Sas v. State of Maryland

• Decision Date: 15 January 1969
• Docket Number: 15031,14787,15189,15349,14891,14197,Civ. A. No. 14808,12556 and 15318.,13919,14792,14451
• Citation: 295 F. Supp. 389
• Parties: John SAS v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director of Patuxent Institution. Timothy Patrick O'CONNOR v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director, Patuxent Institution. George L. CRESWELL v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION. James C. SHINE v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director of Patuxent Institution and the Maryland State Legislature. Albert Delanor MUREL v. BALTIMORE CITY CRIMINAL COURT and Director of Patuxent Institution, State of Maryland. Robert N. HAYES, Jr. v. Harold M. BOSLOW, M.D., Director, Patuxent Institution. Gene David WEDDLE v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION and State of Maryland. Charles C. COFIELD v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Patuxent Institution. Charles Mason TIPPETT v. STATE OF MARYLAND, and Director of Patuxent Institution. Charles M. CRAIG, Jr. v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director of Patuxent Institution. William R. MONROE v. DIRECTOR OF the PATUXENT INSTITUTION, and State of Maryland. John E. SIMON v. STATE OF MARYLAND.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

295 F. Supp. 389

John SAS v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director of Patuxent Institution.

Timothy Patrick O'CONNOR v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director, Patuxent Institution.

George L. CRESWELL v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.

James C. SHINE v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director of Patuxent Institution and the Maryland State Legislature.

Albert Delanor MUREL v. BALTIMORE CITY CRIMINAL COURT and Director of Patuxent Institution, State of Maryland.

Robert N. HAYES, Jr. v. Harold M. BOSLOW, M.D., Director, Patuxent Institution.

Gene David WEDDLE v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION and State of Maryland.

Charles C. COFIELD v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Patuxent Institution.

Charles Mason TIPPETT v. STATE OF MARYLAND, and Director of Patuxent Institution.

Charles M. CRAIG, Jr. v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Director of Patuxent Institution.

William R. MONROE v. DIRECTOR OF the PATUXENT INSTITUTION, and State of Maryland.

John E. SIMON v. STATE OF MARYLAND.

Civ. A. Nos. 14808, 14451, 14891, 14792, 14197, 13919, 14787, 15031, 15349, 15189, 12556 and 15318.

United States District Court D. Maryland.

January 15, 1969.

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Patrick J. B. Donnelly, Baltimore, Md., Karl G. Feissner, Feissner, Kaplan, Miller & Smith, Hyattsville, Md., Alan H. Murrell, Harry E. Silverwood, Jr., Baltimore, Md., for petitioners.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Alfred J. O'Ferrall, Franklin Goldstein and Morton Sacks, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md., for the State of Maryland.

WATKINS, District Judge.

In Sas v. Maryland, 4 Cir. 1964, 334 F.2d 506, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit — although holding that the Maryland Defective Delinquents Act, Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 31B (Supp.1961) hereinafter the Act was "facially constitutional" (334 F.2d at 509); that the Court "cannot agree with petitioners' contention that the statutory definition" of a defective delinquent "upon its face is unconstitutional" (334 F.2d at 513); and that examination of "the trial and hearing provisions of the Act can leave no doubt that it places around the accused more procedural safeguards than any of the Acts of a similar nature which have been upheld by the courts including the Supreme Court against * * *" an attack based upon denial of procedural due process (334 F.2d at 515) — remanded the consolidated petitions for habeas corpus relief by five inmates committed to Patuxent Institution under the Act for liberal reconsideration of the challenges made as to the constitutionality of the Act, such reconsideration involving "a critical analysis on the broadest of terms after a careful factual development of its present operation. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963)." (334 F.2d 517).

The trial court was specifically directed to "determine whether the statute is being constitutionally applied" (334 F.2d at 509) and in so doing to consider and determine, in addition to any points which counsel might raise;

I. "Whether the statutory definition of a defective delinquent as applied by the Maryland courts is sufficiently definitive to permit its practical application within constitutional limitations;"

II. "Whether the procedures embodied in the statute are applied in such a manner as to afford due process to the accused within the confrontation requirements of the sixth amendment;"

III. "Whether the proposed sic objectives of the Act are sufficiently implemented in its actual administration to support its categorization as a civil procedure and justify the elimination of conventional criminal procedural safeguards, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963);"

IV. "Whether the interpretation and application of the statutory requirement that a defective delinquent be found to be `an actual danger to society' may within the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment include those whose conduct indicates no more than a danger to property rights as distinguished from violence to the person;"

V. "Whether Patuxent does in fact furnish treatment for treatable defective delinquents as distinguished from other lawbreakers which would support the Act under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." (334 F.2d at 509).

