Sargent v. Am. Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J.
| Decision Date | 21 November 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 42130.,42130. |
| Citation | 217 Iowa 225,251 N.W. 71 |
| Parties | SARGENT v. AMERICAN INS. CO. OF NEWARK, N. J. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Municipal Court of City of Des Moines; Russell Jordan, Judge.
This is an action by the plaintiff to recover from the defendant on a fire and explosion insurance policy. The case was tried to the court; the jury being waived. A judgment was entered in the plaintiff's favor, and the defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Sampson & Dillon, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Gillespie, Moody & Stewart, of Des Moines, for appellee.
On or about January 29, 1930, the defendant-appellant, the American Insurance Company of Newark, N. J., issued a fire insurance policy to the plaintiff-appellee, W. I. Sargent. The insurance policy covered certain household goods and furniture.
A fire, or explosion, occurred in the appellee's house on or about March 18, 1931, while the foregoing policy was in effect. See Sargent v. Mechanics' Insurance Company of Philadelphia (Iowa) 247 N. W. 267. As a result of the fire or explosion, the personal property covered by the policy was damaged. In due time demand was made upon the appellant by the appellee for the payment of the loss. But apparently, because the policy covered damage by fire rather than damage by explosion, the appellant refused to pay for the loss on the theory that the damage was caused by explosion rather than by fire. Because the appellant would not assume the loss under the policy, the appellee commenced the present action to recover for the damages. When the cause came on for trial, the municipal court tried the facts because a jury was waived. After the evidence was introduced, the municipal court decided for the appellee, and entered judgment accordingly. From that judgment the appellant appeals.
There is no reference to explosion in the appellee's petition, as originally filed. The petition originally predicated a cause of action on the theory of a fire. Attached to the original petition is the policy under consideration. That policy purports to cover damages by fire, but makes no mention of damages by explosion.
Later the appellee amended his petition by attempting to state an additional cause of action on the theory of explosion. In this amendment the appellee refers to a lost letter alleged to have been written by the appellant to its agent in Des Moines before the policy in question was issued. According to the alleged contents of that letter, the inherent explosion clause was to automatically become a part of all policies issued thereafter. It was following that letter that the appellee's policy now under consideration was written. So it is concluded by the appellee in his amendment that he can recover for the loss, due to the explosion, under the automatic assumption clause named in the letter.
Subsequently, however, the appellee again amended his petition by setting forth another cause of action. The theory of this second amendment is that the appellant agreed to give the appellee, through a rider to be attached to the policy, coverage for loss due to inherent explosion. But it is pleaded in this amendment that the appellant failed to attach such clause or rider. Whether the failure was due to breach of contract or something else does not appear. Nevertheless, the appellee prayed that the municipal court, sitting as a court of equity, reform...
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