Sassi v. Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 55,55
• Citation: 37 N.Y.3d 236,154 N.Y.S.3d 290,175 N.E.3d 1246
• Parties: Richard J. SASSI II, Appellant, v. MOBILE LIFE SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

37 N.Y.3d 236

175 N.E.3d 1246

154 N.Y.S.3d 290

Richard J. SASSI II, Appellant,

v.MOBILE LIFE SUPPORT SERVICES, INC., Respondent.

No. 55

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 12, 2021

Sussman and Associates, Goshen (Jonathan R. Goldman of counsel), for appellant.

Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, Woodbury (Matthew Cohen and Keith Gustein of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge DiFIORE.

Correction Law article 23–A and Executive Law § 296(15) protect certain individuals convicted of criminal offenses from unlawful discrimination in employment and licensing. In this appeal, the issue is whether plaintiff adequately alleged that defendant, plaintiff's former employer, violated the antidiscrimination statutes based on the denial of plaintiff's application for employment following the completion of his criminal sentence. Applying our liberal pleading standard for a pre-answer motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, we conclude that the courts below erred in concluding the complaint failed to state a cause of action. We therefore reverse the Appellate Division order and deny the motion to dismiss.

Assuming the allegations in plaintiff's verified complaint to be true as we must in this procedural context, between 2014 and 2016 plaintiff Richard J. Sassi II, a former police officer, was employed by defendant Mobile Life Support Services, Inc., an ambulance service. When plaintiff applied to work for Mobile Life in 2014, he disclosed that he "was facing a misdemeanor charge relating to allegedly calling in a false emergency to 911" as a police officer in 2012. Defendant hired plaintiff and soon promoted him to a full-time dispatcher position. In early 2016, plaintiff informed his supervisors that his "retrial"¹ on the misdemeanor charge was imminent, and he was subsequently convicted. Throughout, plaintiff kept defendant apprised of the status of his trial, his conviction, and the results of a presentence investigation report that recommended against incarceration.

In the complaint, plaintiff averred that, during the period between his conviction and sentencing, he was told by both Mobile Life's chief operating officer (COO) and its human resources director that he was a "good employee" and, in the "unlikely event he was sentenced to jail time," they would allow him to use accrued benefit time and "re-instate him upon his release." On May 18, 2016, plaintiff was "sentenced to 60 days' incarceration" and immediately remanded to custody. When his wife promptly informed defendant about the sentence, she was told that plaintiff could use accrued benefit time until he "came back" to work. Soon thereafter, however, while plaintiff was incarcerated, defendant terminated him for "job abandonment." Following his release from jail, plaintiff contacted a Mobile Life employee "who advised that he wanted plaintiff to return to work," but indicated "the supervisors were divided" on the issue. "[U]nable to regain his job" through that contact, plaintiff subsequently met with the COO and the human resources director who advised him that because Mobile Life "had previously terminated others who had been incarcerated, they had to be consistent and terminate plaintiff." Plaintiff then commenced this action contending that defendant violated Correction Law article 23–A and Executive Law § 296(15) by refusing to "re-employ" him, seeking damages and reinstatement to his former position.

Mobile Life moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under CPLR 3211(a)(7), generally asserting, among other things, that Executive Law § 296(15) and Correction Law article 23–A—which prohibit discrimination based on a previous conviction—were inapplicable because plaintiff was convicted during his employment. Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint and, on plaintiff's appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed (176 A.D.3d 886, 107 N.Y.S.3d 875 [2d Dept. 2019] ). This Court granted leave to appeal ( 34 N.Y.3d 913, 123 N.Y.S.3d 87, 145 N.E.3d 970 [2020] ).

