Saroya v. Univ. of the Pac.

• Decision Date: 27 November 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:20-cv-03196-EJD
• Citation: 503 F.Supp.3d 986
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Viney SAROYA, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC, Defendant.

503 F.Supp.3d 986

Viney SAROYA, Plaintiff,

v.UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC, Defendant.

Case No. 5:20-cv-03196-EJD

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division.

Signed November 27, 2020

Blair E. Reed, L. Timothy Fisher, Bursor and Fisher, P.A., Walnut Creek, CA, for Plaintiff.

Danielle Michelle Mayer, Kristina Starr Azlin, Stacey Hsiang Chun Wang, Vito Anthony Costanzo, Holland & Knight LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Paul G. Lannon, Jr., Holland and Knight LLP, Boston, MA, Qian Shen, Holland and Knight LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE

Re: Dkt. No. 31, 33

EDWARD J. DAVILA, United States District Judge

The COVID-19/Coronavirus pandemic has affected several sectors of our society. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has reverberated throughout the higher education system. Beginning in March, higher education institutions across the country made the unprecedented decision to close their campuses, hitting pause on the "full collegiate experience." At the same time, universities began transitioning their classes to online and other remote learning formats for their students to avoid a lost quarter or semester. Plaintiff Viney Saroya filed this putative class action against Defendant, University of the Pacific ("UOP"), alleging UOP breached a contract with its students (Claim I) or, alternatively, unjustly enriched itself at its student's expense (Claim II) when it retained the full amount of tuition and fees it collected for the Spring 2020 semester despite ceasing in-person instruction and closing its campus facilities and resources with just six weeks left of the semester. The class action also raises a claim of conversion (Claim III) and a claim of money had and received (Claim IV). Currently at issue is UOP's Motion to Dismiss all claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 31, ("Mot. to Dismiss"). UOP has also moved to strike specific allegations from the First Amended Compliant ("FAC"). Dkt. No. 33, ("Mot. to Strike"). Having considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Strike.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of all people who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 semester at UOP, and who lost the benefit of the education and services that they paid for as a result of UOP's response to COVID-19. FAC ¶ 1. UOP is a private university, with a total enrollment of over 6,000 students across eleven schools and colleges with campuses located in Sacramento, San Francisco, and Stockton, California. Id. ¶ 2. The university offers over 40 degrees encompassing more than 80 areas of study for undergraduate students, as well as a number of graduate and professional programs. Id. Plaintiff is an undergraduate student at UOP's San Francisco campus pursuing a bachelor's degree in business and economics. Id. ¶ 15.

UOP's Spring 2020 semester commenced on or about January 13, 2020. Id. ¶ 22. Before paying tuition and fees for the spring semester, Plaintiff consulted UOP's course catalogue where he came to understand and believe that every course he enrolled in would be taught in-person. Id. ¶ 16. The course catalogue is directed at students and provides information about the courses offered, the instructors, the days and times during which the courses would be held, and the on-campus location where the courses would be taught. Id. ¶¶ 5, 16. According to Plaintiff, UOP promotes its "on-campus experience" on its website, while other publications such as course specific syllabi and university attendance policies highlight the in-person nature of the courses that were offered for the spring semester. Id. ¶¶ 6, 30.

On March 11, 2020, UOP interim President, Maria Pallavicini, announced that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, spring break would be extended through March 20, 2020, and that effective March 23, 2020, all in-person classes would be suspended for the remainder of the Spring 2020 semester. Id. ¶ 26. UOP did not hold any in-person classes from March 23, 2020, through the end of the spring semester which concluded on or around May 6, 2020. Classes that continued after March 23, 2020 were provided in an online format, with no in-person instruction.

Plaintiff alleges that UOP and its students "entered into a contractual agreement where Plaintiff would provide payment in the form of tuition and fees and UOP, in exchange, would provide in-person educational services, experiences, opportunities, and other related services." Id. ¶ 3.

Plaintiff, it is argued, was deprived of the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique. Id. ¶ 31. According to Plaintiff, UOP did not deliver the educational services, access, or opportunities that Plaintiff and other students like him contracted and paid for. Id. ¶ 28.

The approximate cost of tuition and fees at UOP for the Spring 2020 semester was $24,794 for full-time undergraduate students, and $24,687 for full-time graduate students. Id. ¶ 24. At the beginning of the semester, Plaintiff paid approximately $15,000 in tuition and fees to UOP. Id. ¶ 15. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks individually and on behalf of the class, UOP's disgorgement of the pro-rated portion of tuition and fees, proportionate to the amount of time that remained in the Spring 2020 semester when classes moved online and UOP halted in-person services. Id. ¶ 34. UOP moves to dismiss the FAC as legally insufficient. The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is designed to "test[ ] the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block , 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When analyzing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer , 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and therefore are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. Litig. , 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Rule 8(a) governs and requires that, to avoid dismissal of a claim, Plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

B. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co. , 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). Motions to strike are generally disfavored and "should not be granted unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing on the subject of the litigation. If there is any doubt whether the portion to be stricken might bear on an issue in the litigation, the court should deny the motion." Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc. , 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "With a motion to strike, just as with a motion to dismiss, the court should view the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. "Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of the district court." Cruz v. Bank of New York Mellon , No. 12-CV-00846-LHK, 2012 WL 2838957, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2012) (citing Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co. , 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) ).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

UOP requests that the Court take judicial notice of two sets of exhibits. Dkt. No. 32, ("RJN"). UOP first asks the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits A-H attached to the declaration of Dr. Maria Pallavicini (the "Pallavicini Decl."). All exhibits are readily available on UOP's public website. RJN at 5. Exhibits A-D are UOP's course catalogs for the 2019-2020 academic year, which are referred to throughout Plaintiff's FAC. Pallavicini Decl. ¶¶ 5-8; see also FAC ¶¶ 3-5, 16, 46-48, 50. Exhibit E is a copy of the Financial Responsibility Agreement Acknowledgements ("Financial Agreement"). Pallavicini Decl. ¶ 9. Exhibits F-H are periodic communications UOP sent to students concerning the university, campus, and COVID-19. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13-14. Next, UOP asks the Court to take judicial notice of Exhibits A-J attached to the declaration of Kristina S. Azlin (the "Azlin Decl."). The exhibits include state and local orders and announcements concerning response to COVID-19.

The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART UOP's RJN. The Court does not take judicial notice of Exhibits A-J attached to the Azlin Declaration. The Court does not find these materials necessary to consider for the Court's analysis. However, the Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits A-H attached to the Pallavicini Declaration. Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lee v. City of L.A. , 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) ; Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc. , 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)....