Sargent v. HG Staffing, LLC

• Decision Date: 22 March 2016
• Docket Number: 3:13-CV-00453-LRH-WGC
• Citation: 171 F.Supp.3d 1063
• Parties: Tiffany Sargent, Bailey Cryderman, Samantha L. Ignacio (formerly Schneider), Vincent M. Ignacio, Huong (“Rosie”) Boggs, and Jacqulyn Wiederholt on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HG Staffing, LLC ; MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC d/b/a Grand Sierra Resort ; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

171 F.Supp.3d 1063

Tiffany Sargent, Bailey Cryderman, Samantha L. Ignacio (formerly Schneider), Vincent M. Ignacio, Huong (“Rosie”) Boggs, and Jacqulyn Wiederholt on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.HG Staffing, LLC ; MEI-GSR Holdings, LLC d/b/a Grand Sierra Resort ; and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

3:13-CV-00453-LRH-WGC

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

Signed March 22, 2016

Joshua D. Buck, Leah Lin Jones, Mark R. Thierman, Thierman Buck, LLP, Reno, NV, for Plaintiffs.

H. Stan Johnson, Cohen-Johnson, LLC, Terry Kinnally, Cohenjohnson LLC, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants.

ORDER

LARRY R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. Doc. # 144.¹ Defendants filed a Response (Doc. # 161), to which Plaintiffs' replied (Doc. # 167). Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages for their Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. Doc. # 164. Plaintiff's filed a Response (Doc. # 165), to which Defendant's replied (Doc. # 166). Additionally, Defendants' filed a Motion to Decertify FLSA Collective Action and for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. Doc. # 162. Plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. # 168), to which Defendants' replied (Doc. # 169).

I. Facts and Procedural History

On June 21, 2013, Plaintiffs Tiffany Sargant (“Sargant”) and Bailey Cryderman (“Cryderman”) filed their original collective and class action Complaint against Defendants in the Second Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe. Doc. # 1, Ex. A. On August 22, 2013, Defendants filed a Petition for Removal. Doc. # 1. On June 13, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) before the Court. Doc. # 47.

The SAC alleged nine causes of action: (1) Failure to Pay Wages for All Hours Worked in Violation of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq ; (2) Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207 ; (3) Failure to Pay Overtime at the Correct Rate, 29 U.S.C. § 207 ; (4) Failure to Compensate for All Hours Worked in Violation of NRS 608.140 and 608.016 ; (5) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages in Violation of the Nevada Constitution and NRS 608.250 ; (6) Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of NRS 608.140 and 608.018 ; (7) Failure to Timely Pay All Wages Due and Owing in Violation of NRS 608.140 and 608.020 -.050; (8) Unlawful Chargebacks in Violation of NRS 608.140 and 608.100 ; and (9) Age Discrimination Violation of 29 U.S.C. § 621 and NRS 613.330. On May 6, 2014, Plaintiffs' Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims (first, second, and third causes of action) were conditionally certified. Doc. # 40.

On September 3, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification as to their fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes of action. Doc. # 144. On November 4, 2015, Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and a Motion to Decertify FLSA Collective Action and for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action. Doc. # 161 and 162. On November 30, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Reply in support of their Motion for Class Certification and their Response to Defendants' Motion for Decertification and Partial Summary Judgment. Doc. # 167 and 168. On December 17, 2015, Defendants filed a Reply in support of their Motion for Decertification and Partial Summary Judgment. Doc. # 169. On January 12, 2016, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted as to Plaintiff's fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. Doc. # 172.

II. Legal Standard

A. Class Certification

To qualify for class certification, the class must meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), and at least one requirement of Rule 23(b). Fed. Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.131 (4th ed. 2004) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b). The proponents of the class bear the burden of demonstrating that all the prerequisites for class designation are met. See In re No. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig ., 693 F.2d 847, 854 (9th Cir.1982). “The class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.” Wal – Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , 564 U.S. 338, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551–52, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 23(a) sets forth four threshold requirements applicable to all class actions: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a).

The Supreme Court refers to these elements as “numerosity,” “commonality,” “typicality,” and “adequacy of representation,” respectively. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor , 521 U.S. 591, 613, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997).

In addition, Plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3) in order to maintain a class action. Under Rule 23(b)(3) —the subsection chosen by Plaintiffs—certification is appropriate if the court finds that “questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, and other materials in the record show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp ., 236 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2001). A motion for summary judgment can be complete or partial, and must identify “each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, along with evidence showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof, the moving party must make a showing that no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc ., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On an issue as to which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, however, the moving party can prevail merely by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's case. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

To successfully rebut a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to facts supported by the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J , 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir.2000). A “material fact” is a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. See v. Durang , 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir.1983). A dispute regarding a material fact is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the party's position is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the party. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “[S]peculative and conclusory arguments do not constitute the significantly probative evidence required to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Nolan v. Cleland , 686 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir.1982).

C. Decertification of a Collective Action

The FLSA authorizes collective actions against employers accused of violating the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Section 216(b) provides that “[a]n action ... may be maintained against any employer ... by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Thus, to maintain a collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they are similarly situated. See Anderson v. Cagle's , 488 F.3d 945, 952 (11th Cir.2007).

Participants in a § 216(b) collective action must affirmatively opt into the suit. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”). That is, once a plaintiff files a complaint against an employer, any other similarly situated employees who want to join must affirmatively consent to be a party and file written consent with the court. Albritton v. Cagle's , 508 F.3d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir.2007).

FLSA collective actions utilize a two-step process in the pretrial phase. The first step of whether a collective action should be certified is the notice stage. Anderson , 488 F.3d at 952–53 ; Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co ., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir.2001). Here, a court determines whether other similarly situated employees should be notified.

A plaintiff has the...