Sarah v. Young

Decision Date31 January 1873
Citation68 N.C. 309
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSARAH V. YOUNG, in her own right, and as Adm'r cum test. annexo, of ROBERT S. YOUNG, v. ALFRED YOUNG and others.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

A, in his will, gave to his wife “all my estate, real, personal and mixed, to be managed by her, (and that she may be enabled the better to control and manage our children,) to be disposed of by her to them, in that manner she may think best for their good and her own happiness:” Held, to be a gift to the wife in trust, not for herself nor for the children alone, but for both, to be managed at her discretion for the benefit of herself and children.

Held further, that the trust is coupled with the power to dispose of the property among the children at her own discretion as to time, quantity and person; and that no one of them is entitled, as of right, to have a share of the property allotted to him upon his arrival at age.

This Court will not adjudicate a hypothecal case, which may or may not arise, for the mere purpose of advising as to circumstances altogether contingent and uncertain.

( Little v. Bennett, 5 Jones Eq. 156; Aston v. Lee, 6 Jones Eq. 27; and Cook v Ellington,Ibid, 371, referred to and approved.)

CIVIL ACTION, brought to obtain the construction of a will, heard before Logan, J., at the Fall Term, 1872, of CABARRUS Superior Court.

In 1864, Robert L. Young, the testator, was killed in one of the engagements of the late war, having first made and published the following as his last will and testament, to wit:

“I, Robert S. Young, of the county of Cabarrus, and State of North Carolina, do make this my last will and testament, revoking all wills or parts of wills heretofore made by me.

To my beloved wife I give all my estate, real, personal and mixed, to be managed by her, (and that she may be enabled the better to control and manage our children) to be disposed of by her to them in that manner she may think best for their good and her own happiness.

Witness my hand,” &c.,

Which will was duly admitted to probate, and the plaintiff, his widow, appointed administratrix with the will annexed.

As alleged in the complaint, the testator died seized of a large estate, real and personal, the latter, or most of it, being lost by the results of the war, leaving the defendants, his children, all under age at his death. That she has kept the children together, educating and maintaining them, and managed the estate to the best advantage.

The two eldest of the children had attained their majority before this action was instituted.

The plaintiff contends, that under a proper construction of the will of her husband, his estate is vested in her absolutely.

If not, and she is declared to be a trustee for the children, she prays directions as to the proper execution of that trust.

The defendants, admitting the allegations of the answer, contend that it was the true intent and meaning of the testator, as expressed in his will, was to vest in the plaintiff the estate in trust for their benefit, with a limited power of disposal. Otherwise if the plaintiff is not a trustee, she can have only a life estate, as there are no words of inheritance.

His Honor, after argument in the Court below, adjudged:

1. Under the will the plaintiff has a general power in trust, which is to be construed equitably and liberally, that the substantial intention of the testator may be carried out, the plaintiff having both the power and intent.

2. Taking in consideration the value of the estate and the condition of the family of the testator in life, each child is to be raised and educated to his or her majority.

3. As each child arrives to his or her majority, such a portion of the estate is “to be disposed of by (her),” the plaintiff, to them, as a prudent parent would bestow upon a child starting in life.

4. The plaintiff is to “manage” all the property of the testator's estate received by her under his will in a prudent and economical manner, to effectuate and carry out the substantial instructions of said will as above stated, reserving and retaining at all times a sufficiency for her own comfort and “happiness.”

5. The plaintiff has no right to convey any of the property as her own, but at her death the heirs of the testator will be entitled thereto.

From this judgment both plaintiff and defendants appealed.

Wilson, for the plaintiff .

Battle & Son and Allison, for defendants .

READE, J.

The will which we have to construe is as follows:

“To my beloved wife I give all my estate, personal and mixed, to be managed by her (and that she may be enabled the better to control and manage our children,) to be disposed of by her to them, in that manner she may think best for their good and her own happiness.”

Two of the defendants, have arrived at age, and the widow files her complaint, in which she says, that she has kept the property together and raised and educated the children; but now a controversy has arisen between her and the two defendants who have arrived at age; she claiming that the property “vested in her absolutely;” and they claiming that it “vested in her in trust for the benefit of the children.” And thereupon the plaintiff, who is the widow of the testator, and administratrix with the will annexed, demands judgment of the Court.

“1. Whether, according to the proper construction of said will, it was the purpose and intent of the testator to vest the estate absolutely in the plaintiff? or,

2. To vest the same in her in trust for the benefit of the children?”

The defendants in their answer, state their claim somewhat differently from what the plaintiff does. They say, that the estate vests in the plaintiff, “in trust for the benefit of the defendants, with a limited power of disposal.” And they further insist, that if the widow is not such a trustee then the most that she has is a life estate.

The construction which his Honor below put upon it is, that the widow has “both a power and an interest.” And that “each child is to be reared and educated to his or her majority,” and then to have a portion of the estate allotted; that the widow has “no right to convey any of the property as her own; but at...

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18 cases
  • In re Estate of Soulard
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 7, 1897
    ...8 Mo.App. 90; McCullock v. Holmes, 111 Mo. 448. (11) The grantees could be at the same time trustees and cestuis que trustent. Young v. Young, 68 N.C. 309; Cummings v. Corley, 58 Mich. 492; Love v. Francis, 63 Mich. 182. (12) The words "to the use of" on the instruments of gift are equivale......
  • Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Ashville, N. C., Inc. v. Morgan
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1972
    ...was created and that the doctrine of Cy pres should be applied, the Attorney General cites Stephens v. Clark, et al., supra; Young v. Young, 68 N.C. 309 (1873); Crudup v. Holding, 118 N.C. 222, 24 S.E. 7 (1896); Jarrell v. Dyer, 170 N.C. 177, 86 S.E. 1031 (1915); Morris v. Morris, supra. No......
  • Stephens v. Clark
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 6, 1937
    ...intent is not to grant an estate, but to impose a trust and direct the collection of rent for application to a specific purpose. Young v. Young, 68 N.C. 309; Witherington v. Herring, 140 N.C. 495, 53 S.E. 6 Ann.Cas. 188; Fellowes v. Durfey, 163 N.C. 305, 79 S.E. 621. If an instrument is exp......
  • Morris v. Morris
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 22, 1957
    ...words are necessary to create a trust if the purpose is evident. Stephens v. Clark, 211 N.C. 84, 189 S.E. 191. In the case of Young v. Young, 68 N.C. 309, this Court construed the following testamentary disposition: 'To my beloved wife I give all my estate, real, personal, and mixed, to be ......
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