Sarpy v. Papin

• Decision Date: 31 May 1842
• Parties: SARPY v. PAPIN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

7 Mo. 503

SARPY

v.PAPIN.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

May Term, 1842.

ERROR TO ST. CHARLES CIRCUIT COURT.

NAPTON, J.

This was an action of ejectment brought by Papin against Sarpy, to recover a tract of land in St. Louis county. The plaintiff gave in evidence a patent from the United States, dated 15th June, 1826, and a plat of survey; and proved that the defendant was in possession at the commencement of the suit. The defendant gave in evidence the proceedings of the board of commissioners on the claim of Pierre Francis Davolsey to the land in dispute, recommending the same for confirmation; and the claim was confirmed by act of Congress of 4th July, 1836. Notice of this claim was filed with the recorder of land titles on the 28th November, 1802.

Depositions were read, showing that Davolsey had cut wood and grass on the land in 1769, and several succeeding years, but had never inhabited or cultivated the same. The claim of one Brazeau, which was confirmed by act Congress of 4th July, 1836, was also read in evidence. Letters from the commissioner of the general land office, directing the register and recorder of the land district in which the land in dispute was located, to reserve from sale all land made fractional by unconfirmed private claims, were also read in evidence. These letters were dated in September, 1823, and were found on file in the records of the land office at St. Louis. On the motion of the plaintiff, Papin, the Circuit Court instructed the jury, that the patent of Papin was a better legal title than the claims of Davolsey and Brazeau, as confirmed by the act of 4th July, 1836. The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that the patent of Papin vested in him no title This instruction was refused.

No other questions are presented here, except such as arise on the instructions, and facts preserved by the record. The instruction given by the court involves a simple inquiry between the rights accruing by the act of 4th July, 1836, and those conferred by a patent for the same land in 1826. The second section of the act of 4th July, 1836, provides, “that if it shall be found that any tract or tracts confirmed as aforesaid, or any part thereof, had been previously located by any other person or persons, under any law of the United States, or had been surveyed and sold by the United States, this act shall confer no title to such lands, in opposition to the rights acquired by such location or purchase, but the individual or individuals whose claims are hereby confirmed, shall be permitted to locate so much thereof as interferes with such location or purchase, on any unappropriated land of the United States,” &c.

It is contended on behalf of the defendant, that this section only embraces such sales and locations as were made in strict conformity to law. Let us see how this construction would stand with the known intent and object of the law. The whole history of national legislation on the subject of these claims, evinces the willingness of Congress to part with the title of the United States, without looking narrowly into the merits of claims, provided they can do so without compromising the rights of third parties. This act, like others of a similar character, was clearly a gratuity, and, as such, Congress chose to prescribe the terms on which their bounty could be obtained. Liberality to claimants was not designed to work the grossest injustice to others equally meritorious. It was not intended to invest the claimants with a title by which they could immediately eject another claimant, who had the additional merit of having paid his money into the public treasury, and obtained his patent. It mattered not, whether that patent was valid or not; so far as any title was invested by the act of 1836, that patent could not be avoided. Any other construction would defeat the design of Congress. If the locator, or patentee, had an unimpeachable title, he needed no aid from Congress, and any reservation in his favor would have been useless. Moreover, it appears that ever since the year 1811, these claims have been expressly reserved from sale, except, perhaps, during one or two short intervals in 1826 and 1830. No regular and legal locations or entries, could, therefore, have been made; and yet Congress, with a full knowledge that numerous locations had been made on these claims (for the fact had been communicated by the board of commissioners), and with their own previous enactments before them, reserving these lands from sale and location, enacted the second section of the act of 1836, stipulating for the security of the locations and sales, and making ample provisions for the rights or claims...