When reviewing a pre-answer motion "to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, we must give the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations as true and accord the plaintiff[ ] every possible favorable inference" ( Chanko v. American Broadcasting Cos. Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 46, 52, 29 N.Y.S.3d 879, 49 N.E.3d 1171 [2016], citing Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 326, 746 N.Y.S.2d 858, 774 N.E.2d 1190 [2002] ). Giving plaintiff "the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be drawn from [the] pleading," this Court determines only whether the alleged facts " ‘fit within any cognizable legal theory’ " ( Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 318, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565, 655 N.E.2d 661 [1995], quoting Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ). The question is whether the complaint adequately alleged facts giving rise to a cause of action, "not whether [it] properly labeled or artfully stated one" ( Chanko, 27 N.Y.3d at 52, 29 N.Y.S.3d 879, 49 N.E.3d 1171, citing Leon, 84 N.Y.2d at 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ).

Where applicable, the Correction Law and the Human Rights Law protect individuals convicted of criminal offenses from discrimination in the context of applications for employment or licensing, subject to certain exceptions. In 1976, the legislature enacted Correction Law article 23–A and Executive Law § 296(15) in furtherance of "the ‘general purposes’ of the Penal Law," including " ‘the rehabilitation of those convicted’ and ‘the promotion of their successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society’ " ( Matter of Acosta v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 16 N.Y.3d 309, 314, 921 N.Y.S.2d 633, 946 N.E.2d 731 [2011], quoting Penal Law § 1.05[6] ; see Matter of Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605, 528 N.Y.S.2d 519, 523 N.E.2d 806 [1988] ). Correction Law § 751 broadly states that article 23–A applies to "any application by any person for a license or employment at any public or private employer, who has previously been convicted of one or more criminal offenses in this state or in any other jurisdiction." Correction Law § 752 contains similar language, stating that "[n]o application for any license or employment, and no employment or license held by an individual, to which the provisions of this article are applicable, shall be denied or acted upon adversely by reason of the individual's having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses." Executive Law § 296(15), the Human Rights Law, incorporates article 23–A, making it "an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person ... to deny any license or employment to any individual by reason of [that individual] having been convicted of one or more criminal offenses ... when such denial is in violation of [Correction Law article 23–A]."

The statutes do not categorically preclude consideration of a prospective employee's criminal history and expressly permit the denial of employment or licensing if there is (1) a "direct relationship" between the previous criminal offense and the specific employment or license, or (2) if granting the request for employment or a license "would involve an unreasonable risk" to the property, safety, or welfare "of specific individuals or the general public" ( Correction Law § 752 ). Thus, under the statutory scheme, reliance on a previous criminal offense when denying an application for employment or a license is not necessarily unlawful (see e.g. Bonacorsa, 71 N.Y.2d at 614–615, 528 N.Y.S.2d 519, 523 N.E.2d 806 ). Whether an exception applies depends on factors identified in Correction Law § 753 such as, among other things, the relationship between the specific employment duties and the criminal offense as well as the amount of time that has elapsed since the offense occurred ( Correction Law § 753[1][b], [c], [d] ).² Under these provisions, when filling positions, public and private employers must treat job applicants with prior convictions equitably "while also protecting society's interest in assuring performance [of job duties] by reliable and trustworthy persons" ( Bonacorsa, 71 N.Y.2d at 611, 528 N.Y.S.2d 519, 523 N.E.2d 806 ).

On this appeal, based on the arguments preserved by the parties, the only question before us is whether plaintiff adequately alleged a violation of the antidiscrimination statutes. While the legislative history suggests that the legislature may not have considered this specific scenario—a request for reemployment with a pre-incarceration employer—we conclude that the factual allegations are sufficient to survive defendant's pre-answer motion to dismiss. Nothing in the statutory language, scheme, or legislative history indicates that the legislature intended for article 23–A or Executive Law § 296(15) to exempt a previous employer from the reach of those statutes. Instead, the statutes broadly refer to "any application by any person for ... employment at any public or private employer, who has previously been convicted of one or more criminal offenses" ( Correction Law § 751 ). Thus, this case does not fall outside the scope of the antidiscrimination statutes merely because plaintiff previously worked for Mobile Life.

Moreover, we...