George P. SAPONARI, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marsha E. Saponari v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

727 A.2d 396

125 Md. App. 25

George P. SAPONARI, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marsha E. Saponari v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

No. 838, Sept. Term, 1998.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 8, 1999.

Keith W. Donahoe (Koonz, McKenney, Johnson, DePaolis & Lightfoot, on the brief), Greenbelt, for appellant.

Stephen B. Caplis (Eric R. Harlan and Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, EYLER and SONNER, JJ.

DAVIS, Judge.

Marsha E. Saponari, wife of appellant, George P. Saponari, was killed on August 9, 1994 when she was struck by a CSXT freight train while attempting to cross the railroad tracks at a commuter station in Laurel, Maryland. Appellant, individually and as personal representative of the estate of his deceased wife, brought suit on April 16, 1996 against appellee, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Appellant claimed negligence by appellee, alleging wrongful death individually and pursuing a survivor's claim on behalf of the estate. Appellee denied negligence and raised the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Following discovery, appellee made a motion for summary judgment which was denied by the court (Sothoron, J.) on October 16, 1997.¹

A jury trial began on March 16, 1998, and appellee made motions for judgment on the issues of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk at the close of appellant's evidence and at the conclusion of all the evidence. Both of the motions were denied. The court instructed the jury on the issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and, despite objection by appellant's counsel, assumption of the risk. On March 19, 1998, the jury returned its verdict and answered special interrogatories submitted to it by the court as follows: appellee was negligent, the decedent was not negligent, and the decedent assumed the risk of her death. Consequently, the court entered judgment for appellee on April 8, 1998.² Appellant timely filed an appeal on April 9, 1998 and presents for our review one question that we restate as follows:

I. Did the trial court err by submitting the issue of assumption of the risk to the jury?

Appellee filed a cross-appeal on April 15, 1998 and presents the following question that we restate and restructure as follows:

II. Did the trial court err by denying appellee's motion for summary judgment and subsequent motions for judgment because the decedent was contributorily negligent and assumed the risk of her death as a matter of law?

We answer appellant's question in the negative and appellee's question in the affirmative. Therefore, we vacate the court's judgment and remand the case for entry of a judgment in favor of appellee.

FACTS

On the morning of August 9, 1994, at approximately 8:30 a.m., appellant drove his wife to a commuter train station located in Laurel, Maryland, so that she could take a Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC) train to her job in Washington, D.C. Before addressing the accident at issue, it is helpful to describe the setting of the Laurel Train Station. The station building and a commuter parking lot are adjacent to the southbound tracks while a passenger shelter for inclement weather is on the northbound side of the tracks. Because of a steep hill behind the shelter, the road accessing the northbound side is well below the level of the tracks. The road accessing the southbound side, however, leads into the commuter parking lot and is level with the railroad tracks. Therefore, a person wishing to reach the station or southbound tracks from the northbound side must either walk up a flight of steps next to the shelter and use a wooden walkway to cross the two sets of active railroad tracks or proceed through a tunnel beneath the tracks that leads directly to the southbound side.

If a person chooses to use the stairs adjacent to the shelter on the northbound side, at the top of the staircase there is a six-foot platform before a two-foot yellow warning zone that abuts the northbound track. An individual must look to the left upon reaching the platform to ascertain whether a train is coming from the southbound direction. The shelter, however, obstructs a person's view of the northbound track for the first three feet of the platform. Within the next three feet before the yellow warning zone, a person is able to see 640 feet up the northbound track.

Appellant's wife regularly commuted to her job from this station, usually driving herself and parking in the commuter lot. On the day in question, however, appellant dropped off his wife and she exited the car on the northbound side below the tracks. Because she needed to go to the southbound tracks for her commute to Washington, D.C., the decedent had to cross the tracks. Instead of walking through the tunnel to reach the southbound side, the decedent chose to proceed up the stairs adjacent to the shelter and cross the railroad tracks via the wooden walkway. After arriving at the top of the stairs, the decedent's next few steps are a matter of dispute between the parties. Tragically, however, the undisputed result was that, when the decedent stepped onto the walkway and began crossing the northbound tracks, appellee's freight train struck and killed her. We shall set forth the facts that may be ascertained from testimony at trial and the parties' briefs regarding the decedent's path prior to her untimely death.

Immediately before appellant's wife began to ascend the stairs that morning, John Gianetti, a local politician, handed her a campaign brochure. At the top of the steps, testimony reflects that the decedent may have "paused for a second," but never broke stride before crossing the yellow warning zone and walking onto the northbound tracks. Furthermore, although it is apparent that the decedent made a "slight nod to the left," it is unclear whether she ever looked to ascertain whether a train was approaching from the southern direction. Unfortunately, a freight train traveling at fifty-two miles per hour³ was only approximately sixty feet away when the decedent stepped onto the northbound track. Evidence demonstrates that the train failed to sound the horn signaling its approach prior to reaching the station; however, the horn was sounded when the decedent began to cross the track, although it is disputed whether the sound actually was heard before or after the train struck the decedent. With less than a second to react once she reached the northbound track, appellant's wife was struck by the freight train and killed.

Appellant subsequently brought suit, individually, for wrongful death and on behalf of the estate based on a survivor's suit, on April 16, 1996 in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.

DISCUSSION

I

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred by submitting the assumption of the risk issue to the jury. Assumption of the risk is "an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chances from harm from a particular risk." Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 705, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (quoting Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 243, 262 A.2d 549 (1970)). If proven, assumption of the risk is a complete bar to recovery because it serves as "a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident occurs." ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 91, 702 A.2d 730 (1997) (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 360, 189 A. 260 (1937)).⁴ The elements of assumption of the risk are well settled in Maryland, and the defendant must prove that the plaintiff "(1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger." Flippo, 348 Md. at 706, 705 A.2d 1144 (quoting ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 91, 702 A.2d 730).

In the determination of these elements, "an objective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him." ADM Partnership, 348 Md. at 91, 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421, 226 A.2d 273 (1967)). Although the question of whether the plaintiff assumed the risk is normally for the jury, if it is clear that an individual of normal intelligence, in the plaintiff's position, must have understood the danger, then the issue is for the court. See id. at 91-92, 702 A.2d 730; Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283-84, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991). Because the plaintiff needs only to be aware of the risk and then voluntarily undertake it, the defendant is not required to prove that the plaintiff was negligent. See Schroyer, 323 Md. at 282-83,

592 A.2d 1119. Applying these principles, we turn now to appellant's contention that the trial court erred by submitting the issue of assumption of the risk to the jury.⁵

Appellant argues that knowledge of the danger, the first element of the assumption of risk defense, requires more than the knowledge of a general danger in crossing railroad tracks. Instead, appellant submits that appellee was required to prove that the decedent had actual knowledge of the danger posed by the particular train that struck her, not by a train in general. As support for this argument, appellant relies on Rogers v. Frush, supra,

wherein the Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff, who was injured by an automobile while riding a motorcycle without a helmet, did not assume the risk of injury. The Court reasoned that, even if the plaintiff had knowledge of and appreciated the risk, riding without a helmet did not relieve the defendant of her obligation to operate the automobile in a prudent manner. See Rogers, 257 Md. at 244,

262 A.2d 549.

Appellant further relies on Flippo, supra, in which a ten-year-old child was injured while climbing a...