Sappington, In re
| Decision Date | 31 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 16063,16063 |
| Parties | In re SAPPINGTON. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carley J. Ingram, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Dayton, for appellee.
Richard D. Donenfeld, Dayton, for appellant.
Appellant, David Sappington, a minor child of seventeen at the time of the judgment below, appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery Count Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Sappington pleaded guilty to four counts of gross sexual imposition contrary to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), was found delinquent, and was committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services ("DYS") for a minimum period of twenty-four months and a maximum period not to exceed his attaining the age of twenty-one. Sappington raises as error the juvenile court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent him. We find that the court abused its discretion by not appointing a guardian ad litem where the record indicated a strong possibility of conflicting interests between the juvenile and his father, who represented him at the adjudicatory and dispositional hearing. Therefore, we reverse and remand the case for new proceedings.
On March 26, David Sappington was charged with four counts of delinquency and gross sexual imposition by a complaint filed with the juvenile division by the Miamisburg Police Department. At that time, he resided in Dartmouth Hospital. On April 25, 1996, David made his first juvenile court appearance on these charges. He was unrepresented by counsel but was accompanied by his father. Also present were representatives of South Community Mental Health Center and Dartmouth Hospital. The magistrate advised David of his rights and informed him of the possible dispositions of the case. When the court asked whether David wished to exercise his right to an attorney, the following colloquy occurred:
The magistrate then related the charges to David. When asked, David responded that he understood the charges and had no questions about them. The magistrate then accepted David's admission of guilt.
Later, David's father informed the magistrate that his son had suffered from psychological problems from an early age. He related that, in the years before the hearing, David had become suicidal and threatening toward other people, including his parents. He was hospitalized for one week in December 1994. After his release, the threats against his family increased. His parents then placed him with unofficial foster parents for about a year, until that household could no longer manage his increasingly difficult behavior. After his return to his parents' house, David again became threatening. In July 1995, he appeared before the juvenile court on charges of domestic violence against his mother. Between July 1995 and January 1996, David was placed with two different foster homes by South Community, Inc. In January 1995, he was transferred to Dartmouth Hospital. David's father expressed concern to the magistrate that David's eligibility for psychological treatment through South Central, Inc. and Dartmouth might terminate upon his eighteenth birthday, if David was not confined beyond that point. He encouraged the magistrate to consider "David's needs and the community's need" in determining the disposition of the case.
A representative from Dartmouth Hospital also spoke at the adjudicatory hearing. He informed the magistrate that David had been diagnosed with a number of mental disorders, including schizoaffectiveness, bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, post-traumatic stress, and several other illnesses. He also related that David had trouble distinguishing what was true from what was not.
The magistrate held a dispositional hearing on June 4, 1996, attended by David, his father, a probation officer, and representatives from Family Services, South Community, and Dartmouth Hospital. At the hearing, the magistrate announced his intention to recommend that David be committed to the Department of Youth Services for consecutive terms on all four counts. Given an opportunity to comment, David's father and representatives from South Community and Dartmouth expressed their agreement with his decision. On July 3, the court entered four orders upon the magistrate's decision, each entry committing David for a six-month term to be served consecutively with the others.
On appeal, appellant raises four assignments of error, all relating to the procedure observed below. We will consider only appellant's second assignment of error, because we find that it disposes of the instant appeal. With his second of assignment of error, appellant asserts:
"The trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the appellant on April 25, 1996, or thereafter."
Both R.C. 2151.281(A) and Juv.R. 4(B) mandate that a juvenile court must appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of a child involved in matters before the court under certain designated sets of circumstances. Appellant argues that a conflict of interest existed between him and his father so that the court should have acted under these provisions. The relevant portions of R.C. 2151.281(A) read as follows:
Functionally similar portions of Juv.R. 4(B) read:
Because these provisions are mandatory, the failure of a court to appoint a guardian ad litem, when such an appointment is required under the rule or the statute, constitutes reversible error. See In re Adoption of Howell (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 80, 92, 601 N.E.2d 92, 99-100. Resolution of the issue raised by appellant's assignment of error, therefore, turns on whether the record below shows a conflict of interests between father and son sufficient to merit reversal. We note, however, that the magistrate did not explicitly find an absence of conflicting interests. Rather, the finding was implicit in his decision to hold the two hearings without appointing a guardian ad litem.
