Sasso v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Citation | 43 N.E.3d 668 |
| Decision Date | 11 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 54A05–1411–PL–527.,54A05–1411–PL–527. |
| Parties | Sheila SASSO and Mary Sasso, Appellants–Defendants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
James E. Ayers, Wernle, Ristine & Ayers, Crawfordsville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
W. Brent Threlkeld, Kelly A. Roth, Threlkeld & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
[1] Sheila Sasso appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) on State Farm's complaint for declaratory judgment. Sheila presents several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:
[2] We affirm.4
[3] In October of 2010, Sheila, an Illinois resident, called her mother, Mary,5 to determine whether she would be interested in visiting the Parke County, Indiana, covered bridge festival. Sheila hoped to “meet vendors” for her online business, which was “similar to e[B]ay” but “not [an] auction.” Appellant's App. at 126. Mary, a resident of Crawfordsville, Indiana, agreed.
[4] Sheila met up with Mary on October 14, and, the next day, Mary drove Sheila in Mary's car to the festival. Sheila paid Mary $50 for gas and bought Mary lunch. Later, while Mary was driving to another location at the festival, her vehicle was involved in an accident, and Sheila was severely injured. Mary has an automobile insurance policy with State Farm.
[5] On October 15, 2012, Sheila filed a negligence claim against Mary. Thereafter, State Farm, under a different cause number, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Sheila and Mary. On August 4, 2014, State Farm moved for summary judgment on its complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment in favor of State Farm. This appeal ensued.
[6] Our standard of review for summary judgment appeals is well established. As our supreme court has stated:
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.2014) (alterations original to Hughley ).
[7] Summary judgment is a “high bar” for the moving party to clear in Indiana. Id. at 1004. “In particular, while federal practice permits the moving party to merely show that the party carrying the burden of proof [at trial] lacks evidence on a necessary element, we impose a more onerous burden: to affirmatively ‘negate an opponent's claim.’ ” Id. at 1003 (quoting Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994) ). Further:
Summary judgment is a desirable tool to allow the trial court to dispose of cases where only legal issues exist. But it is also a “blunt ... instrument” by which the non-prevailing party is prevented from having his day in court. We have therefore cautioned that summary judgment is not a summary trial and the Court of Appeals has often rightly observed that it is not appropriate merely because the non-movant appears unlikely to prevail at trial. In essence, Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.
Id. at 1003–04 (). Thus, for the trial court to grant summary judgment, the movant must have made a prima facie showing that its designated evidence negated an element of the nonmovant's claims, and, in response, the nonmovant must have failed to designate evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind.2009).
[8] We first address whether Sheila's negligence claim against Mary is prohibited by Indiana's Guest Statute, Indiana Code Section 34–30–11–1. That statute provides as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
[9] According to Sheila, the Guest Statute does not prohibit her claim against Mary because the purview of the Guest Statute.6 Appellant's Br. at 5. That is, Sheila asserts that she is not within the scope of the Guest Statute because she was not “transported without payment.” See I.C. § 34–30–11–1.
[10] Sheila is mistaken. This provision of the Guest Statute has long been interpreted to require that the motor-vehicle operator be “directly compensated ... in a substantial and material or business sense[,] as distinguished from [a] mere social benefit or nominal or incidental contribution to expenses[ ] of the trip.” Allison v. Ely, 241 Ind. 248, 254, 170 N.E.2d 371, 374 (1960). As this court has added, “[t]o exclude from the Guest Statute cases of this nature where groups of friends or relatives make arrangements or travel together, consideration must be given by the guest in excess of expenses incidental to the trip.” Knuckles v. Elliott, 141 Ind.App. 232, 239, 227 N.E.2d 179, 183 (1967). In Allison, our supreme court held that, as a matter of law, “[t]he purchase of a few gallons of gasoline ... d[oes] not constitute ‘payment’ ” under the Guest Statute. 170 N.E.2d at 377. And, in Knuckles, we held—again, as a matter of law—that paying “for some of the gasoline on the trip and ... for food” also does not constitute a payment under the Guest Statute. 227 N.E.2d at 180.
[11] Sheila's argument on appeal is contrary to our long-standing interpretation of this statutory language. And while the Guest Statute has been amended since Allison and Knuckles, the provision that there is no liability when the guest is “transported without payment” has remained intact. See Allison, 170 N.E.2d at 373 (). Accordingly, as a matter of law Sheila's contribution of gas and food is equivalent to being “transported without payment,” and Mary is not liable to Sheila.
[12] Sheila also asserts that the Guest Statute violates the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Specifically, Sheila asserts that the Guest Statute violates her federal right to equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV ; her state right to open courts, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12 ; and her state right to equal privileges and immunities, Ind. Const. art. 1, § 23. We address each argument in turn. We then consider other, more general arguments Sheila raises on appeal.
[13] We first consider Sheila's federal argument. Despite misgivings about the validity of the prior version of Indiana's Guest Statute under the Equal Protection Clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained:
Nevertheless a recent [U.S.] Supreme Court decision requires us to reach a contrary result. In Cannon v. Oviatt ... the Supreme Court of Utah rejected an equal protection challenge to a guest statute virtually identical to Indiana's. The appeal to the United States Supreme Court presented the question whether the guest statute violated the equal protection clause because it barred recovery for ordinary negligence. See 43 L.W. 3103. The Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question.[ [[7 ] Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810, 95 S.Ct. 24, 42 L.Ed.2d 37 [ (1974) ]. Although that ruling is not a plenary consideration of this significant current topic in tort law, it is an adjudication on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344–345, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289–90, 45 L.Ed.2d...
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