Saterfield v. Smith
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-00560-GCS |
| Parties | LLYOD SATERFIELD, K53497 Plaintiff, v. ROBERT SMITH, and MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
In March 2018, Plaintiff Llyod Saterfield filed suit against Defendants Dr. Robert Smith and Dr. Ritz, the latter of whom has since been dismissed. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his chronic lower back pain and related medical issues during Plaintiff's incarceration at Menard Correctional Center. (Doc. 1, ¶ 45). On January 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Defendant Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui. (Doc. 72). Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 149). For the reasons delineated below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In 2013, Plaintiff began complaining of lower back pain while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. (Doc. 153, p. 3). On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff underwent a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan ("MRI"), which revealed a moderate bilateral spinal stenosis at level L4-L5. Id. At that time, treating physicians prescribed Plaintiff Ibuprofen. (Doc. 153, p. 4). However, in 2017, Plaintiff was hospitalized with acute kidney failure, which was attributed to his intake of Ibuprofen. Id. On September 5, 2017, Defendant Siddiqui prescribed Plaintiff Tramadol for his continued back pain. Id. On September 8, 2017, Defendant Siddiqui submitted a referral request for an MRI of Plaintiff's spine. Id. Dismissed-party, Dr. Ritz, requested that Plaintiff's x-rays be updated and that the 2014 MRI report be presented before the referral request of the MRI was approved. Id. Defendant Siddiqui then ordered a subsequent x-ray of Plaintiff's spine, which was performed on October 26, 2017. (Doc. 153, p. 5).
In early November 2017, Defendant Siddiqui submitted another referral request for an MRI on Plaintiff's spine. (Doc. 153, p. 5). Defendant Smith reviewed Plaintiff's condition and determined that he needed more information, including an updated x-ray report and the 2014 MRI. Id. On November 27, 2017, Plaintiff discussed the x-rays with Defendant Siddiqui, who noted Plaintiff's chronic lower back pain. Id. Defendant Siddiqui renewed Plaintiff's prescription for Tramadol and referred Plaintiff to physical therapy. Id.
On December 8, 2017, Plaintiff again met with Defendant Siddiqui regarding his condition. (Doc. 153, p. 5). Defendant Siddiqui entered a request for the 2014 MRI report due to Defendant Smith's previous request for collegial review. Id. He also noted that Plaintiff's pain was being controlled by Tramadol and put in a renewed referral for a physical therapy evaluation. Id.
On January 18, 2018, Plaintiff underwent his physical therapy evaluation. (Doc. 154, p. 5).1 Plaintiff reported that Tramadol controlled his pain, but experienced higher levels of pain without the medication. Id. After the evaluation, Plaintiff was scheduled for several weeks of physical therapy appointments. Id. On February 16, 2018, Defendant Siddiqui again saw Plaintiff regarding his condition. Id. Defendant Siddiqui noted that there had been no response to physical therapy. Id. He therefore initiated a referral request for an MRI. Id.
On February 22, 2018, after review of the x-rays and previous MRI report, Defendant Smith did not approve of the referral "at this time." (Doc. 153, p. 6). Defendant Smith instead recommended Plaintiff be prescribed Elavil, a nerve pain medication; he further recommended that Plaintiff continue with conservative on-site management. Id.; (Doc. 154, p. 15-16). Despite Defendant Smith's recommendation, Defendant Siddiqui did not prescribe or administer Elavil to Plaintiff in 2018. (Doc. 154, p. 10).
Throughout April, May and June of 2018, Plaintiff experienced continued back pain and indicated that Tramadol was no longer controlling his pain. (Doc. 153, p. 6-7). On June 18, 2018, Defendant Siddiqui submitted a referral for an MRI, indicating that other medications had not been successful and that Plaintiff continued to complain ofpain. (Doc. 153, p. 7). On June 22, 2018, the proper personnel approved Defendant Siddiqui's request for a new MRI. Id.
On July 31, 2018, Defendant Siddiqui determined that Plaintiff's spinal stenosis was slightly worse than in 2014 and that Plaintiff should undergo an orthopedic consultation. (Doc. 153, p. 7). On August 2, 2018, Defendant Siddiqui and Dr. Ritz discussed that recommendation. Id. Dr. Ritz then approved the request for an orthopedic surgeon evaluation. (Doc. 153, p. 7-8).
On October 3, 2018, after Plaintiff received an orthopedic evaluation by an offsite specialist, Defendant Siddiqui submitted a referral request for Plaintiff to undergo an L4-5 laminectomy, which was approved. (Doc. 153, p. 8). Plaintiff underwent laminectomy on November 19, 2018. Id. On January 14, 2019, Plaintiff indicated that he was very pleased with the surgical results and that he had no radicular symptoms. (Doc. 153, p. 9). Plaintiff informed the provider that his symptoms were relieved by either brace or splint, and by rest at both follow-up appointments. Id.
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings and affidavits, if any, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c); Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997)(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). This Court must consider theentire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving factual disputes in favor of the non-movant. See Regensburger, 138 F.3d at 1205 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). See also Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009)( that "we are not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record . . . we draw only reasonable inferences") (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also appropriate if a plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. While the Court may not "weigh evidence or engage in fact-finding[,]" it must determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2007).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial. See Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 670-671 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 276 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). No issue remains for trial "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250 (citations omitted). Accord Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 880 (7th Cir. 1996); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1994). In other words, "inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice." Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (). Instead, the non-moving party must present "definite, competent evidence to rebut the [summary judgment] motion." EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
A prisoner seeking to establish that the medical care he received in prison was so insufficient as to violate the Eighth Amendment must prove that: (1) he had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) the defendant prison official was deliberately indifferent to that need. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011). A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has determined that treatment is mandated, or if it is "so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584-585 (7th Cir. 2006)(citing Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997)), overruled on other grounds in Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013). In order to find that a defendant was deliberately indifferent, there must be a condition that required treatment, knowledge on the part of the health care provider of an excessive risk to health or safety, and a decision to disregard that risk. See Sellers v. Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994)(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). Deliberate indifference exists only where an official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838.
When a plaintiff asserts a claim of deliberate indifference on the basis of a defendant physician's care, that plaintiff must show the decision is "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate the person responsible did not base the decision on such judgment." Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011). This standard exceeds mere...
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