Ohio appellate courts have not heretofore followed a single, clear standard when reviewing a trial court's determination not to appoint a guardian ad litem. They have differed as to the quantum of evidence of conflicting interests between parent and child they found necessary to support a reversal of the lower court. Some courts have paid special consideration to the language of Juv.R. 4(B)(2) in reaching their determinations. The rule requires an appointment if "[t]he interests of the child and the interests of the parent may conflict." (Emphasis added.) To this extent, the rule differs from R.C. 2151.281(A)(2) which mandates appointment when "[t]he court finds that there is a conflict of interest between the child and the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, a number of courts have held that, when the record from below indicates a "strong possibility" that interests may conflict but the lower court did not appoint a guardian ad litem, there is reversible error. In the Matter of Trembley (June 24, 1983), Ashtabula App. No. 1108, unreported, at 3, 1983 WL 6160; see, also, In re Christopher (1977), 54 Ohio App.2d 137, 143, 8 O.O.3d 271, 274-275, 376 N.E.2d 603, 607 (); In re Adoption of Howell (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 80, 92, 601 N.E.2d 92, 100 (). Learned comment on Juv.R. 4(B)(2) supports the emphasis placed in these opinions on the rule's language. One writer explained:
" " In the Matter of Myer (June 16, 1981), Delaware App. No. 80-CA-10, unreported, at 2, 1981 WL 6316 (quoting Judge Don Young in Anderson, Ohio Family Law, Section 4.12).
Other courts have required a more clear showing of conflict before reversing the lower court's judgment. See, e.g., In re Nation (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 763, 767, 573 N.E.2d 1155, 1157-1158; In re Wilkins (June 26, 1996), Hancock App. No. 5-96-1, unreported, at 3, 1996 WL 355046. In Nation, the Shelby County Court of Appeals emphasized the abuse of discretion standard applicable to appellate review of a lower court's factual findings. 61 Ohio App.3d at 767, 573 N.E.2d at 1157-1158. Noting that " 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Legg
...relevant facts in determining whether a potential conflict of interest exists between the parent and child.” In re Sappington, 123 Ohio App.3d 448, 453–454, 704 N.E.2d 339 (1997), citing Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952). The question is whether the record “revea......
-
In re W.W.E. W.E.
...discretion standard. In re K.R., 11th Dist. No. 2015–T–0008, 2015-Ohio-2819, 2015 WL 4207085, ¶ 27, citing In re Sappington, 123 Ohio App.3d 448, 454, 704 N.E.2d 339 (2d Dist.1997). Here, nothing in the record demonstrates that appellant was mentally incompetent during the proceedings. Furt......
-
In re D.G.
...N.E .2d 110 (10th Dist.), ¶12, citing In re K.J.F., 2nd Dist. No. 2003-CA-41, 2004-Ohio-263, ¶23, citing In re Sappington, 123 Ohio App.3d 448, 452, 704 N.E.2d 339 (2nd Dist.1997), and In re Spradlin, 140 Ohio App.3d 402, 406, 747 N.E.2d 877 (4th Dist.2000)."[T]he juvenile court is in the b......
-
In re D.A.G.
...916 N.E.2d 110 (10th Dist.), ¶12, citing In re K.J.F., 2nd Dist. No. 2003-CA-41, 2004-Ohio-263, ¶23, citing In re Sappington, 123 Ohio App.3d448, 452, 704 N.E.2d 339 (2nd Dist. 1997), and In re Spradlin, 140 Ohio App.3d 402, 406, 747 N.E.2d 877 (4th Dist. 2000). {¶ 49} "[T]he juvenile court......