Perhaps implicit in the foregoing are the following questions raised, at the conclusion of the opinion:

VI. Whether the statute, though "fair on its face and impartial in appearance" is being "administered in the spirit in which it is conceived" and has not "become a mere device for warehousing the obnoxious and antisocial elements of society." (334 F.2d at 516).

VII. Whether "Deficiencies in staff, facilities, and finances" have undermined "the efficacy of the Institution and the justification for the law, and * * * the constitutionality of its application." (334 F.2d at 517).

Later, seven other habeas corpus cases by inmates of Patuxent Institution (the place of confinement designated in the Act and hereinafter "Patuxent") who had appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, were remanded by it and were by this court¹ consolidated with the original Sas cases. Other habeas corpus cases also raising questions as to the constitutionality of the Act, and its administration, were stayed by this court, pending its decision in the consolidated Sas cases.

Counsel were appointed for the twelve petitioners, and conferences were held between them and this court, and representatives of the office of the Attorney General of Maryland. It was unanimously decided that prosecution of the Consolidated Sas cases in this court should be deferred² in view of the remand by the Maryland Court of Appeals of Daniels v. Director, 1965, 238 Md. 80, 206 A.2d 726. In that case the Maryland Court of Appeals had said (238 Md. at 83-84, 206 A.2d at 728-729):

"Lastly, the applicant, claiming that the application of § 5 of Art. 31B to his intellectual and emotional status, has put him in double jeopardy and made him a victim of cruel and unusual punishment in that he is compelled to endure a life sentence for a petty property offense for which, in the first instance, he was given a sentence of not more than three years, contends that the lower court, by not affording him a plenary hearing for the purpose of inquiring whether Patuxent is fulfilling its purpose as to him, thereby denied him the right to show that he is in fact confined in a penal institution undergoing punishment rather than treatment for his alleged defective delinquency in violation of his constitutional rights. While the record before us does not indicate whether the question posed here was ever raised below, or whether a proffer was ever made as to what the applicant intended to show with respect thereto, such question, although inartfully stated, was raised in the motion for a judgment n. o. v., or in the alternative, for a new trial, and we think the lower court should have considered it.

"The application for leave to appeal will be denied as to all contentions except the last one. As to it, leave to appeal will be granted and the case remanded so that the lower court may determine whether his continued detention at Patuxent is a violation of his constitutional rights, Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).

On remand, the hearing judge, besides making provision for an adequate record of the proceedings, shall make explicit findings of fact and expressly state his conclusions of law."

In Murel v. Director, 1965, 240 Md. 258, 213 A.2d 576, the Maryland Court of Appeals elaborated on the scope of the hearing to be had in the Daniels remand. Murel had raised various constitutional questions as to Patuxent, and "a specific issue as to whether he, as one of the inmates of Patuxent, was receiving effectual treatment for his defective delinquency." (240 Md. at 260, 213 A.2d at 577). As to this point the court remanded the case "to await the final outcome of the Daniels case now pending in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County." (240 Md. at 261, 213 A.2d at 578; emphasis in original).

As to the scope of the review in Daniels, the court further said (240 Md. at 260, 213 A.2d at 577):

"The Daniels case, having been remanded to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, is still pending in that court. We are informed by the Attorney General, however, that both parties, and the circuit court, are in agreement that the mandate of this Court in the Daniels case is such as to render the scope of the facts and other matters to be considered therein on the remand as broad as those constitutional issues outlined by the United States Court of Appeals in Sas v. Maryland, supra."

The Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Digges, C. J. and Powers, J.) carefully followed the instructions contained in the remands in Daniels v. Director, 1965, 238 Md. 38, 83-84, 206 A.2d 726 and Murel v. Director, 1965, 240 Md. 258, 260, 213 A.2d 576. Eight days were devoted to the hearing³ of oral testimony, from medical and lay experts, the testimony covering more than eight hundred printed pages, with sixty-four exhibits. That court⁴ filed an extensive opinion, finding the Act valid on its face, and in its interpretation and application.⁵ Filed together with the opinion were separate Findings of Fact.

On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals, having "read the record with meticulous care and considered it at length with full deliberation" was "convinced that the conclusions reached by the trial court rest on a foundation of sound law properly applied to proven justifying facts" and adopted "the careful and thorough opinion of Judges Digges and Powers and its Appendix A `Court's Findings of Fact' and Appendix B `Trial Summary' * * * as the expression of the reasons we agree with the conclusions of the trial court, and are to be printed as part⁶ of the opinion herein of this Court * * *." Director v. Daniels, 1966, 243 Md. 16, 28, 221 A.2d...